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ABSTRACT 
 
Suicide contagion is a real phenomenon. The stigmatization of suicide attempters, 
completers, survivors of suicide loss, and the idea of suicide itself is at least partly to 
blame for these outbreaks. Regarding suicide as an analyst, journalist, witness, responder, 
or bereaved family member or friend can be a devastating form of metaphorical and 
literal looking. Through a psychoanalytic understanding of constitutive rhetoric, this 
dissertation offers a textualized way of considering the difficult process of giving 
individuals who have completed suicide one’s regard. Beyond just suicide, this rhetoric 
of regard presents the disconstituent as the lost persona that withdraws from identification 
practices. In so doing, this work offers a methodology which articulates the painting 
technique known as the “vanishing point” through the Lacanian subject positions of the 
Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. This dissertation argues that identification can be 
understood as a demand for a false confession of a subject that does not really exist 
through Kenneth Burke’s notion of “the negative” and “self-abnegation.” The 
disconstituent is the persona lost to and by the subjective practices of identification. 
Disconstitutive rhetoric is the false confession and interrogation that creates the state of 
disconstituency which resides within the regarded disconstituent. This dissertation 
concludes by arguing for an ambivalent regard which mirrors the disconstituent 
withdrawal while still allowing for the one regarding to feel for the regarded. 
Key words: Constitutive Rhetoric, Kenneth Burke, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, 
Studium and Punctum, Regard, Suicide, Suicidology, Vanishing Point, Identification, the 
Subject
 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
I was eleven years old when my brother, William Kryn Blaisdell Womesldorf, 
completed suicide. It is one thing to perceive that something is empty. It is another to 
perceive that something is missing a part of what it seems to be and thus to perceive 
emptiness. Kryn’s suicide occurred on December 21st, 1988, which was both the last day 
of classes before Christmas Break at my school in Thibodeaux, Louisiana and the day my 
mother and I planned to move to Lake Charles, Louisiana to reunite with my father. My 
father had been an Episcopal priest for all eleven years of my life in Thibodeaux, but had 
recently transformed into an Episcopal priest in Lake Charles. My sister remained in 
Thibodeaux for the remainder of her senior year. 
Kryn had been in college for a couple of years. He initially attended school at 
Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana and transferred to Louisiana State 
University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It was in Baton Rouge that he killed himself.  
Here are some things I can tell you about Kryn with some confidence: he liked playing 
basketball and was a punter/kicker in football, he drove a blue Chevrolet that he called 
“Blue Thunder” based on the 1980’s TV series, he was nine years older than me, he was 
the one who ran while carrying me home after I injured my wrist, he used to trick me into 
going to the bottom of sleeping bags where I would be trapped and swung in a circle, and 
he checked into a hospital in Baton Rouge due to severe depression.  
The realities of time and trauma have rendered a great deal of my memories of 
Kryn, and the aftermath of his suicide, distant if not entirely lost. The shock of a suicide 
completed by someone you love is extraordinarily destructive to everything that you 
believe about yourself and the world. One of the memories that sticks with me, though 
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even it has begun to fade, is the memory of sitting on a bench at my brother’s wake 
across from the room where his body filled a casket with his suicide. My parents asked if 
I would like to go see Kryn. I declined. I was sitting with my two closest friends, Nikki 
and John. No one questioned this choice to not go see Kryn one last time. My friends 
simply expressed dismay at the fact that I was not crying. I remember saying, “I’m all 
cried out.” Over the years, this has proven to not be the case, but I am still good at 
wearing that mask. The truth is I could no longer bear the weight of mourning Kryn’s 
death. When my parents asked me if I wanted to go see Kryn, the journey was too much 
for me. I could not bear seeing my brother, whom I still desperately love, because I knew 
that I would see his suicide. At this darkest moment in my life, I was not prepared to give 
him my regards. My mourning is still incomplete, and I believe it always will be. 
Regarding “Regarding” 
This dissertation is not about clinical depression. It is not even precisely about 
suicide; rather, this dissertation is about regarding suicide. I choose the term “regarding” 
in the spirit of Susan Sontag’s (2003) Regarding the Pain of Others. While she never 
explicitly defines this central term, it seems to mean a type of looking that is studied and 
respectful, a type of looking that approaches an other with a personal history of looking 
and feeling, a type of looking that enters the scene with the honesty of being an I/eye, and 
a type of looking that happens in public spaces which risks the possibility of this looking 
being regarded itself. Sontag makes it clear that “One should feel obliged to think about 
what it means to look” (p. 95). As she argues, “photographs are a means of making ‘real’ 
(or ‘more real’) matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore” (p. 
7). Here, Sontag points to the idea that sometimes a photograph happens to the viewer in 
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such a way that demands the viewer’s regard. In this way, the spectating I wagers its self 
in the scene that is regarded, taken and re-presented for regarding, which becomes a site 
of interactive remembering where the I mingles on some seemingly deeper level with its 
other. It is precisely to “give one’s regard” as a witness who has agreed to not take 
looking for granted. Of course, this type of looking is difficult in any situation and 
particularly so with regard to images of suffering. We, in fact, often find ourselves 
renegotiating the terms of our agreement. Sontag observes that there is “shame […] in 
looking at the close-up of a real horror” (p. 42). We look as if we are looking intently 
while we begin looking away.  
Sontag’s sense of “regard” is somewhat different from Robert Hariman’s (1986) 
usage in “Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory.” In his consideration of “status” 
and its corresponding placements of “centrality” and  “marginality,” he offers “regard” as 
an important position within the “complex” of “doxa” (p. 48). Within Hariman’s “doxa 
complex” as a “correspondence with episteme [italics Hariman’s],” “regard” shares the 
same airs as “ranking” and “concealment” in order to formulate a way of thinking about 
rhetoric that is no longer caught up in the throes of “rehabilitation” from Platonic 
subordination in the search for truth (pp. 48-51). Thus, Hariman’s sense of “regard” is a 
matter of “reputation” and “expectation,” “the regard in which one is held” that is “both a 
description of one’s being and one’s worth” (pp. 48-49). As he succinctly puts it, “One is 
what one is said to be” (p. 49). Hariman’s “regard” is not precisely “regarding.” Regard, 
here, is an end even if it is never fully settled. Instead, it is the “product of ranking,” but 
he also notes the importance of “concealment” as a way of managing this production (p. 
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49). Like status, one generally attempts to achieve a higher regard within social 
hierarchies which entails discretion.  
For Sontag, one attempts to give one’s regard to something that has, at least in 
part, been revealed. For Hariman, one attempts to earn another’s regard, at least in part, 
through the act of concealment. On closer examination, though, it is a similar, if not the 
exact same, regard that is being considered. Hariman’s presenting subject is seeking the 
regard that Sontag’s viewing subject wants to give. Both are contingent on partial 
revelation. Indeed, both are geared towards a kind of doomed knowingness and known-
ness. As Hariman (1986) suggests, “No one is known in one’s entirety” and “one’s exact 
identity” could “only” be known “as a complex of particulars” (p. 49). In other words, for 
Hariman, a fixed regard is impossible due to an inherent concealment on the part of the 
regarded subject and must be either actively maintained or removed. Hariman argues that 
“regard is in part achieved by the concealment of rank,” and that the resulting 
reconsidered rhetorical concept of “doxa” might be understood “as the mask of meaning” 
that functionally “activates all the anxieties of displacement” (pp. 49-50). In Hariman’s 
argument, it is difficult to discern whether he is claiming that this “doxa mask” is 
transforming meaning, hiding meaning, or using the idea of meaning as the mask itself. 
Perhaps it is an articulation of all three within his complex of rank, concealment, and 
regard respectively. 
If one correlates the idea of “regard” with the idea of using meaning as the mask, 
“concealment” becomes something a little different. What does “meaning” mask? An 
important difference between Sontag and Hariman, at this juncture, is that Sontag is 
discussing “regarding” in the context of looking at pictures of others’ suffering. 
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Similarly, the two discussions are about the others’ effect upon one’s regard, but Sontag’s 
“other” is a human being that is regarded in a picture, and Hariman’s “other” is another 
human being who does the regarding as a part of an exterior society. Nonetheless, 
Sontag’s regarded other seems to also push back. The important difference is that while 
Hariman’s “other” can just as easily be understood as an active we within the social 
maneuvering of constitutive being, Sontag’s “other” can no longer actively participate. 
Thus, it is the constitutive position of we who are caught in “all the anxieties of 
displacement.” These anxieties of a we may very well be what meaning masks. As Sontag 
(2003) puts it, “No ‘we’ should be taken for granted when the subject is looking at other 
people’s pain” (p. 7).  
Hariman (1986) argues that “status” is a matter of being either “central” or 
“marginal” and that “we empower discourses by imposing social order upon the world 
that relegates words, writers, and speakers to zones of centrality or marginality” (pp. 38-
39). Again, his article is addressing a feeling of marginalization within rhetorical theory, 
and he concludes that rhetorical theorists need not “resist marginality” nor “endorse 
authority” because of the constitutive power of being the “other” (pp. 50-51). In other 
words, we can be the constitutive margins of the ontological project without endorsing 
any particular center. But, what happens when we find ourselves both at the center and no 
longer being regarded ourselves? What happens, for instance, when our other whom we 
are regarding completes suicide? This is along the lines of the decentralizing force that 
Sontag is after with her sense of “regard.” She is attempting to capture the moment when 
our regard of another’s suffering undoes us. This is the type of “regarding” that this 
dissertation is considering—regarding that undoes a constituency of us. Sontag (2003) 
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notes, “It is felt that there is something morally wrong with the abstract reality offered by 
photography; that one has no right to experience the suffering of others at a distance […] 
the standing back from the aggressiveness of the world which frees us for observation” 
(p. 118). She concludes, “There is nothing wrong with standing back and thinking” (p. 
118). I tend to agree. 
I don’t exactly remember the situation, but I remember telling my mother that I 
had done some reading with regard to depression and that I had concluded that, “Kryn 
will be okay.” It’s a strange memory because I see it in the Lake Charles kitchen. This 
isn’t impossible because we obviously visited my father while he was living there 
without us. Yet, it feels out of time like the certainty of a gasp. It’s a different sort of 
looking while looking away, one of those memories that are like a parent slowly backing 
away in the pool to teach the child to swim. It’s almost terrifying. It’s also the first time I 
specifically remember lying about knowing. I was masking something inside of me with 
meaning. I cannot say whether this mask was successful or not at the time, nor can I say 
whether the mask was for my mother or for me, but I can say that I was very likely 
wrong. Kryn would not be okay. 
You can imagine the scene of the littler me learning of his older brother’s suicide. 
I had just arrived at my completely empty home from my last day ever at my school in 
Thibodeaux excited about Santa Clause and new adventures in Lake Charles only to 
discover the solemn faces of family friends, my mother, and my sister. We went back to 
my parents’ empty bedroom and exploded into the very meaning of gut-wrenching sobs. 
Shortly thereafter, I ran to a friend’s house and attempted to play until my friend’s mother 
came upstairs into the room with a knowing look and gave me her regards. These regards 
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were not comforting. They confirmed for me that I was radically no longer the same 
person that I had believed myself to be for so long. In this way, my friend’s mother’s 
regard was not empty, but the moment was rapidly emptying out. The most terrifying 
thing about cemeteries is the complete lack of ghosts. When your brother hangs himself 
with the cord from the blinds in his hospital room, that emptiness is simultaneously 
terrifying and reassuring.  
 This emptiness is that to which this writer is also attempting to give his regard 
through this dissertation. This emptiness is also what makes Kenneth Burke’s opening of 
A Rhetoric of Motives (1969b) so fascinating for this reading writer. Burke opens a 
treatise on the way in which people validate one another’s connectivity through processes 
of identification with the example of Milton’s depiction of Samson’s suicide. This 
moment is more than a professor sitting on a desk being clever for the adoring students 
and asking, “But, why suicide?” For me as a reader, it’s Robin Williams, the actor and 
comedian who will later commit suicide in “real life,” tearing out the introduction of a 
book on how to correctly read in an effort to avoid a student’s future suicide in a script—
a student that wanted to be someone other than who his father regarded him to be. It is 
beginning as failure. 
 This dissertation is decidedly not guided by the question of what it means to 
regard suicide as beginning as failure. I do not argue that suicide is necessarily a failure. 
Instead, there are two research questions at work in this dissertation. First, what does it 
mean to regard suicide from the standpoint of beginning as failure? And, second, what 
might a method for grappling with the implications of this failed regard look like? To 
answer these questions, it is necessary to visit the foundational rhetorical theory of 
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“constitutive rhetoric” in order to best position both my meaning of “beginning as 
failure” and this dissertation’s contribution to the field of rhetoric. Specifically, 
constitutive rhetoric offers an opening into understanding who regards whom from the 
standpoint of beginning as failure. 
Constitutive Rhetoric 
 Beyond Burke as a general background, the initial foundation of constitutive 
rhetoric in the field of rhetorical theory can be located in the works of Edwin Black 
(1970), Michael Calvin McGee (1975), and Maurice Charland (1987), with significant 
contributions from Raymie McKerrow (1989), Charles E. Morris III (2002), and Philip 
Wander (1984).  The theory of “constitutive rhetoric,” itself, is first coined by Charland 
in his article, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois” (1987). In it, he 
builds upon Black’s (1970) concept of the “second persona” as a rhetorical 
transformation of audiences and McGee’s (1975) “rhetorical alternative” of “the people.” 
Black (1970) is concerned with the productive power of a perspective that is rhetorically 
projected onto a potential audience that may become real as a result of this projection. As 
he concludes the article, “the critic may, with legitimate confidence, move from the 
manifest evidence of style to the human personality that this evidence projects as a 
beckoning archetype” (p. 119). Like the second person grammatical position of you, 
Black is suggesting that a rhetor may lure an audience into becoming a particular you that 
is constructed through the rhetorical practices of an I. His I is the “author” that “a 
discourse implies” through ideological “tokens” that may be read as “external signs of 
internal states” (p. 110). Black acknowledges that this rhetorical first persona that he 
generally labels as an “author” is “not necessarily a person”—what he suggests is “the 
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distinction between the man and the image, between reality and illusion” (p. 111). 
However, his overall point in his treatment of the “Radical Right’s” rhetorical usage of 
the metaphor, “the cancer of communism,” is that the rhetorical construction of a second 
persona, an “implied auditor,” can very well become an “actual auditor” with ideological 
consequences (p. 113). As Black posits, “The quest for identity is the modern pilgrimage. 
And we look to one another for hints as to whom we should become” (p. 113). His point 
is that an audience desires the lure because the audience wants to emerge as identified. 
 Where Black leaves rhetorical theory with an abstract audience that might be or 
might become, McGee (1975) offers an audience in the form of “the people” who “are 
both real and a fiction” in that they are real individuals collectively transformed into the 
identity of “the people” through rhetorical processes (p. 240). For McGee, “process” is 
important here. He argues that “the people” are “conjured into objective reality, remain 
so long as the rhetoric which defined them has force, and in the end wilt away, becoming 
once again merely a collection of individuals” (p. 242). Within an overall context of 
Marxist “false consciousness” logic, McGee observes that the “political myths” which 
rhetorically constitute a “people” out of a collection of individuals “are nonetheless 
functionally ‘real’ and important,” because these political myths articulate “a ‘people’ 
who can legislate reality with their collective belief” (p. 248). Importantly, he uses the 
example of the Marxist consideration of class struggle in England to suggest that the 
“class struggle” was not “made” by the “working conditions,” but by “human responses 
to working conditions” (p. 248). He defines these “human responses” as a rhetorically 
constitutive “filter for ‘facts’ which translates them into beliefs” (p. 248). Thus, through 
this functionally ideological and legislating people, McGee argues that rhetoric is a 
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powerful tool that makes real conditions for living out of its redefinition of material 
reality within a complex of the competing myths and realities of collective living (pp. 
246-249). In other words, rather than depending on the material of materialist philosophy, 
rhetoric informs and shapes it. As he concludes, “Pursuing a rhetorical alternative in 
defining ‘the people’ leads one to the importance of recognizing the collective life as a 
condition of being the ‘audience’ of those who pretend to lead the society” (p. 249). 
Where Black implicatively articulates the power of the leader, McGee implicatively 
responds with the power of the audience by bringing you and I together in the form of us 
that “becomes historically material and of consequence as persons live it” (Charland, 
1987, p. 137). 
 Following in this tradition of the “Ideological Turn” as observed by Wander 
(1984), Charland (1987) introduces the specific term, “constitutive rhetoric,” by 
combining Burke’s concept of “identification” with Louis Althusser’s concept of 
“interpellation” (pp. 133-134). Through Burke’s “identification,” Charland posits the 
possibility of examining rhetoric’s effect upon “the subject” as Althusser linguistically 
and ideologically describes it, which is “precisely he or she who simultaneously speaks 
and initiates action in discourse (a subject to a verb) and in the world (a speaker and 
social agent)” (p. 133). In short, being a subject is a structural condition of being in the 
world. Charland explains, “the process of inscribing subjects,” “interpellation,” as 
occurring “at the very moment one enters into a rhetorical situation, that is, as soon as an 
individual recognizes and acknowledges being addressed” which “entails an acceptance 
of an imputed self-understanding,” and he notes that “this rhetoric of identification is 
ongoing” as “part of a rhetoric of socialization” (p. 138). In other words, the individual as 
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a “subject” internalizes the ideological construct of “the people” over time by way of a 
constitutive rhetoric that addresses the subject as a structural position within the narrative 
of “the people.” “The people” and the individual subject are constitutively called into 
being, thus becoming real. Like McGee and Black, Charland is not attempting to create 
some monolithic ideal. Rather, he is offering multiple subjective positions within a 
constitutive rhetoric of lived consequence. In particular, he is offering a “collective 
subject […] who experiences, suffers, and acts” (p. 139). But, one’s individual subject 
position is never fixed even as one is “always already” a subject, because there are 
multiple roles within the narrative (pp. 140-141). Still, Charland furthers the 
materialization of a “people” through the subjectifying practice of constitutive rhetoric.  
As Charland (1997) observes, entering into a “rhetorical narrative is to identify 
with Black’s second persona. It is the process of recognizing oneself as the subject in a 
text” (p. 143). But there is also the possibility of recognizing oneself as the uninvited and 
intentionally excluded subject of a text. Namely, there are also they who constitute us 
through antithetical rhetoric. Wander (1984) explains this “third persona” as the 
“audiences not present, audiences rejected or negated through the speech and/or speaking 
situation”—an audience that is spoken to, about, or implied by means of intentional 
exclusion and not allowed to speak (pp. 369-370). In Burkean terms, the third persona is 
the unifying scapegoat of division, antithetical rhetoric, that is frequently used in 
processes of identification (Goehring & Dionisopoulos, 2013, pp. 370-371). But Wander 
(1984) opens the floor for specifically speaking out of turn and perhaps even acting out 
of turn (p. 370). Wander (2011) argues that “the ideological turn in criticism pivoted on 
America’s concerted efforts to expand its sphere of influence” (p. 421). In other words, it 
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should never be forgotten that constitutive rhetoric is also always already a matter of 
power arrangements, and we do participate in its often problematically enforced 
expansion. As McGee suggests when he notes the importance of being the audience, “the 
people” as the subjects of ideological interpellation operate as the validating constituent 
body for those who wield power. But, this ideological reality creates opportunities for 
resistance. Wander (2011) calls into being his own second persona, his readership, 
through a direct address to “you” in his articulation of a critical “way of life” beyond a 
“way of doing scholarship and/or criticism” (p. 427). The reader must resist. 
Resistance is a key component of the ideologically driven iterations of 
constitutive rhetoric and its varying personae. It is present from the very beginning. Black 
(1970) is pushing back against the Radical Right with his notable derision of their 
corrosive metaphor, “the cancer of communism.” McGee (1975) offers the rhetorical 
importance of an awakened people who can act as dialogic companions to Marxism and 
its philosophical bent towards the revolutionary materialist dialectic of power and 
production (p. 249). Charland (1987) posits symbolic “tensions” that “render possible the 
rhetorical repositioning or rearticulation of subjects” (p. 147). Next is Raymie 
McKerrow. McKerrow (1989), through his concept of “critical rhetoric,” hails into action 
his own tempered take on Wander’s reader-as-ideological-subject that must resist by 
rearticulating the rhetorical critic as “more than an observer” within the ideological 
terrain (p. 101). As a practice, he argues, “a critical rhetoric seeks to unmask or demystify 
the discourse of power” (p. 91). His correlation between the subject and power is a matter 
of domination in which a subject is specifically subjected within a “dialectic of control” 
(p. 94). Particularly, McKerrow argues that the subject is positioned through hegemonic 
 13 
struggles that are reflective of both the “dominant and dominated” (p. 94). Based in part 
on his understanding of Michel Foucault, McKerrow argues for an “analysis of the 
discourse of power” in which “any articulatory practice may emerge as relevant or 
consequential” where “nothing can be ‘taken-for-granted’” or privileged “with respect to 
the options its analysis raises for consideration” (pp. 96-97). He breaks his “praxis” for 
critical rhetoric down into eight principles. Of particular interest to constitutive rhetoric, 
his fourth principle, “Naming is the central symbolic act of a nominalist rhetoric [italics 
McKerrow’s],” is specifically “directed against the universalizing tendencies,” which 
reaffirms his commitment to resistance within a “social reality in which humans are both 
subject and subjected” (p. 105). 
Finally, Morris (2002) presents a more subtle form of resistance with his addition 
of the “fourth persona.” He defines this persona as an “invisible audience” who is 
“collusive” with the act of “passing” and is “constituted by the textual wink” (pp. 229-
230). Morris does a wonderful job of positioning himself within the other two rhetorical 
personae. He acknowledges Black’s second persona as the fourth’s “counterpart” by way 
of the “implied auditor of a particular ideological bent” who  “acknowledges the rationale 
for the closet” as an understanding of “the dangers of homophobia” and intuitively 
“renders a pass transparent” (p. 230). Beyond Black’s “closet speech” (1970, p. 112), 
however, Morris (2002) distinguishes the fourth persona as necessarily implying “two 
ideological positions simultaneously, one that mirrors the dupes and another that implies, 
via the wink, an ideology of difference” (p. 230). This distinction somewhat ironically 
ties the fourth persona with the resistance of McKerrow’s fourth principle of “nominalist 
rhetoric” in that it promotes difference above the demand for sameness, but without 
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interpretively naming the point of constitution for the sake of maintaining the pass. 
Similarly, what distinguishes the fourth persona from the third persona ties the two 
together: silence. As Morris notes, where silence “negates and excludes” as a constitutive 
measure of normative power with regard to the third persona, “silence functions 
constructively as the medium of collusive exchange” within the structure of the fourth 
persona (p. 230). 
 While resistance does appear to be quite central to constitutive rhetoric theory, 
Kenneth Chase (2009) astutely observes that these moralizing positions of challenging 
the various dominant regimes “tend to be presumed rather than explicitly defended” (pp. 
239-240). It is always assumed, on some level, that we should resist. Further, Barbara 
Biesecker (1992) questions “how transgressive, counter-hegemonic or, to borrow 
McKerrow’s term, critical rhetorics can possible emerge as anything more than one more 
instantiation of the status quo” (p. 353). Her point is primarily aimed at observing 
McKerrow’s misreading and subsequent misuse of Foucault, but the extension of her 
overall critique is clear. Namely, the ideological resistance in constitutive rhetoric 
treatises is merely caught up in a false liberation narrative that is an effect of power itself 
(p. 353). In other words, the rhetorical critic that operates the tool of critical rhetoric is 
still a subject to the dominant code and still signifies the vilified and repressive power 
regime by way of being the marginalized representation of the repressed.  
 This does not mean that resistance is entirely futile. Biesecker’s reading of 
Foucault suggests a recalibration of resistance. She seizes upon Foucault’s “’stylized 
practices’ of the self” as a way of re-tasking rhetorical critics ”to trace new lines of 
making sense” (B. Biesecker, 1992, pp. 359-361). But, beyond the critical I as 
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constitutive critic, the individual self seems to be problematic within the universe of 
ideologically driven constitutive rhetoric criticism. Theorists of constitutive rhetoric are 
more concerned with an audience of “people” without the complications of “depending 
[…] on the observed behavior of individuals” (McGee, 1975, p. 238). To be clear, the 
individual is present in these works. As McGee notes, “In purely objective terms, the 
only human reality is that of the individual” and that “individuals must be seduced into 
abandoning their individuality” (p. 242). Black (1970) distinguishes “between the real 
author of a work and the author implied by the work” in order to arrive upon the very 
concept of “a persona, but not necessarily a person” (p. 111). And Charland (1987) 
acknowledges that it is “persons” who “are subjects” to interpellation (p. 147). But, the 
function of the individual tends to be an afterthought even as the individual is what 
makes constitutive rhetoric literally matter. The individual is the biological body where 
the tensions asserted by McGee and Charland play out, and the reader is left to presume 
that the individual is also the biological body that exerts physical force upon the living 
conditions of the individual. But, the “givenness” (Charland, 1987, p. 148) of the 
individual person is largely the most “taken-for-granted” (McKerrow, 1989, p. 93) 
component with the least agency; that is, other than the individual critic or individual 
rhetor-as-leader who both seem to have a great deal of agency. 
 There are some exceptions in which individual subjects become sites of resistance 
themselves. Kendall Phillips (2006), for instance, presents the “rhetorical maneuver” as 
“one procedure through which a subject attempts to reconfigure her/his position” (p. 
315). Dana Cloud (1999) builds upon Wander’s work and offers the “null persona” as the 
individual “self-negation” through a directed and resistant silence (pp. 200-201). And 
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John M. Sloop and Kent A. Ono (1997) offer their “out-laws” who “disrupt operating 
discourses and practices that always work to enable [power] and confine [individuals]” 
(p. 66). Sloop and Ono, however, argue that the critic must search for the “out-law 
discourses” rather than individual out-laws because of the “failure of the individual” (p. 
62). Here, they are arguing that just because an individual out-law’s disruptive ways may 
ultimately fail in procuring him or her the desired results does not mean that the 
discourses proffered by individual out-laws are necessarily incorrect. But, it is a 
fascinating move to champion the individual by refusing to allow for the failure of the 
individual to carry any weight. Phillips (1999) goes so far as to problematize their whole 
project as putting “everyday acts of resistance […] into the service of academic criticism” 
rather than the other way around—which Phillips, like other proponents of ideologically 
driven constitutive rhetoric, presumes to be bad (p. 97). Of course, Phillips (2006), in his 
own championing of the individual, spends a great deal of time elaborating on the 
interiority of the individual only to opt for “a more praxis-grounded approach to the 
movement of subjectivity,” which means an exterior depersonalized approach (pp. 312-
318). He ultimately just needed the body to make his point. 
And bodies do matter. Bodies feel pain. Bodies kill and are killed. I do not intend 
to call into question any sincerity with regard to caring for those bodies that do suffer. 
But, the material evaluation of reality does not necessarily mean rhetorical theorists must 
sacrifice individual “persons” for their bodies any more than we should condone 
ideological regimes sacrificing bodies for their subjects. Cloud’s (1999) “null persona” is 
the perfect metaphor for my departure from the materialist tradition, because it is the 
explicit materialization of self-negation (p. 179), which ultimately defies the possibility 
 17 
of resistance as posited by Biesecker. Biesecker (1992) argues that practices that are 
“resistant” are “virtual breaks” that are “yet-to-be-materialized” and “antecedent to those 
subjects” articulated by McKerrow’s critical rhetoric as well as those articulated by the 
prior iterations of constitutive rhetoric (p. 357). As she puts it, resistant practices 
precisely do not “make meaning” (p. 357). I argue this is exactly what proponents of 
constitutive rhetoric attempt to do, make meaning, and the potential failure of the 
individual risks the failure of that project. Making meaning is a jockeying strategy to gain 
the perception of superior exigency. 
 I agree that the failure of the individual subject is certain. Phillip’s (2006) ultimate 
avoidance of interiority is understandable when considering the way that the interiority of 
the individual is fumbled around within a materialist discourse. His series of Stuart Hall 
quotations regarding the self, identity, and the subject leaves my head spinning with 
questions as to whether these things (self, identity, subject) are the same thing and if there 
is even a body on the premises (pp. 312-313). As Hall (1985) explains elsewhere, 
Althusser’s notion of ideology was caught somewhere between structuralism and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis with a decentered subject that Althusser could not let “remain as 
an empty space” (pp. 101-102). Charland (1987) claims to have “circumvented” the 
“problem” of “the ontological status of those addressed by discourse before their 
successful interpellation” through his “analysis” (p. 147). His summation of this 
circumvention is that “Persons are subjects from the moment they acquire language and 
the capacity to speak and to be spoken to,” and that prior to this presumed “successful 
interpellation,” there is “more than a set of commonplaces, but is a con-text” (p. 147). I 
certainly do feel conned by his text because I don’t believe he takes this precise moment 
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of entering sociality with a sense of text particularly seriously other than, once again, 
giving his argument a body—a materiality. More explicitly, he writes: 
Our first subject positions are modest, linked to our name, our family, and our 
sex. As we enter the adult world, they become more complex, as different 
constitutive rhetorics reposition us with respect to such formal and informal 
institutions as the state, the economy, the church, and the school. Thus, though we 
are subjects through language, and indeed can only speak as subjects, our 
subjectivity and ideological commitments are not fixed at our first utterances. 
(Charland, 1987, p. 147) 
 
It is clear that Charland finds the larger institutional complexities far more interesting 
than the actual lived lives of the various individuals subjected to ideological 
interpellation. I find no inherent fault in that preference. But, to refer to “our first subject 
positions” as “modest” undermines the complexity of those linkages in our formative 
years and underscores the lack of serious theoretical care accorded to the individual 
bodies prior to, within, or outside of successful interpellation that constitutive rhetoric 
proffers to make itself hold meaning to hold court. 
Eric Jenkins and Josue David Cisneros (2013) go so far as to materialize love as a 
“living labor” that “constitutes the common” in order to make “rhetoric-love” meaningful 
(p. 96). To avoid a failed individual, they propose their decentering of the subject by 
“beginning methodologically with the act rather than the subject” (p. 87). Even as they 
suggest this approach is “beginning in the middle,” the methodological gesture is 
problematic because to begin with a speech “act” of love is to presume a subject and to 
directly position the individual as marginal (p. 87). Thus, in asking rhetorical critics to 
pause “before foreclosing on the possibilities of subjectivity,” they have already literally 
casted the subject to the side and foreclosed on the possibilities of the non-subject (p. 87). 
More importantly, like Althusser, Jenkins and Cisneros make these moves because they 
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refuse “the subject as constituted by lack” (p. 96). Specifically, they are taking a swipe at 
Joshua Gunn’s psychoanalytic approaches to rhetoric, ideology, and his dismissal of 
rhetorical considerations of love. 
Gunn (2008b) does, in fact, argue that “Love is shit” (pp. 143-145). More 
importantly, he argues “love is failure” because it offers the “gesture of something more,” 
which is “the deceptive promise that I have the power to produce something more in me 
than me for you” (p. 138). As he points out, rhetoricians typically refer to this gesture as 
Burkean “identification” (p. 138). At the core of Gunn’s arguments is the Lacanian 
proposition that the subject is indeed constituted by lack. But, Joshua Gunn and Shaun 
Treat (2005) take Althusser’s “pre-ideological subject” more seriously, albeit within the 
context of the filmic Zombie metaphor, as “the individual who has yet to become self-
conscious or called into the service of larger social organization, community, or state” (p. 
153). Gunn and Treat’s re-articulation of the Althusserian interpellation of the subject, 
“subjectification,” puts ideology at the service of the individual as the “realization of the 
self” rather than the typical zombified, or mindlessly controlled, subjects running around 
in constitutive rhetoric narratives realizing ideology (pp. 153-155). In fact, while Gunn 
and Treat allow for resistance in their psychoanalytic repositioning of the ideological 
subject, it is important to observe that they do not demand it. One can take an ideological 
perspective seriously without standing with or against it. In the context of Hariman’s 
sense of regard, one does not have to rank or even place a perspective within a system of 
marginalization. As with the various iterations of constitutive rhetoric, ideology does 
operate as an interiority that does counter overly deterministic logics, but psychoanalytic 
approaches take the complexities of the interiority of a first persona perspective, even in 
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the sense of an initial persona, far more seriously even if such an approach does not 
always advocate for specific political actions.  
Gunn (2008b) argues that rhetorical studies have been hostile towards 
psychological and psychoanalytic (“psychological analysis”) approaches to rhetoric as a 
territorial threat since the 1970’s (p. 143). While concepts such as ideology and 
hegemony have strong psychoanalytic roots, Gunn and Treat (2005) explain that 
American rhetorical critics, in particular, have only begrudgingly accepted 
psychoanalytic insights and have dismissed even these insights in tremendously watered 
down variations (p. 158). Gunn and Treat essentially map out the hegemony of a 
hegemony by way of a “postmodern retro-fitting” of ideological critique that ultimately 
embraces the “Gramscian perspective” of the “exterior work of ideology” in which 
theories of ideology are “evacuated of interiors” (pp. 157-158). Gunn and Treat propose 
an alternative route that embraces the psychoanalytic roots of ideological thought. 
Specifically, they suggest the restoration of the unconscious underpinnings of theories of 
ideology.  
Gunn and Treat (2005) break down two typical ways that the “unconscious” is 
used within psychoanalysis: one that is adjectival and another that is topographic (p. 
161). As adjective, they explain, “unconscious” refers to those “acts, thoughts, or ideas” 
accessible to the subject when simply brought “into conscious awareness” through basic 
observation (p. 161). One might say, “Hey, you didn’t make eye contact with me!” The 
other might respond, “Oh sorry! It’s an unconscious act I do around authority figures 
probably based on my history of teachers expecting answers.” In the topographical sense, 
“unconscious” is more like a thing and repository, “the contents of which we cannot 
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know except in terms of its effects on conscious life” such as suddenly fully formed 
thoughts and ideas (including dreams), slips of the tongue, or post-hypnotic phenomenon 
(Gunn & Treat, p. 161). This topographical sense of the unconscious articulates the 
individual person as much more complex. The initial connection between the 
unconscious and ideology, or hegemony, is fairly apparent as a sort of symptomatic 
subjectivity. However, this newly mapped out terrain offers greater possibilities when 
considering the argument that the repressed material in the unconscious is “constantly 
and ceaselessly attempting to re-enter consciousness […] but can succeed in doing so 
only in disguise” (Gunn & Treat, p. 162). In other words, what is repressed, ideologically, 
returns in distorted ways. Significantly, Gunn and Treat elaborate that we are not 
“completely governed by” this repressed material and that this material is not 
“completely inaccessible” due to the possibility of another person discerning it through 
analysis (p. 162). 
Gunn and Treat (2005) observe that “much of one’s life is led and governed 
consciously, and our ability to reflect on our lives and make conscious choices certainly 
means that rhetoric, traditionally conceived, plays a rather large role in society” (p. 162). 
I agree, but I also do not back away from another adjectival and topographical use of 
“unconscious” in the form of the “unconscious reality.” By this term, I am referring to an 
overwhelming sense of lack of which my body acts as a metaphor for my self in that the 
vast majority of what makes up my body is lacking consciousness. That my very 
consciousness always already seems to come to me in the form of subjective 
interpellation underscores that the lens through which I encounter the world fails to 
directly address that world outside of my interpellation. This constitutive lack, beginning 
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as “not me” while promising “me” to you and me, is what I mean by beginning as failure 
(Gunn, 2008b, pp. 138, 148). 
This notion of beginning as failure offers a way to think about a type of persona 
that I refer to as the disconstituent as well as a way of thinking about a critic or analyst 
who might approach this persona. Another assumption that uniformly occurs in 
theoretical entries regarding the subject of constitutive rhetoric is that of successful 
interpellation. The disconstituent is not a subject of successful interpellation, which is 
different from being successful or successfully being.  Take Cloud’s “null persona” for 
instance. While this subject position is a marginalized one, it is a position that an 
individual “knows” itself to be as a subject to ideological circumstance well enough to 
use silence to push back against ideological forces that seek to further objectify that 
subject position. Here, resistance is still constitutive in two key ways. First, resistance 
itself acknowledges the existence of the force being resisted and dialectically engages 
that force with comprehensible silence. Second, this comprehensible gesture is applied in 
such a manner as to hopefully reposition the subject relations. The disconstituent does not 
actually push back even if the critical listener or viewer perceives such a pushing back in 
the critical listener’s or viewer’s regard. This is the key separation that I am making 
between Hariman’s sense of regard and Sontag’s sense of regard as I read them. 
Hariman’s is still a matter of successful interpellation that involves a two-way event. 
Sontag’s regard is a one-way event that is nonetheless potentially, even directly, 
implicated. The interior implicated-ness is what is under investigation in this dissertation. 
In other words, for the disconstituent to be disconstituent, it must not only do the obvious 
work of undoing us through withdrawal, it must also on some level undo me.  
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The disconstituent is not limited to an individual who is suicidal or completes 
suicide, nor is an individual who completes or attempts suicide necessarily a 
disconstituent. However, there are many instances in which they overlap and even 
become synonymous. This overlapping will be parsed out throughout the dissertation. 
The underlying concept of disconstituency follows from Jose Esteban Muñoz’s (1999) 
consideration of “disidentification” within the interstice of psychoanalysis and political 
philosophy—namely, the states of identification, counter-identification, and 
disidentification (pp. 11-13). I liken these vectors to assimilation, revolution, and 
reformation, respectively. Muñoz is operating out of a system that also has Althusser’s 
interpellation of the subject as its basis. His use of “identification” is not Burkean, 
however. Muñoz’s “identification” comes from French linguist, Michel Pêcheux, and 
simply entails the logic of a “Good Subject,” or obedient subject, within an ideological 
apparatus such as a nation-state (Munoz, p. 11). In other words, identification is the 
interpellation of a subject who largely conforms, or assimilates, to the expectations of the 
state. Counter-identification, then, is the interpellation of a “Bad Subject” who turns 
“against this symbolic system” (Munoz, p. 11).  This subject seeks to replace the 
symbolic system with one that is counter to the dominant ideology as is the case with 
revolution. Within a Burkean framework, one might consider this to also be identification 
by antithesis. As Muñoz effectively posits it, “Disidentification is the third mode of 
dealing with dominant ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within such a structure 
nor strictly opposes it; rather, disidentification is a strategy that works on and against 
dominant ideology” (p. 11). Thus, it is easy to link this logic to reformation because it is a 
strategy that seeks to reshape the state of the situation rather than fully maintain or 
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completely overthrow and replace power apparatuses of the state. Yet, it is substantially 
more than simply greasing the wheels of the machine and exchanging minor parts in 
incremental shifts.  
Simply put, each point in Muñoz’s structure is active, and both disidentification 
and identification are every bit as much acts as counter-identifying practices. Thus, each 
point of activity is also constituent activity inhabited by constituent subjects who do the 
work of the political body whether it comes from a standpoint of difference or sameness. 
I offer the disconstituent as one who does not inhabit a fourth state but is inhabited by it: 
a state of disconstituency in which the disconstituent possesses neither a desire for the 
status quo nor a desire for meaningful change to the status quo. The disconstituent rejects 
the political body with no obvious desirous movement other than the relinquishment of 
nominal and existential participation. The disconstituent withdraws. Disconstituency is 
different from alienation in that the disconstituent is often a positive focal point and 
locale of the desire for the other’s desire, the “objet a,” in the making of an us, but cannot 
for various reasons be the reciprocal I/you that it sees as a successful I in the 
interpellation context of that us. The disconstituent may not mean any harm, but the 
disconstituent exits and leaves behind an exit wound because the disconstituent reflects 
back, whether conscious of this or not, the unconscious reality of lack that drives our 
compulsive subjectivity. To put the disconstituent act another way, the disconstituent is 
not the scapegoat that we sacrifice for the sake of our redemption; rather, the 
disconstituent sacrifices us. 
One cannot, in fact, give one’s regard to the disconstituent as the disconstituent 
has either completely departed from the situation or is no longer collecting such regard. 
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In so doing, the disconstituent directly undoes the us that allows for the you and I of any 
given situation. Thus, the effective, or at least respectful, critic or analyst who wants to 
see his, her, or its way to the disconstituent—the critic or analyst who wants to “get it”— 
must become undone on some level within her, his, or its approach.  Within this schema, 
the disconstituent is no longer a subject and may never have been. At best, the analyst can 
express the disconstituent individual as an individual who at one point operated as a lost 
persona. Thus, for the analyst, the disconstituent is a lost persona that can never actually 
be found and which threatens the same, though nonreciprocal, realization within the 
analyst’s regard. The analyst must begin as failure. 
Additionally, disconstituent artifacts that one might analyze are not sought; rather, 
they are found. And, what one finds is not always the same as what another might find. A 
disconstituent artifact occurs to the analyst. Just because one image might undo me does 
not mean that it would necessarily undo you. If I seek it for the purpose of 
disconstituency, I am both already guarded against it and merely producing a type of 
regard that confirms my approach. At the same time, disconstituent artifacts are not 
magic. In his lecture series on the “The Neutral,” Roland Barthes (2005) explains his 
course preparation process as a matter of selecting texts from his “vacation home”, 
arbitrarily received through familial inheritance and the “pleasure of free reading” (p. 9). 
In his “library of dead authors,” he makes “the dead think in myself” (p. 9). In Camera 
Lucida (1981), Barthes searches through photographs until certain ones “provoked” him 
(p. 16). What Barthes is ultimately referring to in these moments is his photographic 
concept of “punctum.” I will go into more detail later, but punctum, for Barthes, refers to 
instances in photographs, and I extend this to texts in general, that disturb the viewer’s 
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interior sense of subjectivity and/or self. My point is that while one cannot precisely 
search out the kinds of artifacts that I am after with regard to the disconstituent because 
of their personal nature within the regard of the analyst, an analyst can attempt to make 
his, her, or its self available to potential artifacts in places one might expect to find them 
so long as there is the possibility of forgetting about the search. In the case of this 
dissertation, one artifact was suggested, a student I coached mentioned another in a 
speech, and the first one occurred to me based upon my interest in a certain director. 
What ties them all together for me is suicide. 
One final note on the disconstituent: like the personae within constitutive rhetoric 
theory, the disconstituent is not the biological individual per se. Instead, the 
disconstituent is the lost persona within our regard. The term “disconstituent persona” 
would be largely appropriate, but removing “persona” and leaving the term as 
“disconstituent” repeats the important performance of the persona being lost. Again, 
disconstituency does not require biological suicide. Thus, one can refer to a 
“disconstituent individual” as a living performance of a disconstituent. Likewise, one 
may refer to a former individually lived state of disconstituency as a “disconstituent 
individual.” But, the important thing to remember is that the disconstituent is the lost 
persona.  
Suicide 
The second term in the title of this dissertation is “suicide.” Discussions of suicide 
carry with them a greater sense of risk than other forms of death. There is a fear of 
contamination. And, there is some truth to that fear. After Robin Williams completed his 
suicide, health officials and media members were wringing their collective hands as they 
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approached the public event of regarding his death (Sanger-Katz, 2014). This is because 
the phenomenon of “suicide contagion” seems to be a reality, and it is even more 
prominent in the case of celebrity suicides. A common example for reporters and health 
officials is the 12 percent increase in the suicide rate after Marilyn Monroe’s suicide in 
1962 (NBCNews, 2014). The apparent causal relationship between writing about suicide 
and suicide contagions goes back to at least Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s 1774 The 
Sorrows of Werther and the subsequent rash of copycat suicides (Laird, 2011, p. 536). 
Health officials and psychologists agree that journalists are in a difficult situation because 
of the very real threat of copycat suicides (Spratt, 2009). On the one hand, silence only 
furthers surrounding stigmatization with regard to suicide while also flying in the face of 
the journalistic responsibility to report significant events in communities. On the other 
hand, news coverage of suicides in general has been clearly linked to increases in suicide 
(AFSP, 2014). For anyone writing about suicide, each stroke of the key can become an 
ethical dilemma.  
But, of course, writing about suicide is not precisely causal even if it can be 
influential. There are suggested ways for reporting on suicide. The American Foundation 
for Suicide Prevention offers a helpful document to aid reporters in their quest to report 
without doing harm: “Recommendations for Reporting on Suicide” (AFSP, 2014). For 
instance, I italicized the word “completed” above as a nod to their suggestions. They 
suggest this term as well as “died by suicide” and “killed him/herself” in place of other 
terms such as “successful,” “unsuccessful,” or “failed attempt” (AFSP). This also 
excludes the commonly used phrase, “committed suicide,” because it suggests criminality 
(AFSP). Further, the recommendation for those reporting on suicide is to avoid 
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sensational language such as “Used Shotgun” or “epidemic” as well as language 
“Describing a suicide as inexplicable” (AFSP).  
While the goal of these guidelines is understandable, to avoid accidentally 
encouraging vulnerable individuals to choose suicide, these guidelines are somewhat 
problematic. For instance, while one may be able to retrospectively locate warning signs, 
suicide remains largely inexplicable. As New York Times reporter, James McKinley, 
notes, “each suicide is unique […] and it’s hard to find patterns” (Dam, 2010). And, it is 
not just journalists scratching their heads. Even when warning signs are observed, 
accurate predictors for suicide continue to elude researchers and health professionals.  In 
their study of US Veterans, Finley et al. (2015) found that suicide-related behavior is not 
particularly predictive of risk of suicide in cases of traumatic brain injury (p. 384). 
Unsurprisingly, they note that the combination of posttraumatic stress disorder, 
depression, and suicide-related behavior is more predictive (pp. 384-385). While 
admitting bafflement with regard to any general causation for recent significant increases 
in suicides in Korea, Lim, Lee, and Park (2014) find that the more lethal the chosen 
method of suicide the more likely a suicide will be completed. Kvaran, Gunnarsdottir, 
Kristbjornsdottir, Valdimarsdottir, and Rafnsson (2015) find a strong correlation between 
the number of times an individual visits the “emergency department” and completed 
suicides when combined with other typical predictors such as “psychiatric diagnoses” (p. 
6). While they offer the caveat that most suicide completers do not find their way to 
clinical services, they note that their findings point towards a “complex” path to 
completion of suicide that may go on for lengthy periods of time (p. 7). This finding is 
somewhat in contrast to the generally accepted logic that suicides are short-term 
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happenings (NBCNews, 2014).  According to Consoli et al. (2015), a history of suicide 
attempts is not necessarily a highly predictive factor of suicidality, but that high levels of 
ongoing depression, hopelessness, expressions of a low value for life and “high 
connection with the universe” are (p. S27). By “suicidality,” researchers mean the 
transformation of suicidal ideation, or thoughts of suicide, into suicide attempts (Consoli 
et al., p. S28). In each of these studies, an understanding of that point of suicidality 
continues to be elusive. While researchers continue to locate statistical predictors, they 
are still left with the inexplicability of suicide. While researchers are quick to point out 
that drug abuse issues and mental illness are found in 90% of instances of suicidality 
(AFSP, 2014), there is still the 10% of instances of suicidality that occur with a clinically 
clear mind. 
The worldviews of “hopelessness,” “a low value for life,” and high connectivity 
with “the universe” observed by Consoli et al. (2015) points towards the philosophical 
dimension of suicide. These ideological stances posit the question of whether or not one 
should kill oneself. I do not mean to suggest that suicide is necessarily an “intellectual” 
pursuit; rather, suicide carries with it a set of ideologies long considered by philosophers 
from Socrates ingesting hemlock to the Absurdist search for meaning in individual 
human lives. As for Socrates’s death, there is debate as to whether or not it might be 
considered a suicide (Stern-Gillet, 1987), but if it were to be considered suicide it would 
likely fall under the category “the standard Greek and Roman reasons” (Laird, 2011, p. 
525). Holly Laird (2011) explains “the standard Greek and Roman reasons” to be what 
are sometimes considered honorable deaths—“death before dishonor and agent’s choice 
before patient’s suffering” (p. 525). Seneca is arguably the most extreme supporter of 
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these types of suicide going so far as to suggest that the elderly should quit wasting 
society’s resources and time (Pasetti, 2009, p. 280). At one point, he considered taking 
his own life, but thought it would cause his father too much sorrow (Pasetti, 2009, p. 
287). As Lucia Pasetti (2009) observes, Seneca’s primary argument is for the right to 
choose one’s own death at the right time for the right reason (p. 282).  
It is debatable whether or not Seneca valued life considering his assessment that 
most people probably only truly live up to life’s potential for a total of one day over the 
course of their entire lives (Pasetti, 2009, p. 278). However, the central question in 
philosophy with regard to suicide is the question of life’s value (Matthews, 1998, pp. 
107-108). According to Albert Camus (1955), suicide is the only “serious philosophical 
problem” because it poses the very question as to whether or not life is worth living (pp. 
3-4). As he says, everything else “comes afterwards” (p. 3). For existentialists such as 
Camus and Sartre, authentic meaning in life must be found within ourselves because 
there is nothing in our externally absurd existence—against which absurdity we should 
rebel—to provide such meaning (Matthews, p. 109). In line with Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
conclusions, existentialists argue that one must throw off the shackles of society and 
search for freedom through rational self-interest. As Eric Matthews (1998) explains, 
suicide, for the existentialist, is “inauthentic and a betrayal to “our freedom” and must be 
rejected (p. 109). Matthews further places the existentialist conclusion about suicide in 
line with Aristotle’s assessment of suicide “as a form of cowardice” (p. 109). 
Operating out of a Christian perspective, Søren Kierkegaard also condemns 
suicide as  “mutinying against God” (Stokes & Buben, 2011, p. 83). As Patrick Stokes 
and Adam Buben (2011) explain, Kierkegaard believed in the notion of “spirit” and that 
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the human spirit is the self-reflexive self, meaning that the spiritual self is the process of 
the self “relating itself to itself” (p. 82). One is “spiritless” if one is unaware of being a 
self and this, for Kierkegaard, is the “most common form of despair” (p. 82). But, for 
him, “ignorance is no excuse” and suicide remains unforgivable (p. 82). Of further 
importance to the overall task of this dissertation is Kierkegaard’s idea that the self is 
defined by its relationship with other selves, God, and itself, and that these individual 
relationships are also responsibilities (pp. 83-84). Thus, suicide is an abandonment of 
one’s responsibilities. This sentiment, suicide as irresponsibility, captures a great deal of 
the philosophical perspectives on suicide. At each level, the question is never truly a 
matter of whether or not life has value or is meaningful. Rather, the question is whether 
or not we should respect life for the sake of those around us who do find meaning and 
value in life. To kill yourself is to declare to others that not only is your life meaningless 
and of little value, but that their lives are also by proxy meaningless and of little value. 
That is, except in approved cases of sacrifice for others or in ways that validate the 
sanctity of life that is also for others.  
Matthews (1998), for his part, shifts the question of universal value, and the 
murkiness of Kierkegaard’s spirited morality, to the rational question of whether or not 
life is always worth living which opens up possibilities for departure from the traditional 
philosophical stances on suicide (pp. 108-110). He argues that while Kant offers a 
rational approach to suicide, regarding it as irrationally self-contradictory, Kant is still 
forwarding the very same principle, Kant’s notion of “self-love,” which is ultimately a 
matter of accruing things in this world, rather than nature or God, that make life worth 
living (pp. 108-110). In other words, Matthews argues that much of the philosophical 
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tradition with regard to suicide ultimately disregards the fact that all suicides are 
motivated by despair and that the ultimate question is whether or not one can justify the 
position of all hope is lost (p. 110). Thus, while he allows for a selfish rather than soulful 
response to despair, Matthews is still caught up in the same knot. He still cannot simply 
allow a suicide to be apart from us. 
What becomes overwhelmingly clear is that the act of suicide, and the act of not-
suicide, is consistently placed in the philosophical service of us. Meaningless suicide is 
the ultimate betrayal and the most other to the collective understanding of self. Even as it 
continually baffles both our predictive and prescriptive regard, we must continually 
attempt to explain it in order to explain it away for the sake of ourselves. In other words, 
the regard of suicide is most often the active disregard of suicide. Further, the future-
oriented deliberative approach that questions whether or not one should or will attempt 
suicide can be more so a pretentious reaction. Most people who are concerned with 
suicide are concerned with how we deal with it, or with how we might use it, ex post 
facto. For instance, Laird (2011) argues that Emile Durkheim used the study of suicide as 
a means to both found the field of sociology and to overtake the discipline of psychology. 
In particular, Durkheim worked to establish “statistics as the supreme instrument” for 
understanding suicide (Laird, p. 530). Laird argues further that the contemporary field of 
“suicidology” emerged out of this competition between the two disciplines as a particular 
point of modernist contention (pp. 529-531). Sigmund Freud also contributed lasting 
ideas to this inter-disciplinary discussion, including the causalities of an erotic component 
to the death drive, melancholia or depression, and “disappointed over-idealism” (Laird, 
pp. 537-541). Even as research results, like those in the aforementioned work of Consoli 
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et al. (2015), continues to support Freud’s findings, Freud’s influence has been largely 
repressed within the current quantified logics of a supposedly purer science. It is difficult 
to blame suicidologists considering that they are already in taboo waters as they seek 
academic legitimacy like so many other disciplines and fields. 
Foundationally, however, suicidology seeks to “alleviate moral crises associated 
with suicide and to open suicide as a topic for rational discussion” (Laird, 2011, p. 531). 
This is particularly true in the area of suicidology focused on what is known as 
“postvention.” “Postvention,” a term currently specific to suicide, refers to organized 
responses to instances of suicide that focuses on survivors of suicide loss. Specifically, 
Edwin Shneidman, considered “the father of modern suicidology,” coined the term 
“postvention” and declared it to be “a direct form of prevention of future suicides” (Cook 
et al., 2015, pp. 4-5). As one might surmise based on the reality of media-influenced 
suicide contagion, more direct encounters with suicide also have a strong correlation with 
consequent completed suicides (Cook et al., p. 17). Cook et al. (2015) assert that suicide 
bereavement is “unique” for the following reasons: suicide is itself exceptional, the 
ambiguity of fault and volition, the resulting social stigmatization and feeling of blame 
and guilt further exacerbated by the larger population’s perception that suicide is 
preventable, the depth and breadth of a suicide’s traumatizing effects, the lack of 
resolution coupled with feelings of abandonment and rejection, fear of one’s own 
potential suicide or other family members’ and close friends’ potential suicides because 
of the consequent increased risk, and the disturbing feeling of relief if the suicide occurs 
after a lengthy period of intense relational struggle (pp. 13-18). In short, the suicide of a 
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loved one, or even just a nearby person, is crushing, and how to handle its destructive 
wake can be perplexing. 
For instance, there is the question of whether or not one should view the body as a 
part of bereavement because of potential disfigurement or unwanted memories. Omerov, 
Steineck, Nyberg, Runeson, and Nyberg (2014) find that most people do not ultimately 
regret either choice, but that parents who do choose to view the body experience more 
nightmares. From personal experience, I can tell you two things. First, my feelings of 
regret or non-regret for choosing to not view Kryn’s body can be drastically different 
from moment to moment. Second, my parents did choose to view my brother’s body and 
the nightmares never actually seem to go away. The long-term effects of another’s 
suicide are real. Inspired in part by Shneidman’s statement that the “person who commits 
suicide puts his psychological skeleton in the survivor’s emotional closet,” researchers 
seek and find a strong correlation between someone’s suicide and an increase in the 
mortality rates and ill health of his or her siblings for up to 18 years after the suicide 
event (Rostila, Saarela, & Kawachi, 2014). It has been 28 years since Kryn’s suicide, and 
I believe that I am only just now beginning to healthily emerge from the wake. Regret or 
not, regarding suicide can be a treacherous and exceptionally life-altering process. 
Much of postvention and suicidology research focuses on the sense-making 
processes of the bereaved. At the current center of this research is Diana Sands’ (2009) 
“Tripartite Model of Suicide Grief: Meaning-Making and the Relationship with the 
Deceased” in which she outlines three phases of bereavement following from the “walk a 
mile” metaphor of shoes: “trying on the shoes,” “walking in the shoes,” and “taking off 
the shoes.” Sands’ approach argues that the relationship with the deceased, what she calls 
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“continuing bonds,” is on going and does not end at the point of the suicide (p. 11). Based 
upon a body of research, Sands explains that “self-narratives” are particularly altered by 
suicide events because what socially defines and shapes the self becomes irrevocably 
unraveled by the suicide of another (pp. 10-11). It is, as she observes, a “betrayal of the 
fundamental relational pact of trust” (p. 10). Because of the “shattering of their sense of 
self” that is common in suicide bereavement, the sense-making process of relocating a 
sense of self occurs within the loss survivors’ regard of their loved ones who have 
completed suicide (pp. 10-11). In other words, through the narrative identification with 
suicide, survivors of suicide loss seek meaning that might restore their sense of self.  
“Trying on the shoes,” Sands (2009) explains, entails “engaging with the 
intentional nature of a suicide death” (p. 12). Interestingly, she observes that “suicide 
death sends a message” and that this “message is difficult to decode and understand” (p. 
12). In other words, the “trying on the shoes” phase of suicide bereavement focuses on 
imagining the causal worldview of someone who would complete suicide in order to 
answer why it happened. The “walking in the shoes” phase extends this type of thinking 
into a more thorough “reconstruction of the death story” with specific attention given to 
the message that the individual suicide sends in such a way that recodes the message in 
order to make the message make sense (pp. 13-14). This phase involves deeper levels of 
empathetic “suicidal ideation” and a similar state of “hopelessness” (p. 13). The difficulty 
of this phase, and the probable reason that this is the point of greatest risk for suicide, is 
getting past what Sands calls the “blind spot” of suicide bereavement, which is the 
“incomprehensibility at the core of suicide” (p. 13). In other words, it is very easy to 
remain stuck in the “walking in the shoes” phase. Finally, “taking off the shoes” occurs 
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as a way of “repositioning” one’s self in the relationship with the deceased and the rest of 
the world that generally allows for an understanding of the suffering that led to the 
suicide, and even forgiveness, but typically not for justification (pp. 14-15). Justification 
risks not foreclosing on one’s own suicide. Sands explains that the repositioning of the 
self is about placing the suicide in the past and restoring order in the present in such a 
way that repairs social trust and “personal efficacy” (pp. 14-15). Staying with the 
metaphor, taking the shoes off is really a matter of putting back on one’s own shoes and 
learning how to walk in them again. 
The actual moment of “meaning-making” does not seem to fully come to fruition 
until the third phase of Sands’ model. In fact, when looking at bereavement research 
within the postvention area of suicidology, it is common to use the terms “sense-making” 
and “meaning-making” interchangeably, which becomes rather confusing. For instance, 
Katherine P. Supiano (2012) uses the term “sense-making” but not “meaning-making” in 
the title and “meaning-making” but not “sense-making” in the abstract of her article. In 
the article’s body, Supiano adequately defines “sense-making” as “the capacity to 
construct an understanding of the loss experience,” but “meaning-making” is never given 
the same clarity (p. 490). Yet, there are instances in which both terms are implicitly 
differentiated such as, “Human suffering in all its forms compels the suffering person to 
attempt to understand the reasons and meaning of the event” (p. 490). Groos and 
Shakespeare-Finch (2013) also suggest this differentiation in instances such as, “much of 
the meaning- and sense-making process for participants in this study included the need to 
explore some of the reasons why the suicide had occurred and addressing emotions of 
guilt, blame, hurt, and anger” (p. 18). While the content of this sentence indicates terms 
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and ideas one might associate with “sense-making,” “meaning-making” is difficult to 
locate. In the paragraph directly following the one with this particular sentence, 
“meaning-making” does seem to take place when participants in group therapy become 
“hypervigilant for other children” and develop “important new relationships and support 
structures” (p. 18).  
This general differentiation and conflation is further problematic when Supiano 
(2012) seems to place it in the context of Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning by 
quoting him from that text (p. 490). Much of Frankl’s work is driven towards something 
along the lines of “meaning-making,” but he never attempts to “make sense” of the 
Holocaust. He does differentiate between “meaning” as a sense of purpose in life or 
“responsibleness” (Frankl, 1959, pp. 108-109), and “super-meaning” as the “ultimate 
meaning” which “exceeds and surpasses the finite intellectual capacities of man” (p. 
118). While I respect Frankl’s spiritual conviction, the use of his work runs the risk of 
simultaneously further stigmatizing suicide, as a form of being irresponsible and weak in 
the face of suffering not unlike Kierkegaard, and giving it unfounded meaningfulness as 
the higher calling for purpose in the lives of the bereaved. A clearer differentiation would 
help researchers in developing an understanding of the different parts of bereavement 
with regard to suicide, because attempting to make sense of suicide and giving it meaning 
can be radically different from one another. In fact, while one might attempt to make 
suicide make sense, it is possible that one may never do so and that one cannot for the 
sake of continuing one’s own life. This is Sands’ “blind spot.” Further, a clearer 
differentiation might better suggest that rather than attempting to give the suicide 
meaning, the bereaved leave the struggle to make sense or meaning within the suicide 
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event behind and seek meaning, or purpose, in their own lives as a radically altered and 
productive worldview that can stand on its own as functionally independent from the 
suicide event. While none of these points in bereavement are necessarily linear to one 
another or within themselves as a definite progressive movement, separating these 
processes may prove critical to understanding Biesecker’s call for “new lines of making 
sense” that resist the forceful demand of meaning. 
Another rhetorical issue within the postvention area of suicidology is how to label 
those left behind in the wake of a suicide. I have largely adopted the term, “survivor of 
suicide loss,” in accordance with the guidelines set forth by Cook et al. (2015, pp. 4-5). 
The problem arises when one uses labels such as “suicide survivor,” “survivor of 
suicide,” “suicide victim,” or “victim of suicide.” Each of these terms could refer to 
either the person who attempted but did not complete suicide or those collaterally 
affected by the attempt or completion. Further, any use of “victim” can be problematic 
for a number of reasons, including issues of agency and stigmatization. However, this 
point about the term “victim” is my own. While postvention researchers and 
professionals offer a thorough breakdown of survivors of suicide loss as “suicide 
exposed,” “suicide affected,” “suicide bereaved, short term,” and “suicide bereaved, long 
term” (Cerel, McIntosh, Neimeyer, Maple, & Marshall, 2014), ways of referring to the 
individual who attempted or completed the suicide is less clear. Disturbingly, albeit 
somewhat understandable, postvention researchers and practitioners also seem to 
disregard suicide to a certain extent. While postvention and therapy are not the goals of 
this dissertation, I certainly hope that my work may offer some insight to researchers and 
practitioners. As Groos and Shakespeare-Finch (2013) note in their “Limitations” section, 
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“In common with previous research, we know nothing about people who chose not to be 
involved in this group process” (p. 19). I offer my own account to their lack. 
As I look through postvention research and media struggles, it seems clear that 
rhetorical theory would be helpful. Unfortunately, the sparse attention to suicide in 
rhetorical theory also largely falls under the category of disregard. It is possible that this 
has to do with the “[un]readability” of such an act (Burgess, 1974, p. 229). For instance, 
Parke Burgess (1974) takes issue with Jeanne Y. Fisher’s (1974a) rhetorical treatment of 
a murder-suicide event using Burke’s dramatism for this precise reason (Burgess, 1974, 
p. 229). Fisher (1974b) responds to this criticism by arguing that some acts have more 
symbolic power than anything found in literature (p. 233). But, Fisher’s and Burgess’s 
disagreement is not truly a matter of “readability;” rather, their disagreement has more to 
with something somewhere between correct and corrective reading. In fact, it is the 
feeling of unreadability that is read in many cases of suicide, which leaves the reader with 
a sense of corrective anxiety about whether or not a correct reading is even possible. To 
say that something is unreadable is to disregard it. Fisher’s (1974a) article, even as she 
defends her rhetorical regard of a murder-suicide act as testing the boundaries of 
rhetorical theory (p. 182), does the precise work of disregarding the actual suicide that is 
used in her test (pp. 184-185). An actual suicide does occur. But, Fisher only focuses on 
the “symbolic suicide” of the character in her story by way of his altering his name and 
physical appearance via surgery (pp. 184-185). The homicide aspect of the case and the 
life of the murderer are clearly the points upon which Fisher chooses to focus her regard, 
and the suicide itself is almost completely disregarded. This particular episode in 
rhetorical theory is endemic of the majority of rhetorical treatments on the subject of 
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suicide. Namely, everything but an actual suicide tends to be worth the analysts’ regard 
even as their topics or artifacts are directly about suicides. More often than not, rhetorical 
theorists are guilty of Phillips’ critique of Sloop and Ono in that they put the idea of 
suicide at the service of rhetorical theory rather than putting rhetorical theory at the 
service of the issue of suicide. 
Stern-Gillet’s (1987) “The Rhetoric of Suicide” is particularly disappointing for a 
couple of reasons. First, the title is really hopeful for this dissertation, but the article 
ultimately does not bear it out as being about either the ways in which suicide might be 
rhetorical or the ways in which suicide is rhetorically treated. Instead, the article focuses 
on a “’responsibility-ascribing’ function” that might be used to ascertain whether or not a 
death might be considered a suicide (p. 160). Second, there is further hope for this 
dissertation in Stern-Gillet’s language at the beginning of the article in which she uses the 
phrase “manners of viewing” and argues that the way in which some writers discuss 
suicide is a “disregard […] of the concept of ‘suicide’” (p. 160). However, her whole 
argument boils down to a differentiation between martyrdom and suicide and the idea 
that because one cannot ascribe the responsibility for Socrates’ death to Socrates one 
should consider his death to be a case of martyrdom rather than suicide (pp. 166-169). 
A couple of topic areas in recent rhetorical theory that one might suspect would 
put suicide in a more central position in analysis are those of female suicide bombers and 
assisted suicide. Rather remarkably, this is not the case. As for female suicide bombers, 
Marita Gronnvoll and Kristen McCauliff (2013) and Teri Toles Patkin (2004) offer 
excellent accounts of their female subjects’ agency, but ideological autonomy and, not 
unlike Fisher, the homicidal component of their acts are what is regarded as worth 
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investigating. In fact, in line with Fisher and materialist iterations of constitutive rhetoric, 
the readability of the bodily commitment to an ideological discourse involved with these 
suicides is what is most valued. Like Stern-Gillet, Patkin shifts much of her analysis to a 
framework of martyrdom (p. 80). Gronnvoll and McCauliff, though, do offer some 
helpful insights for this dissertation by using Julia Kristeva’s theory of the abject to posit 
female suicide bombers as a particular variation of the they in constitutive rhetoric that is 
the “jettisoned object” which demarcates a clear indicator of “what we are not” (p. 337). 
In noting that a fatally violent act upon the innocent is itself perceived as “an act of 
extraordinary betrayal” when done by women (p. 347), Gronnvoll and McCauliff argue 
that this allows western audiences to particularize the female suicide bomber as a foreign 
they within an abject “culture of death” (p. 350). While Gronnvoll and McCauliff are 
more so regarding the homicidal component of a suicide bombing, the descriptive 
approach of an constitutive abject they is salient with much of the regard given to many 
individuals who attempt or complete suicide in general. 
Assisted suicide may very well fall under the second form of “the standard Greek 
and Roman reasons”—“agent’s choice before patient’s suffering” (Laird, 2011, p. 525). 
Robert Wade Kenny’s two entries regarding assisted suicide, though, may be the most 
troubling rhetorical treatments of suicide in general. For one thing, both entries are ad 
hominem attacks on individuals involved with assisted suicides as much as anything else. 
In his article, “The Rhetoric of Kevorkian’s Battle” (2000), Jack Kevorkian is lampooned 
as a death-dealing coldhearted researcher. And in “The Death of Loving: Maternal 
Identity as Moral Constraint in a Narrative Testimonial Advocating Physician Assisted 
Suicide” (2002), Kenny attacks the credibility of Carol Loving, the mother of Nick 
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Loving who completed suicide with the assistance of his mother and Kevorkian. Whether 
or not Kenny’s assessments are accurate, his playfulness is disturbing. You can see the 
above wordplay in the title of the Loving article. In the other article, Kenny (2000) offers 
another moment of wordplay by turning Burke’s “equipment for living” into “equipment 
for dying” (p. 387). Dark humor is not undesirable to me. I use it quite often as a means 
of alleviating unhelpful heaviness in discussions or to offer a bit of light in particularly 
dark moments. However, there is a dismissive quality to Kenny’s writing that gives his 
wordplay a shade of insidiousness. For example, “The Death of Loving” is a too-cute 
reference to both Nick Loving’s suicide and Carol Loving’s narrative failure as a loving 
mother. Kenny (2002) crosses a line when he describes multiple instances of Nick Loving 
hanging himself in suicide attempts and explicitly blames Carol Loving for her son’s 
suicidality multiple times based on some twisted and implicit form of psychoanalysis 
regarding her testimonial narration (pp. 259-266). Ultimately, Kenny just attacks two 
individuals’ character and offers no insight into the issue of assisted suicide itself. 
There is hope yet, however, for rhetorical theory’s engagement with suicide. The 
final three articles each fall under the category of how suicide has been rhetorically used 
and each offers helpful insights. I have already cited the first of these. Pasetti’s (2009) 
article additionally falls under the category of putting suicide in the service of rhetorical 
theory because the goal of this article is to ascertain Seneca’s contribution to the art of 
declamation with specific attention to Seneca’s use of the topic of suicide (pp. 274-275). 
But, in her discussion, Pasetti mentions Seneca’s use of “prosopopoeia” aside from 
suicide texts (p. 280). Prosopopoeia, the personification of an abstract idea or the 
representative speech of an “absent or imagined person” (Lie, 2012, p. 148), is a very 
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useful way to think about the disconstituent as a lost persona whom we regard but are not 
regarded in return and perceive as sending a message that cannot actually be sent.  
Next, Richard Bell (2009) explains how the idea of suicide was attached to 
dueling as a rhetorical strategy in anti-dueling campaigns in the early years of the U.S. 
Particularly, he grounds this observation in the rhetorical usage of Alexander Hamilton’s 
death at the hands of Aaron Burr in which it was reported and documented that Hamilton 
“never intended to pull the trigger” in the infamous Hamilton-Burr duel (pp. 384-385). 
Anti-dueling activists used this instance to declare that all duels are in effect “a fatal 
compact of suicide and murder” (Bell, 2009, p. 384). Bell (2009) explains that suicide 
was one of the foremost preoccupations in the early republic due to a deeper anxiety 
about the self-destructive potential within the politics of the American experiment as an 
“unruly body of constituents” (pp. 385-386). Further, there was fear of an impending 
outbreak of suicides based on several states no longer “deterring suicides by punishing 
survivors and mutilating corpses” as was the common practice of the British (pp. 385-
386). Finally, suicide was considered by many to be a direct betrayal of the constitutional 
social contract (p. 387). Bell’s insight offers an important historical and juridical 
perspective on suicide as a constitutive concern beyond the respect for life. As Bell 
posits, suicide was perceived as threatening the survival of an entire constituency. 
Finally, Michelle Murray Yang’s (2011) “Still Burning: Self-Immolation as 
Photographic Protest” offers the most direct regard of suicide in recent rhetorical theory. 
Yang argues that this particular form of suicide, self-immolation, is a rhetorical act that 
imparts a performative representation of “violence done by an ‘other’” (p. 2). With 
particular attention given to the iconic Vietnam War photograph of the Buddhist Thich 
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Quang Duc’s self-immolation, Yang offers a protestation politics of the photograph (pp. 
2-3). In her consideration of the photograph, Yang productively utilizes Barbie Zelizer’s 
concept of the “about to die moment” in certain photographs. Specifically, she 
investigates Zelizer’s articulation of the subjunctive voice found in photography that 
engages Barthes’ “third meaning” (Yang, 2011, pp. 10-14). Zelizer (2004) explains that 
Barthes’ “third meaning” in photography gestures towards a contingency that emerges 
once the viewer has “depleted both its literal/informational side and its symbolic 
dimension” (pp. 159-160). The “third meaning” is ultimately a precursor to Barthes’ 
notion of punctum as the element in a photograph, or text, that disturbs the viewer’s 
subjectivity. For Zelizer it invites the viewer into the possibility of intervention, or rather 
the hope of an impossible intervention, in the action of a photograph (pp. 161-162). This 
sense of elusive hope in “about to die moment” photographs informs her articulation of 
the subjunctive voice as the hypothetical “what if” that pulls a viewer into a relationship 
of contingency with a photograph (pp. 162-163). The event that is captured in the 
photograph cannot be changed, but the action depicted in the photograph and the elusive 
hope of intervention can change the viewer. This is almost exactly the type of regard that 
this dissertation explores. The only difference is the specificity of suicide and the 
disconstituent. 
Regarding Again 
 Camus’ point that everything else comes after the problem of suicide is a matter 
of philosophical inquiry and the initiation of the examined life. When facing the actual 
suicide of another, however, the question of going on returns. You might think of this 
dissertation as arriving at the beginning of a nocturne, a point at which there is an 
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encounter between two obscured visions, that of dusk and that of prayer. The idea of the 
subject is very much alive in these places. James Elkins (1996), one of the first people to 
bring together theories of seeing from different disciplines, offers the concept of 
“subjective contour completion” as a helpful insight with regard to the way the visual 
operates in subjectivity. Elkins explains: 
If a building is half hidden by the branches of a tree, we literally see it in 
fragments: subtract the tree and you would have a floating collection of irregular 
building pieces. But the eye completes the puzzle and sees the building whole. 
Psychoneurologists call the phenomenon subjective contour completion, and it 
helps explain how we can routinely see a single building instead of disjunct 
pieces. On a deeper level, subjective contour completion answers to a desire for 
wholeness over dissection and form over shapelessness. (p. 125) 
 
Elkins brings the reader into the ocular reality of fragmentation in a way that speaks to 
the human being’s internal subjective struggle—or, perhaps, the seeming ease of 
alleviating that struggle. Elkins points to a central concern: he argues that “subjective 
contour completion” is an answer to a “desire for wholeness.” It is the answer to the 
yearning of a nocturne. But what does the desiring? What suggests that these are 
fragments that we want to be completed? Burke insists that mystery is intricately 
foundational to order, to the “possibility of the social” as Biesecker (2000) puts it (p. 43). 
In mystery humans see anxiety and exhilaration. Mystery seems to pull. As Burke 
(1969b) states, “In mystery, there must be strangeness; but the estranged must also be 
thought of as in some way capable of communication” (p. 115). When Sontag regards 
photographs of suffering subjects that do not regard her because they no longer can, 
subjects that threaten to undo her in her regard, what is that rhetorical moment? 
Before I start to answer that question, I need to add another nuance to this subject-
object relationship in the “objet petit a.” Elkins’ “subjective contour completion” could 
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be brought into the science wars as an explanation of why subjectivity is inferior to 
objectivity. Subjectivity deceives. But, then, I would argue the same of objectivity insofar 
as objectivity offers the same deception, at least from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
Lacan (1978) explains this by distinguishing between hermeneutics and psychoanalytic 
interpretation in which “interpretation cannot in any way be conceived in the same way 
as […] hermeneutics, hermeneutics, on the other hand, makes ready use of interpretation 
(p. 8). Lacan is suspicious of the term “research.” He prefers to think of psychoanalysis 
as a method of finding, because self-analysis is always a matter of what was lost 
returning, and that a psychoanalyst merely partners with the analyzed who must always 
ask the same question of “what is the analyst’s desire” (pp. 7-9). His point is that with 
hermeneutics, interpretation is a way of knowing. A hermeneutic orchestrates 
interpretation in such a way as to bring out the meaning of a text not unlike the way that 
constitutive rhetoric theorists have used the individual as subject to make ideological 
meaning. In psychoanalysis, however, interpretation is a way of being in itself at the very 
core of interpellation. Thus, while a hermeneutic system could incorporate this way of 
thinking about interpretation, the same could not be said of psychoanalysis because to 
articulate “interpretation as knowing” is quite literally beside the point if not even more 
fundamentally deceptive. We do not know; we only claim to know. In this way, I prefer 
to rethink both “subjectivity” and “objectivity.” Simply put, “subjectivity” is like an 
interpretive search for the subject in that it is not quite yet a finding, but would be most 
accurately described as an interpretive being qua subject—to interpretively be as a 
subject. And “objectivity” is the interpretive search for the object at the behest of 
subjectivity. Thus, if I refer to an individual as a subjectivity, I am specifically suggesting 
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that the individual is an interpretive being of the subject. And, an objective point of view 
is simply a way of orienting that interpretive being. But, I might also “see” subjectivity in 
an object—or, at least, I might want to see. This sense of objectivity is what is meant by 
the Lacanian notion of the “objet petit a”—the object of my desire that signifies me. 
 So, to return to the above question about Sontag’s sort of regard, the sense in 
which objectivity is the search for the object at the behest of subjectivity begins the 
answer. But, the viewer can also recognize in one of these photographs a subject that the 
viewer knows is no longer a self-perpetuating subject. Something else is revealed here. It 
is both Burke’s “mystery” and Lacan’s “unconscious,” which can only be known through 
the repetition of form. Lacan (1978) ties repetition to the unconscious to observe that 
“our concept is always established in our approach that is not unrelated to that which is 
imposed on us, as a form, by infinitesimal calculus” (p. 19). He elaborates, “if the 
concept is modeled on an approach to reality that the concept has been created to 
apprehend, it is only by a leap, a passage to the limit, that it manages to realize itself” (p. 
19) Is it the subject that makes the leap or is it the unconscious? Does mystery itself cross 
from itself into the known? Is that the only repetition that ever actually happens? I argue, 
no. It is not the subject, the unconscious, or the mystery. It is the individual that is 
articulated by the subject, the unconscious, and the mystery. I also argue that traumatic 
encounters with the images that we regard have a particular power over the idea of us. In 
particular, images of suicide can facilitate the return of certain repressed materials of the 
unconscious that short circuit our sense of I in a way that is akin to our earliest sense of a 
subjective persona in which our own persona can be lost. 
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Barthes writes in Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (1981) about his 
ongoing encounter with the photograph. He explains, “I was overcome by an 
‘ontological’ desire: I wanted to learn at all costs what photography was ‘in itself,’ by 
what essential feature it was to be distinguished from the community of images” (p. 3). 
Something about the photograph makes him need to distinguish it, and he decides that 
“What the Photograph reproduces to infinity has occurred only once” and it “always 
leads the corpus I need back to the body I see” as “the This (this photograph, and not 
Photography), in short, what Lacan calls the Tuché, the Occasion, the Encounter, the 
Real” (p. 4) As I will explain in Chapter 2, Barthes is a bit off in his estimation of this 
photograph being an Encounter, although it may very well be the Real. But, more 
importantly for the moment, Barthes calls his “ontological desire” a disorder of supposed 
need and fragmentation and speaks to the curative gesture in psychoanalysis. His journey, 
his explicit search for the subject, begins from disorder in the hopes of not completing the 
puzzle, but to encounter the completed puzzle. Thus, Barthes transforms the subjective 
ontological desire into a sort of visual call and response. He argues that “certain 
photographs exerted […] adventure” upon him” so that “This picture advenes, that one 
doesn’t” (p. 19). Tellingly, he concludes, “The principle of adventure allows me to make 
Photography exist” (p. 19). I argue that he wants Photography to exist to validate his 
subjectivity. But, as with an image of suicide or suicide itself, what happens when an 
image, utterance, or act specifically no longer regards you in such a way that you matter? 
What follows is a dissertation attempting to answer the aforementioned following 
research questions: 
1. What does it mean to regard suicide from the standpoint of beginning as failure? 
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2. What might a method for grappling with the implications of this failed regard 
look like? 
This dissertation attempts to theoretically forestall subjective contour completion and to 
sit within the fragments of Babel. This is the sublime prayer of the nocturne. And it is 
doomed to fail. But, as Burke (1969b) observes, “There is mystery in an animal’s eyes at 
those moments when a man feels that he and the animal understand each other in some 
inexpressible fashion” (p. 115). Why might I look at anything in the world? The answer 
is that something shows me as possibly more than me. Or, as Lacan (1978) puts it: 
The world is all-seeing, but it is not exhibitionistic—it does not provoke our gaze. 
When it begins to provoke it, the feeling of strangeness begins too. What does this 
mean, if not that, in the so-called waking state, there is an elision of the gaze, and 
an elision of the fact that not only does it look, it also shows. In the field of the 
dream, on the other hand, what characterizes the images is that it shows. (p. 75) 
 
In the above passage, Lacan reveals a few significant components to the work of this 
dissertation. There is the “it” that “begins to provoke it,” the “elision of the gaze,” and 
“the field of the dream.” Lacan makes it clear that the world “does not provoke our gaze,” 
but that some thing provokes some thing. I argue that the first thing is a matter of both 
visual and auditory hailing and that the second thing is the individual production, or 
attempted production, of the subject through the gaze. The subject, which is always only 
an attempted subject, can be understood as the elision of the gaze in the way that it 
simultaneously inhabits and represses the gaze. Finally, the field of the dream may be 
understood as the revelation of the unconscious reality. 
 Chapter 2 offers an additional literature review and culminates in a discussion of 
the relationship between the disconstituent and identification. To arrive upon an 
understanding of this relationship, I attempt to come to terms with the subjective nature 
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of simultaneously being lead and blindly leaping through the work of Burke, Lacan, and 
Barthes. Specifically, I focus on “The Deaths of the Subject” that I see in their work in 
order to bring the subject to the point of identification as the demand of a false confession 
in order to articulate the disconstituent’s rejection.  
Chapter 3 is my attempt to literally come to terms with how we can fail to see. Put 
otherwise, Chapter 3 attempts to create a failed model in that it attempts to recreate our 
failed regard. I delve a bit further into the psychoanalytic notion of the gaze so as to 
establish a particular understanding of Peggy Phelan’s (1997) consideration of the 
painting technique known as the “vanishing point” as a visual structure of the gaze. I 
subsequently reformat Joshua Gunn’s (2008a) articulation of the Ideal, Symbolic, and 
Real fathers outlined by Lacan but based on Freud’s work. I reformat Gunn’s stance 
through the use of Freud’s rendition of the fathers in Moses and Monotheism (1939) as 
opposed to Gunn’s use of the earlier, shorter version in Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1918). 
In so doing, I combine my reworking of the vanishing point and the fathers into the 
promised method of our failed regard which follows along the lines of Ideal, Symbolic, 
and Real but in the form of the Authorial Subject, the Authoritative Subject, and the 
Constituent Subject. This structure also follows well with Sands’ (2009) “trying on the 
shoes,” walking in the shoes,” and “taking the shoes off.”  
The final three chapters examine each of these subjectivities from a failed 
standpoint so as to deteriorate from the Authorial Subject, Authoritative Subject, and 
Constituent Subject into the State of Disconstituency, Disconstitutive Rhetoric, and the 
Disconstituent respectively. To aid in the exposition of these movements, each of these 
final chapters will focus in part on specific suicidal artifacts. Chapter 4 will regard Gus 
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Van Sant’s Last Days (2005a), which follows a character named “Blake” who closely 
resembles Kurt Cobain. Chapter 5 will regard Vice Magazine’s “Last Words” fashion 
spread in which models pose in renderings of famous female authors’ suicides. 
Specifically, I will focus on the poetic image of Sylvia Plath. Chapter 6 will carry us to 
the end of our nocturne with regard to Eric Steel’s controversial documentary, The Bridge 
(2006), which films suicidal jumps from the Golden Gate Bridge. 
 I chose these images, whether moving or not, whether fictional or non-fictional or 
somewhere in between, because they do something more than provoke me. They invoke 
the me that tried to play away my brother’s suicide. In Elkins’ (1996) assessment of a 
specific set of images of death that are particularly horrifying, he concludes, “they are 
painfully close to something I know I cannot or must not see” (p. 115). The very thought 
of suicide, perhaps because of my personal history or perhaps because I still must be, has 
the same effect on me as these images have on Elkins. For him, “These images shout all 
other images down: they are harsh and importunate, so that they are not only hard to see; 
they also make everything else hard to see” (p. 116). Nonetheless, I stand back and think. 
I regard these images even as I get the sense that the subjects I see in them have chosen to 
have nothing to do with me. Additionally, these artifacts have the benefit of not being 
closely aligned with any particular politics making the disconstituent connections more 
available. 
As you read the dissertation, I would like for you to keep three deaths in mind. 
The first is Burke’s aforementioned Fall of Babel. This is what he places at the heart of 
rhetoric, a mythical holocaust of sorts. Thus, the process of identification begins upon the 
imaginary broken bodies of a utopian connectivity.  
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The second death is the death of an anonymous child found in Freud’s “Burning 
Child Dream.” I will discuss this dream in the second chapter, but it’s important to know 
that this dream is the heart of psychoanalysis. As Lacan (1978) argues, “Everything is 
within reach, emerging, in this example” (p. 35). And within this dream, and this death, 
there is another death. As Lacan says of Freud, “The unconscious, he tells us, is not the 
dream” (p. 37). He later continues this thought by locating the subject in the I as “the 
complete, total locus of the network of signifiers, that is to say, the subject, where it was, 
where it has always been, the dream” (p. 44). 
 Finally, there is the death of Barthes mother. The majority of the work from 
Barthes in this dissertation comes out of the period following her death, because it rings 
with such heart-wrenching honesty and arguably performatively plays out his life’s work 
(Dyer, 2010). Barthes’ love for his mother is well known and his own death just three 
years later carries with it the traces of a broken heart. In these three deaths, we find the 
broken hearts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. As Burke (1969b) offers, 
“rhetoric also includes resources of appeal ranging from sacrificial, evangelical love, 
through the kinds of persuasion figuring in sexual love, to sheer ‘neutral’ communication 
(communication being the area where love has become so generalized, desexualized, 
‘technologized,’ that only close critical or philosophical scrutiny can discern the vestiges 
of the original motive)” (p. 19) And from there we, reader and writer, may proceed with 
the rethought subjectivity and objectivity to accept Burke’s challenge. Central to all of 
this are the writings and lectures of Kenneth Burke, Jacques Lacan, and Roland Barthes 
and their interpretive approaches to individuals, texts, and individuals as texts— again, 
the subject that begins as failure.  
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Rhetorical theory is well positioned for this study because it is precisely about 
how we come to terms with the world. We do not have to judge these terms or the world, 
but we can begin to understand how we do so through both rhetoric and rhetorical theory. 
Thus, the impetus here is to come to the term of regard that I have set forth and to take 
the perspective of a first persona seriously. Psychoanalysis is also about coming to terms 
with the world with each other. If psychoanalysis teaches us anything, it is the rethinking 
of the old adage, “history repeats itself.” Alternatively, the psychoanalyst might say that 
what is repressed returns, sometimes in hidden and intensified ways. With regard to 
suicide, we must re-regard what we repress. 	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CHAPTER 2: DEATHS OF THE SUBJECT AND IDENTIFICATION 
AS DEMAND 
 
Chapter 1 introduced several key concepts worth reiterating. First, this 
dissertation is an attempt to offer a regard that defies ranking in a system of central and 
marginal status. To regard without ranking, to regard as a way of giving oneself up, is to 
negate order. This kind of regard may very well be impossible for any subject of 
interpellation such as myself. But, second, this likely impossibility is part of the 
beginning as failure that is key to this project. Beginning as failure does not mean setting 
out to fail. It means accepting and acknowledging the failure that has already occurred. 
Third, this dissertation participates in the tradition of constitutive rhetoric with a 
psychoanalytic approach to rhetorical theory and the subject, or non-subject, of 
identification. Chapter 2 focuses its regard on the specific meaning of beginning as 
failure as a constitutive lack which can be found in the works of Burke, Lacan, and 
Barthes. 
Burke, Lacan, and Barthes are central figures in this dissertation because of their 
relationships with the subject. Burke gave his famous “definition of man” to rhetoric only 
to leave his man rotted at his core. Lacan, in the most literal way one can operate a 
metaphor, brought the subject up in Freudian psychoanalysis only to show how easily it 
vanishes. And, Barthes gave the reader new life and death with the author’s literary 
obituary. For each subject that they illuminated was an immediate departure back into 
darkness. This chapter looks at the particular ways through which each of their subjects 
passed. 
 Additionally, each of these thinkers operates with strong psychoanalytic 
tendencies. Lacan is obvious. Early in contemporary rhetorical theory, Burke was 
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primarily considered Aristotelian when he could be more contemporarily tied to 
Hegelianism, Marxism, and Freudian psychoanalysis (McGee, 1975, p. 236). As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Gunn (2008b) syncs Burke’s notion of identification with the 
Gunnian term “gesture of something more” (p. 138). This is also Gunn’s reference to the 
“objet a” in Lacanian psychoanalytic parlance. Sometimes referred to as the “big Other” 
because of its relation to “objet petit a,” “the “objet a” designates the subject’s desire for 
various expressions of other subjects’ desires to be directed towards the subject. Whereas 
the “petit objet a” can be materialized, though not quite attained, the “objet a” cannot be 
materialized as it is only what is promised in identification—and love (Gunn, p. 138). 
Both others are objectively sought for the sake of self-perpetuation.  
 Barthes operates theoretically in very similar ways to Burke in that he has a strong 
psychoanalytic bent combined with a passion for literary criticism. In particular, Barthes 
offers a beautifully written performance style that launches into the heart of subjectivity 
at the intersection of textuality, visuality, and myth. Taken together, Burke, Barthes, and 
Lacan create a rich terrain for psychoanalysis, rhetorical theory, and textual encounters. 
By tracing the ways in which they construct a subject that embodies beginning as failure, 
what I call the deaths of their subjects, the articulation of identification as a demand for 
the false confession of a me that is not and will never be becomes painfully clear—a 
distress call which the disconstituent no longer answers nor deflects. 
Before launching into the deaths of the Burkean, Lacanian, and Barthesian 
subjects, it is worth noting a key way in which Burke puts his reader in distress, which 
also offers a perfectly doomed entrance into this chapter. Burke (1969b) does not begin A 
Rhetoric of Motives as failure. Through literary interpellation, he forces his reader to 
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begin as failure in the way he discusses Milton’s portrayal of and identification with the 
mythic suicidal Samson. Similar to Black’s “real author” as distinguished from an 
“implied author,” Burke’s opening is reflective of the literary perspective that issues forth 
from the commandment of no privileged subtext. Burke observes of Milton’s work that: 
One can read it simply in itself [italics Burke’s], without even considering the fact 
that it was written by Milton. It can be studied and appreciated as a structure of 
internally related parts, without concern for the correspondence that almost 
inevitably suggests itself: the correspondence between Milton’s blindness and 
Samson’s, or between the poet’s difficulties with his first wife and Delilah’s 
betrayal of a divine ‘secret.’ (p. 4) 
 
Burke immediately undoes the thing he suggests the reader could do. Upon his 
mentioning of the historical details, the reader can in fact no longer read the text without 
“concern” for the author’s biographical information. At best, a reader can only pretend to 
do as such or strive to repress this information for as long as possible. Burke doubles 
down on this as an impossibility with the argument that, “Besides this individual 
identification of the author with an aggressive, self-destructive hero who was in turn 
identified with God, there is also factional identification” (p. 4). An array of author’s 
intent is held before the reader’s eyes in these passages only to flow into the claim that 
because “Milton’s religion strongly forbade suicide” he was “Compelled by his 
misfortunes to live with his rage, gnawed by resentments that he could no longer release 
fully in outward contest,” and so, “Milton found in Samson a figure ambivalently fit to 
symbolize both aggressive and inturning [sic] trends” (p. 5).   
It is difficult to locate the divine betrayal, the suicide, in all of this. Are we now 
reading about Samson’s suicide? Are we directly reading Milton’s desire or the 
repression of his desire for suicide? Does Milton not know about his desire? Is there 
something self-destructive in Burke that gives him insight into this potential avenue of 
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inquiry? Is this why he seems to feel he knows something of Milton? Did Burke read 
someone else’s biographical account of Milton? Or, do we now exclude any vague 
knowledge of Burke’s personal life? The author, authors’ intent, motive, and 
interpretation are all rather tricky things because they are, of course, caught up in matters 
of the subject. In his classic “The Death of the Author”, Roland Barthes (1978a) explains 
that the “author is a modern figure […] emerging from the Middle Ages with English 
empiricism, French rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation,” creating “the 
prestige of the individual […] which has attached the greatest importance to the ‘person’ 
of the author” (pp. 142-143). In so doing, Barthes names what many readers seek as 
readers, what motivates interpretation itself. He speaks directly to the impossibility, the 
beginning as failure, the emptiness that we deny through the rational establishment of the 
subject as the faithful manifestation of our own authority over our own textuality.  
Though Barthes and Lacan tend to operate their analyses from an atheistic 
standpoint, Lacan (1978) explains that while the subject “is not the soul, either mortal or 
immortal” there is a matter of faith involved in interpellation because “It is the subject 
who is called—there is only he, therefore, who can be chosen” (p. 47). In other words, 
the subject is the individual person insofar as it is the being-ness that is invoked by 
another to constitute both the myth of and the desire for the unified self. It is the I must be 
as opposed to the I am. And subjects look for objective textual signifiers, the “objet petit 
a,” to master and maintain that myth in a doubly self-deceiving manner (Lacan, p. 5).	  
With this, Lacan shows the playful complexity of the desire at work in the subject qua 
subject, the subject as self-perpetuating or self-performing subject. But, this subject is 
merely a product, or symptom, of the unconscious. This, then, is also the comedy of the 
 58 
analyst who, in bringing this desire out into the open with regard to the analysand, also 
brings it out with regard to his or her self (Lacan, p. 5).	  
For further context, consider the possibility that Burke (1969b) succeeds, at least 
temporarily, in offering the reading of Milton without Milton as he suggests. In fact, 
Rhetoric opens with a series of suicides—all of which serve the “use” of establishing a 
foundational thematic to consider the work of rhetoric, persuasion, and identification. For 
contemporary readers, to begin with Samson’s suicide is a particularly interesting choice 
from the perspective of our post-9/11 context. After all, Samson’s suicidal tearing down 
of the two pillars amongst the Philistines in Gaza is remarkably akin to an ideologically 
driven suicide bombing that one might read about in mainstream news today if not “9/11” 
itself. But, obviously this context, while nearly unavoidable, is clearly not Burke’s intent. 
And, likewise, in Burke’s ideological loading of Milton’s retelling with the rhetorical 
purpose of Milton’s political strife, Burke simultaneously strips this metaphorical 
identification between Milton and Samson of ideology and authorial intent by rendering it 
as only a reference point for understanding a form of identification (pp. 3-6). In other 
words, Burke does succeed on some level at reducing the Milton’s suicidal Samson to a 
textual “petit objet a” by assuring its transformation into merely a signifier of a subject. 
And many readers may add it to their self-signifying collection of little objects of their 
desire for themselves. 
Burke’s (1969b) series of literary suicides culminates in three particular thoughts: 
that war is, “a disease, or perversion of communion,” the idea of “Identification” being 
“compensatory to division,” and his famous claim that “Rhetoric is concerned with the 
state of Babel after the Fall” (pp. 22-23). Right there, in the earliest parts of this work, in 
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the contemplation of suicide and crumbling structures, we are told that we necessarily 
begin from the point of being unraveled. And he finishes the entire treatise with the 
thought that even as we are stuck with rebuilding ourselves out of this crumbled mess, 
“let us, as students of rhetoric, scrutinize its range of entrancements, both with dismay 
and in delight” until we reach “the end of all desire” (p. 333). To clarify, Samson’s 
ideological and suicidal pulling down of the pillars and the wrathful falling tower of 
Babel are both simultaneously chaotic and orderly. They are imagistic of chaos. They are 
ideological rejections of perceived chaos. In that rejection, there is the move to human 
order maddened by the mysterious motive of order itself, which is a process of both 
unifying identification and its always already implied division. In this rhetorical wink, 
Burke effectively condemns, desires, and simply observes as a scholar, all at once in an 
inspirationally engaged futility, a disturbing reflection of the subject on the narcissistic 
pool of mystery. The “end of all desire” is to either choose to cease failing to attain our 
signifying objects of desire via suicide or to simply die. 
As Biesecker (2000) points out, “Burke identifies as central the thematic of 
courtship to which corresponds an underlying stratum of motive he calls ‘hierarchy in 
general’ with its attending effect of ‘mystery’” (p. 47). Out of the mystery of the 
unconscious the individual emerges, and out of the interactions of individuals a mystery 
emerges as the foundation of order. Or, in other words, “In the Rhetoric Burke’s thinking 
of the social finds its resources in the newly determined space of the individual: in the 
predication of the human being per se is the possibility of the social” (p. 47). And, it is 
here that Burke joins his readers by also beginning Rhetoric as failure, because his 
individual subject, his “definition of man,” has always already been doomed. 
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Deaths of the Burkean, Lacanian, and Barthesian Subjects 
 
The Burkean Subject 
 
Much of my argument with regard to the “death of the Burkean subject” follows 
from Biesecker’s (2000) work in Addressing Postmodernity. She argues that two of 
Burke’s masterworks, Grammar and Rhetoric, can and should be read as ontological 
pursuits, rather than the traditional epistemological approaches, that ultimately fail to 
produce an ontologically substantiated subject. This section of the dissertation largely 
focuses on the intricacies of her argument, but it also begins and ends this with aspects of 
his famous “definition of man.” His definition, as found in Language as Symbolic Action: 
Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (1966), is as follows: 
Man is the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, inventor of 
the negative (or moralized by the negative) separated from his natural condition 
by instruments of his own making goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by 
the sense of order) and rotten with perfection. (p. 16) 
 
Burke’s specific discussion of the “man as a symbol-using animal” in his definition is 
revealing and speaks directly to the project of this dissertation. He offers the question, 
“But can we bring ourselves to realize just what that formula implies, just how 
overwhelmingly much of what we mean by ‘reality’ has been built up for us through 
nothing but our symbol systems?” (p. 5) He answers his own question to a large extent 
shortly afterwards that to bring oneself to such a realization “is much like peering over 
the edge of things into an ultimate abyss,” which is why he suggests, the subject “clings 
to a kind of naïve verbal realism that refuses to realize the full extent of the role played 
by symbolicity [sic] in his notions of reality” (p. 5). The “clinging” to which Burke 
speaks directly articulates the realization of desire that is subjectivity—the making “real” 
of subjective desire. It is an apt word choice as it is both a way of holding our own hearts, 
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of forcing our will, and a way of following an Other, small or big, in departure. Clinging, 
here, is the desire of signification and the refusal in repression.  
Additionally, there is the wry rottenness. In his critique of a rather contradictory 
Freud, Burke (1966) re-presents the psychoanalytic insight of “repetition compulsion” 
(what contemporary social scholars might call compulsive performativity) to express the 
subjective desire for perfection as a unified self that cannot ever be achieved but that has 
somehow been aroused “in some earlier formative situation” (p. 18). Burke is cursorily 
beginning to describe the psychoanalytic notion of “drive,” or the driving force of 
subjective desire. The intricacies of the “drive” concept will be explored throughout this 
dissertation. It is important, for now, to simply note the central role drive plays in the 
“shaping” of a human form for Burke (p. 18). It is also intriguing, in this light, to note 
that Burke refers to this part of the definition as a “codicil,” as an extra part or appendix 
to the text (p. 18).	  To think of the drive as an appendage, as a way of reaching that is 
central to the shape of us is an incredible insight for a discussion of suicide, which one 
might consider, within a Burkean subject, an excessive action in the throws of motion.	  
 Action and motion are central to the way that A Rhetoric of Motives begins 
Burke’s us as failure. It is within an action/motion differential that the Burkean human 
being comes to terms. Biesecker (2000) explains that to understand the doomed nature of 
Burke’s project requires a look back to his Grammar as “the Grammar is also a book that 
records its author’s attempt to come to terms with precisely that which Burke’s critical 
method precomprehends: motive understood in a more originary sense than its particular 
determinations—as the essence of being human” (p. 24). “To come to terms” has been 
used already in this dissertation as a significant part of the primary guiding research 
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questions. It is a phrase that is often invoked at times of grief as well as at times of 
negotiation. Biesecker not only brings the discussion out of the purely epistemological 
range, she also sends Burke off on an impossible journey that likewise shifts 
interpretation from a way of knowing to a way of not simply being, but a way of 
interpretive being not unlike our rethought subjectivity. Simply put, Biesecker’s narration 
of Burke’s ontological efforts is a story of a human being coming to term. Biesecker’s 
treatment of Burke is to shift consideration of his work from epistemological readings 
towards “a painstaking and ultimately frustrated investigation of the ontological 
foundation of motives per se: that which effaces itself in the midst of its appearance” (p. 
25). 
To clarify, with “motive” Burke and Biesecker are not just discussing the notion 
of author’s intent. Biesecker is arguing that this is a far deeper and more personal 
ontological pursuit than not knowing what someone meant to say, or meant by saying, but 
rather what people sense in and of their selves—what people sense by way of a person’s 
singular intent. In particular, prior to arriving at identification in Rhetoric, Biesecker qua 
Burke is grappling with the individual human being, that may or may not be a subject, as 
the locus of motive in Grammar.  
 Biesecker (2000), in order to illuminate this struggle, gives a close reading of 
Burke’s action/motion differential, which is as follows: “’Action,’ according to Burke, is 
constitutive of human being: it is the primary mode of being human and is to be 
understood in relation to its dialectical opposite ‘motion,’ a term that signifies ‘sheer 
locomotion’ (85)” (B. A. Biesecker, p. 26). She considers Burke’s example of the 
stumble. Burke (1969a) argues, “If one happened to stumble over an obstruction, that 
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would not be an act, but a mere motion. However, one could convert even this sheer 
accident into something of an act if, in the course of falling, one suddenly willed his fall 
(as a rebuke, for instance, to the negligence of the person who had left the obstruction in 
the way [italics Burke’s]” (p. 14). As clear as this seems, even Burke acknowledges the 
ambiguities of “Terms like ‘adjustment’ and ‘adaptation’” that are used to explain “both 
action and sheer motion, so that it is usually difficult to decide just which sense a thinker 
is using them, when he applies them to social motive” (p. 14). And there is also Burke’s 
intermediate statement, “’Dramatistically,’ the basic unit of action would be defined as 
‘the human body in conscious or purposive motion” (p. 14). Already, Burke finds himself 
on the edge of his abyss with choice as an illusionary trick. In Mythologies, Barthes 
(1972) presents a similar point, or perhaps quandary, when he writes, “Motivation is 
unavoidable. It is none the less very fragmentary. To start with, it is not ‘natural’: it is 
history which supplies its analogies to form” (pp. 126-127). The point in the stumble 
where the human transforms the motion of being into the action of being is lost in the 
past as an avoidable history of taught representation. Even at its most basic point of 
definition, this action/motion differential within the overall subjectivity via 
motive/motivation equation is collapsing on the individual level. Even as Biesecker 
observes that, “when applied to the realm of human being, the term ‘motion’ names for 
Burke the moment wherein the subject performs structure” (B. A. Biesecker, 2000, p. 
26), where the human action begins or ends is lost because a “subject” is itself 
structurally ontological even if the performance is syntactical in nature. More to the 
point, “structure” is an interpretive concept put forth as a compensation for the messiness 
of a chaotic clumsiness. You may remember a common childhood joke in which the joker 
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asks the dupe to close his or her eyes and imagine running through the forest only to slap 
the dupe in the forehead and exclaim, “You hit a tree!” Eventually, the dupe will 
hopefully either stop closing his or her eyes or decline to participate in the joke 
altogether. Is that action or motion? 
While Biesecker (2000) concedes that “the reading of the action/motion 
distinction prevalent among critics is quite correct from the existential purview: human 
beings act, things move” (p. 27), the beingness, as an action, has yet to elude, or 
distinguish itself from, the thingness. The human is still a slinky. In other words, human 
motion is the designated term for the subject performing itself like a wound up automaton 
while action might be the term for the subject creating itself within the context of its 
unwinding. To that point and the continuation of her ontological re-reading, Biesecker 
writes, “in reading this distinction between action and motion as only proposing a 
differential relationship between the human and nonhuman, critics theoretically elide 
what is, perhaps, one of the most productive moments in Burke’s work: the tacit 
suggestion that the difference that obtains between the human and the nonhuman, and that 
indeed structures their relation, also obtains within the human being itself” (p. 27). So, 
action is, ontologically speaking, the point at which a subject interpretively responds to 
the unconscious reality of motion in such a way that is ultimately self defining because 
the “human” is “being itself” within the context of a reality. In other words, the 
individual human responds to the metaphor of its body with the creation of a first 
persona.  
Lacan (1978) explains that this human response is the precise nature of 
“signifiers” in which subjects “are constituted […] by analogy” (p. 46). The signifiers 
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arouse the appetite for action. It is to these internal and external signifiers that one 
habitually, or performatively, clings. In other words, consciousness itself is an 
interpretive activity that becomes merely one signifier of the subject—“I think; therefore 
I am.” But I is not just an individual; I is the subject that stands in for individual process 
of being. Signifiers are only analogous to the being of the subject just as the subject is 
only analogous to the individual. Biesecker (2000) concludes “that for Burke the human 
being is constituted in and by a resident rift or internal action/motion differential” (p. 27). 
“Resident rift” is one of my favorite ways of putting the subjective situation because even 
as she argues that “the [Burkean] human being is constituted in” this rift, it is the rift that 
resides, it is the rift that is the resident rather than a residence. One might rethink 
Nietzsche’s abysmal thought into “the abyss peers back into the abyss.”  To the point, it 
is not uncommon to talk about the objective signifiers themselves as the subject (I = 
single white female), rather than as the subjective viewpoint as the analogy for itself (I 
am what I and others call a single white female), because such a strategy appears to 
temporarily offer a far more concrete sense of reality. This is the same overall issue with 
materialist constitutive rhetoric—the complexities of the “modest” signifiers for and of 
the subject are largely taken for granted. This is what Burke means by “naïve verbal 
realism.” More precisely, Lacan (1978) further explains the functioning of signifiers, that 
“in order for these traces of perception to pass into memory, they must first be effaced in 
perception, and reciprocally, a simultaneity. He refers to this simultaneity as “signifying 
synchrony” (pp. 45-46). One can also liken this functioning to myths.  Barthes (1972), for 
instance explains, “in the eyes of the myth-consumer [italics Barthes’], the intention, the 
adhomination [sic] of the concept can remain manifest without however appearing to 
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have an interest in the matter: what causes mythical speech to be uttered is perfectly 
explicit, but it is immediately frozen into something natural; it is not read as motive, but 
as reason”(p. 129). “Reason,” here, stands in for both “rational” and “causal,” and it 
performatively expresses the effacement suggested by Lacan—what the I/eye perceives is 
re-presented as fact. 
In this way, the signifiers are made into ontic facts. This is the beginning of the 
principle of substitution and therefore hierarchy. What is unfolding here is the precise 
passing away of the subject within the Burkean frame. Just as he has developed the 
process by which the subject performs itself purposively, so too does the subject lose its 
grip, its clinging, on that performance. Biesecker (2000) explains, “if neither action nor 
motion can be understood as ultimately dominated, absorbed, or subsumed by the other in 
the moment of the act, then it is neither possible to conceptualize their relation as 
dialectical in the Hegelian sense of the term (i.e., as a movement toward the supersession 
of binary terms or substance) nor reasonable to understand the human being’s relation to 
the play of those motivational loci as one of mastery” (pp. 27-28). Thus, Biesecker argues 
that the individual human being is “always already in a state of becoming” rather than a 
“controlling or willing subject” master (p. 28). To be clear, the notion of a subject is, in 
fact, not simply lost in the rift so much as the subject is the rift between consciousness 
and a knowable reality. The subject is an empty space that utilizes the analogy of 
consciousness as a manner of activity that might fill the exterior space with itself in such 
a way that can become internalized. 
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Furthermore, Biesecker concludes:  
The point of this somewhat lengthy digression has been to illustrate the way in 
which the ‘paradox of substance’ serves as the methodological trick by means of 
which Burke is able to rewrite an implicitly ontological inquiry into an 
epistemological one. Not only does the paradox of substance enable Burke to 
focus simply on the text or act since scene (that which is, properly speaking, 
outside the act) is incorporated within it, but it also enables him to inquire into 
‘the ultimate ground of motives’ by grammatically analyzing specifically verbal 
acts since what is represented or represents itself in symbolic action is a 
negotiation within an always and already divided agent. (p. 33) 
 
In other words, one could argue that Burke ultimately succumbs to his own naïve verbal 
realism because, “inscribed within the method Burke mobilizes in order to reveal by 
proxy an internal necessity that inaugurates the production of human being as such is the 
guarantee of a failure” (B. A. Biesecker, pp. 38-39).  
Biesecker (2000) argues that Burke’s desire to materialize a subject, to give his 
human being a Platonic weight, is what “occludes the possibility of assuring the accuracy 
of his explanation of the human being if only because he seeks to situate his inquiry at an 
absolute point of origin, a point outside history, anterior to the historical emergence of 
human being” (p. 39). But, the piece that Biesecker is missing is the fact that Burke had 
to begin from a point of failure; the human being has to be incompletely substantiated, 
because otherwise there would be no need for being collectively or otherwise. Burke gave 
himself his own Babel. 
One can easily see the tortured failure of the Burkean subject later in Rhetoric as 
Burke (1969b) tries to salvage the rotten individual. He begins with a rudimentary 
description, “A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are 
joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests 
are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (p. 20). But the 
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distinctness increasingly devolves into a mere materialistic, thus ontic and essentialist, 
separation of bodies rather than subjectivities: ”Here are ambiguities of substance. In 
being identified with B, A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at 
the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined 
and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another” (p. 21). And it 
is critical that he names the ambiguity of substance here because it reveals the equally 
superficial reality of materialism that is only deepened by the presence of the possibility 
of the human being itself. And he leaves us with a beautiful psychoanalytic opening by 
declaring, “While consubstantial with its parents, with the ‘firsts’ from which it is 
derived, the offspring is nonetheless apart from them. In this sense, there is nothing 
abstruse in the statement that the offspring both is and is not one with its parentage (p. 
21). 
Biesecker (2000) offers two questions: “How can ontology be anything other than 
a constantly thwarted attempt to explain the nature of the human being? and Does 
ontology itself not become little more than a cathected desire to produce an exposition on 
man?” (p. 29) My answer is an emphatic, “Yes!” And in this way, one can argue from a 
Burkean perspective, as conceived here, that rhetoric, vis-à-vis identification, and 
ontological desire are substantially the same—that free will is truly a matter of opinion. 
This opinion, though, is always already presented to us at one of the most foundational 
levels of identification and interpellation—“the negative.” The negative, for Burke, is like 
Hagrid telling Harry Potter he’s a wizard. But, Burke makes his magic real through 
rhetoric. For Burke (1969b), rhetoric makes action real by inducing a response in another 
whose very essence responds to symbols—identification (p. 43-46). Not unlike Althusser, 
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Burke cannot leave the individual subject empty, but the negative offers him a way out. 
As Gunn (2008b) observes, Burke is a “not me” kind of guy when regarding the initiation 
of the subject (Gunn, 2008b, p. 148). For Burke (1969a), the negative comes to us first—
the what I am not (the “not me”) suggests to me both that I am and what I might be (pp. 
295-300). He notes that the negative is a “function of desire, or expectations, or interest 
[italics Burke’s]” (p. 296), and that this “’pure’ personality” and “purposiveness” that 
appears as a response to this sense of the negative is often described through the 
“imagery of a voice calling within” (pp. 300-301). Altogether, this is the “voice” of the I 
must be that is informed by the other’s demanding presentation of self. I must be is 
introduced to and as me as and by not me. I must be that type of I am. 
The Lacanian Subject 
 Biesecker (2000) notes that “Despite the fact that, properly speaking, motive is 
not the act and the act is not the motive, one can gain access to motive by way of a 
systematic analysis of the act for which motive has served as the context or generating 
ground” (p. 31). In other phenomenological words, by looking around the edges of our 
“resident rift” at the active signifiers that appear to repeatedly point towards the potential 
contents of the rift—or lack there of—we may ascertain the subjective causality. This 
might be understood as a comforting opening for psychoanalysis, but Lacan does not 
offer much relief. The rift is still a rift no matter how much Burke attempts to substantiate 
it. Elkins (1996) succinctly observes that to Lacan, “the very idea that we are unified 
selves is entirely fictional, a lie that we tell ourselves in order to keep going. In reality 
(that is, in the world we can never face), my sense of myself is a desperate fiction, a 
“symptom” of being human” (p. 74). My point here is to be clear that a psychoanalytic 
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approach to rhetoric will not deliver some magical being that operates the body and its 
persona. 
The subject is not only a fictive causal agent, but the subject is also something 
who is caused and thus has a cause that emerges from somewhere other than the Other 
not me: namely, the unconscious me that is not I. As Lacan (1978) directly suggests: 
I am not saying that Freud introduces the subject into the world—the subject as 
distinct from psychical function, which is a myth, a confused nebulosity—since it 
was Descartes who did this. But I am saying that Freud addresses the subject in 
order to say to him the following, which is new—Here, in the field of the dream, 
you are at home. Wo es war, soll Ich werden. (p. 44) 
 
But, the dream, like the subject, is a linguistic product of the unconscious as well. 
Referring to the ancient idea of dreams as messages from the gods, as voices calling 
within, Lacan begins to manifest this new subject with the argument that, “What concerns 
us is the tissue that envelops these messages, the network in which, on occasion, 
something is caught” (1978, p. 45). The subject that now walks the plank is explicitly the 
subject of the unconscious that is invoked via hailing and made visible but remains 
illusive nonetheless. The tissue is the fictive but driven interpellation of the subject within 
the individual as the orienting lens at the service of consciousness, and the something that 
is caught is the signifying “petit objet a” that aids in the self-perpetuation of a conscious 
subject that has a touch of a deterministic quality in its desire for survival. 
To momentarily step back into Burke in order to tie him to Freud in such a way 
that will demarcate Lacan’s departure from both, it is important to observe that Burke 
does not write “motive” as simply a substitute for “will.” A “will” might be enveloped by 
the idea of a “drive” or of the “subject” itself. Rather, “motive” causally and essentially 
operates at the center of both in precisely the same way as the quite essential Freudian 
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unconscious (Burke, 1969a, p. 431). In other words, it is a mistake to read motive as bias. 
Although one can, at times, read motive as precisely subjective bias. Rather, motive is an 
essential prompt, prior to the negative and rhetoric, which calls for a response. And, as 
such, Lacan (1978) offers the Freudian “residential rift” by the name of the “causal gap” 
(p. 46). The “causal gap” represents Lacan’s departure from Freud’s (and Burke’s) 
essentialism.  For Lacan, Freud, too, is caught up in an “ontological desire” for greater 
certainty of some underlying unity (p. 46). But Lacan’s departure from Freud is also his 
addition to Freud. As he says of Freud’s certainty, “Opposite his certainty, there is the 
subject” (p. 47), or to be exact, the Lacanian subject that is the subject of the 
unconscious.  
To understand how this is, one must, as previewed, return to the  “Burning Child” 
dream that Freud (1965) believes to both fully explain and fully undo everything (p. 549).	  
It is within interpretation (of dreams, symptomatic acts, verbal slips, and laughter) that 
the human subject attempts to catch a glimpse of the real. As Lacan (1978) suggestively 
beckons, “what we have in the discovery of psycho-analysis is an encounter, an essential 
encounter—an appointment to which we are always called with a real that eludes us” (p. 
53).	  
To preface the importance of the dream, it is helpful to note the basic nature of the 
drives in greater detail. As is within the popular lexicon, there are the Freudian anal and 
oral drives that are sexually expository. When speaking of drives, psychoanalysts are not 
speaking of instinctual needs such as hunger or breathing. Rather, psychoanalysts are 
speaking of the ways that individuals manifest their reality through a desire to be realized 
and recognizable. The anal and oral drives are, as such, demands (Lacan, 1978, p. 180). 
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The Lacanian additions, or further elaborations, known as the scopic and invocatory 
drives are the “partial drives” of desire (p. 180). They are the reaches and the reached of 
the subject of the unconscious. All drives pass through the grammatical voices, the 
structural “circuit,” of the drives in the form of active (to see, to hear), reflexive (to see 
oneself, to hear oneself), and passive (to be seen, to be heard) so that subjects make 
themselves both seen and heard in order to encounter the real (pp. 180-200). One might 
also understand these circuitous points as the internalization of externally apprehended 
rhetorical personae in which individuals come to contextually comprehend themselves as 
the subject positions of me, you, and them. Through these points, subjects attempt real 
encounters that are always missed, in part, because of these points. In other words, my 
need to position my self causes me to miss the encounter. 
Barthes (1981) explains the impossibility of real encounters through the Buddhist 
designation for reality, “sunya, the void” and adds the term “tathata,” which “in Sanskrit 
[…] suggests the gesture of the child pointing his finger at something and saying: that, 
there it is, lo!” (pp. 4-5). Barthes, here, is passing photographs through the circuit and 
finding his own “thatness” thwarted at this edge of, not the void, but voidness—
“sunyata.”  
Lacan (1978) offers another dream of his own to preface the “Burning Child” 
dream. It is a daydream that occurs in his office where he has fallen asleep and someone 
has knocked upon his door. The knock is incorporated in some way into his dream as it 
slowly registers to him that he must wake up, “But here I must question myself as to what 
I am at that moment—at the moment, so immediately before and so separate, which is 
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that in which I began to dream under the effect of the knocking which is, to all 
appearances, what woke me” (p. 56). He continues: 
Observe what I am directing you towards—towards the symmetry of that 
structure that makes me, after the awakening knock, able to sustain myself, 
apparently only in relation with my representation, which, apparently, makes me 
only consciousness. A sort of involuted [sic] reflection—in my consciousness, it 
is only my representation that I recover possession of. (p. 57) 
 
Here, in his awakening process, he ventures into his subjectivity. He adventures into the 
way that he has representatively defined himself as the way he makes sense of the reality 
that beckons him to awaken. There is a point in between that he designates as “the gap 
itself that constitutes awakening” (p. 57). It is at this point that Lacan returns to the 
“Burning Child” dream.  
“The dream,” in its entirety, is as follows: 
A father had been watching beside his child’s sick-bed for days and nights on end. 
After the child had died, he went into the next room to lie down, but left the door 
open so that he could see from his bedroom into the room in which his child’s 
body was laid out, with tall candles standing round it. An old man had been 
engaged to keep watch over it, and sat beside the body murmuring prayers. After 
a few hours’ sleep, the father had a dream that his child was standing beside his 
bed, caught him by the arm and whispered to him reproachfully: ‘Father, don’t 
you see I’m burning?’ He woke up, noticed a bright glare of light from the next 
room, hurried into it and found that the old watchman had dropped off to sleep 
and that the wrappings and one of the arms of his beloved child’s dead body had 
been burned by a lighted candle that had fallen on them. (Freud, 1965, pp. 547-
548) 
 
This is the retelling of the dream that is at the heart of psychoanalysis according to both 
Freud and Lacan. For Lacan, everything is within reach with this dream, and, for Freud, 
this is the dream that undoes everything and forces a rebuilding of dream analysis. Thus, 
it is particularly interesting to note that the father does not introduce it to Freud. Rather, 
Freud is told about this dream by one of his female patients who “heard it in a lecture on 
dreams” (Freud, p. 547). As such, in a classic Freudian moment, everything is 
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encountered within his consultation with a female patient. The recounting of the dream is 
itself a subjective adventure with regard to a dream. This fact does not actually take away 
from the interpretation of the dream. It, in a way, enhances the dream’s analytical life as a 
particularly rhetorical event.  
Freud (1965), the woman patient, and the lecturer agree that “The explanation of 
this moving dream is simple enough;” namely, “The glare of light shone through the open 
door into the sleeping man’s eyes and led him to the conclusion which he would have 
arrived at if he had been awake, namely that a candle had fallen over and set something 
alight in the neighborhood of the body” (p. 548). Freud adds, “It is even possible that he 
had felt some concern when he went to sleep as to whether the old man might not be 
incompetent to carry out his task” (p. 548). This collective interpretation is logical 
enough, even with a touch of guilt. Freud continues that, “the words spoken by the child 
must have been made up of words which he had actually spoken […] and which were 
connected with important events in the father’s mind” (p. 548). As simple as this little 
aside by Freud may seem, a very complex suggestion has been made. Here, within the 
dream, Freud articulates the process of the representative signification of possible real 
events. In the dream, according to Freud, the father has transformed memories into 
meaning in such a way that is forming his understanding of his unconscious awareness of 
the present. And here is where, as Lacan says, “everything is within reach”: 
But, having recognized that the dream was a process with a meaning, and that it 
can be inserted into the chain of the dreamer’s psychical experiences, we may still 
wonder why it was that a dream occurred at all in such circumstances, when the 
most rapid possible awakening was called for. (Freud, 1965, p. 548) 
 
It is disturbing to think that the answer to the child’s question is, “Yes.” The subject qua 
father does see. More to the point, the answer appears to be, “Yes, but.” Freud surmises 
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what he considers “the most striking psychological characteristic of the process of 
dreaming: a thought, and as a rule a thought of something that is wished, is objectified in 
the dream, is represented as a scene, or as it seems to us, is experienced” (p. 572). Our 
experience of reality is a repetition at this juncture, a narrative retelling, a re-presentation, 
again and again of the scene at hand. As Cathy Caruth (1996) observes: 
The specific wish behind the dream of the burning child, the wish to see the child 
again, Freud suggests, like the wish behind any dream, is tied to a more basic 
desire, the desire of consciousness as such not to wake up. It is not the father 
alone who dreams to avoid his child’s death, but consciousness itself that, in its 
sleep, is tied to a death from which it turns away. It is not primarily the wish to 
keep the child alive that motivates the father’s sleep but rather the wish of the 
consciousness to sleep that—even at the expense of a burning reality—motivates 
the dream. The dream is thus no longer simply linked to a wish within the 
unconscious fantasy world of the psyche; it is rather, Freud seems to suggest, 
something in reality itself that makes us sleep. (p. 97) 
 
In Caruth’s articulation, there are actually three aspects of the father: one that is how he 
imagines himself, one that is how he represents himself, and the one that dreams. But, of 
course, Freud (1965) is still concerned only with the father that dreams, and suggests that 
the dream was the “fulfillment of a wish,” that “If the father had woken up first and then 
made the interference that led him to go into the next room, he would, as it were, have 
shortened his child’s life by that moment of time” (p. 548). This is what Lacan means by 
Freud’s “certainty.” Again, the Freudian unconscious that somehow manages the dream 
is more than a largely unconscious body that is also conscious (the Lacanian view); rather 
it is an essential self along the lines of Kierkegaard’s spiritual awareness. 
There is a very real realness to Freud’s unconscious, where memory is very like 
Barthes’ photographs and even closer to a documentary film perhaps. But, Lacan (1978) 
argues, “Recollection is not a Platonic reminiscence—it is not the return of a form, an 
imprint, a eidos of beauty and good, a supreme truth, coming to us from the beyond” (p. 
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47). Instead, “It is something that comes to us from the structural necessities, something 
humble, born at the level of the lowest encounters and of all the talking crowd that 
precedes us, at the level of the structure of the signifier, of the languages spoken in a 
stuttering, stumbling way, but which cannot elude constraints whose echoes, model, style 
can be found” (p. 47). Here, Lacan offers the self-sustaining subject of the dream through 
re-collection—not the self-creating, but the self-sustaining subject who does so through 
interpretively piecing together only what has already been found. The father is invoked 
and he sees the truth of it in the dream just as in the past. It is this subject of the father, 
not of the child, that lives one moment longer. The subject qua father holds on to the false 
security of the subject qua father. But it is also this subject that forever misses the 
encounter with the real child. It is this subject, the father qua father, that is forever caught 
in the traumatic loop of a missed encounter.  
Lacan (1978) explains, that, “the encounter, forever missed, has occurred between 
the dream and awakening, between the person who is still asleep and whose dream we 
will not know and the person who has dreamt merely in order not to wake up” (p. 59). 
Like the knocking dream, Lacan points to the gap between the father qua father and the 
subject qua father, the gap between the subject of the unconscious and the subject that is 
made conscious by consciousness, what dreams and who wakes up. So, it is not a matter 
of going deeper into Burke’s rift to discover the subject of the unconscious as much as it 
is a matter of discovering its overwhelmingly fundamental lack. In this way, Lacan 
reveals the heartbreaking truth that “Only a rite, an endlessly repeated act, can 
commemorate this not very memorable encounter—for no one can say what the death of 
a child is, except the father qua father, that is to say, no conscious being” (p. 59).  
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In other words, Lacan is pointing towards the unbearable reality that Elkins suggested 
human beings cannot face. Caruth (1996) is helpful in gaining a grip on the revelation at 
hand:   
The relation between the burning within and the burning without is thus neither a 
fiction (as in Freud’s interpretation) nor a direct representation, but a repetition 
that reveals, in its temporal contradiction, how the very bond of the father to the 
child—his responsiveness to the child’s words—is linked to the missing of the 
child’s death. To awaken is thus precisely to awaken only to one’s repetition of a 
previous failure to see in time. The force of the trauma is not the death alone, that 
is, but the fact that, in his very attachment to the child, the father is unable to 
witness the child’s dying as it occurred. Awakening, in Lacan’s reading of the 
dream, is itself the site of a trauma, the trauma of the necessity and impossibility 
of responding to another’s death. (p. 100) 
 
The father could not bear witness to the child’s death. Instead, he could only bear witness 
to the dying of the father qua father. Additionally, the “necessity” is a matter of both 
unavoidability and expectation of a father’s response to the death of a child that 
continuously presents itself to this father-no-longer. Freud (1965), in fact, argues dreams 
are merely “psychical acts” that are “transformed into dream-shape” through a method of 
“clothing it in a sensory situation and in the present tense” (p. 589).  
This is not an innocuous claim in the context of the burning dream. This 
conclusion is far darker of an idea. It is the idea that the dream is the very translation, or 
transformation, of both the subject qua father, and the father qua father, into the subject 
that is no longer a father and thus a subject of the gap. To be the subject of the gap in 
such a conscious way is a tremendously traumatizing variation of identification. To even 
approach it here has the feel of impossibility. 
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Caruth (1996) observes the foundational importance of this presenting aspect of 
the dream: 
This peculiar movement therefore traces a significant itinerary on Freud’s thought 
from trauma as an exception, an accident that takes consciousness by surprise and 
thus disrupts it, to trauma as the very origin of consciousness and all of life itself. 
The global theoretical itinerary is revisited in Lacan’s interpretation of the dream 
of the burning child, in his suggestion that the accidental in trauma is also a 
revelation of a basic, ethical dilemma at the heart of consciousness itself insofar 
as it is essentially related to death, and particularly to the death of others. 
Ultimately, then, the story of father and child is, for Lacan, the story of an 
impossible responsibility of consciousness in its own originating relation to 
others, and specifically to the death of others. As an awakening, the ethical 
relation to the real is the revelation of this impossible demand at the heart of 
human consciousness. (p. 104) 
 
One might consider this to be precisely Lacan’s Burkean Babel moment—the 
overwhelming impossibility of being the humans that humans believe they must be. 
Lacan (1978) lingers on the brutality of the dream’s invocation: “Father can’t you see 
I’m burning? This sentence is itself a firebrand—of itself it bring fire where it falls—and 
one cannot see what is burning, for the flames blind us” (p. 59). What is ultimately 
devastating is that in the dream there are only representations of the subject qua subject—
yes, representations of the subject’s representation. It is all too unreal.  
For Freud, the illusion of being present is primarily in the dream, whereas Lacan 
does not stop at the point of supposed awakening by his very presentation of the nature of 
the subject as the one who is called forth from signifiers. Caruth (1996) explains, “the 
father is no longer the father of a living child, but precisely now the father as the one who 
can say [italics Caruth’s] what the death of a child is,” which is to say he “transmits the 
otherness of the dead child” (p. 106). This is the new position of the one who was a 
father. It is also a subject position that interpolates other subject positions through 
Caruth’s notion of awakening. 
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But what is the awakening?  This awakening is an awakening to “thatness.” My 
“thatness,” my “tathata,” gives me my sense of realness, but at the greatest moments of 
“thatness” (when becoming the abject “jettisoned object”) I experience trauma because 
even as it seems to establish my realness, traumatic events threaten my mortal existence 
with the awareness of my inevitable death and my fictional existence as an individual 
unified subject/self, which is the foundational problem of the real that I cannot face. And 
so, I fail to be real, or at least I attempt to fail to be real as a strategy for psychical 
survival. Caruth (1996) offers the hope that “such a transmission […] can be transformed 
into the imperative of a speaking that awakens others” (p. 108). But, to what do we loss 
survivors hope to awaken others to? What does awakening, here, resist? What the subject 
resists is the unconscious reality, which is to say the subject resists its utter emptiness 
simply because it must be—to which Lacan replies, not necessarily. We forever miss our 
encounter with the real, because we are, at the very point of the real, stubbornly not. In 
our stumble, we take note of our translation, but we do not notice the moment when our 
eyes are closed as much as we remember it, or “It is what, for us, is represented in the 
term neurosis of destiny or neurosis of failure. What is missed is not adaptation, but 
tuché, the encounter” (Lacan, 1978, p. 69). In short, psychoanalysis, from this particular 
Lacanian point of view, is precisely the awakening analysis of our lack that the subjects 
denies and secretly craves. 
The Barthesian Subject 
 At the core of the process of the subject being as a human being (subject qua 
human being) is not being, or the resistance of the subject against the unconscious reality 
of lack, which is a matter of bodies in discourse with desire. It is important to underscore 
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the shift to subject qua human being as this specifically denotes the subject at least 
partially taking its cue from the bodily experience as metaphor. Namely, the subject qua 
human being is the subject of the unconscious. In any case, it is a matter of desperately 
beginning as failure. This emptiness has been located in the stumbling body through the 
action/motion differential of motive and in the subject of the dream that emerges from the 
unconscious, and now we shall see it in the individual genius at the solstice of the 
symbol: namely, the death of the author.  
While this portion of the chapter is dedicated to the aforementioned essay on the 
author, it is worth noting that Barthes points out in Camera Lucida (1981) that a 
photograph begins with a photographer looking through a “little hole” (pp. 9-10). In the 
end, the same could be said of the author in the context of the nuclear rift that has been 
established up to this point. It may seem as though Barthes is simply discussing the 
interpretive impossibility of a critical reader knowing the author’s intent at this point in 
literary history, but his arguments are actually far more radical and very much in line 
with the Lacanian evacuation of materialist meaning.  
Indeed, as Barthes articulates in the opening of “The Death of the Author” 
(1978a), “Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, 
the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing” 
(p. 142). Barthes, as a great lover of the written form, extends his critical reach beyond 
the ink and papered symbol to acknowledge “As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with 
a view into acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally outside of 
any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself, this disconnection 
occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death” (p. 142). This 
 81 
textual death extends beyond traditional sense of the written text into the realm of 
performative oratory and even shamanism (p. 142). For Barthes, the author, in as far as 
the author is presented in a text, is only an aspect of the medium of collective imagination 
and “his [individual] ‘genius’” is merely an interpretive sleight of hand “not at all to be 
confused with the castrating objectivity of the realist novelist” but a “ point where only 
language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’” (p. 143). Obviously, Barthes locates his “not 
me” in textuality. 
Barthes does not suggest that literary language, or formal language, is not a way 
in which subjectivity itself reaches and is reached towards. For him, it absolutely is. 
Lacanian psychoanalytic “castration” discourse is only metaphorically a matter of 
sexuality. In our regard, we yearn in many ways. When I consider the parts of me that 
yearn, I am not limited to sexual pleasure and neither is jouissance—Lacan’s term for 
Freud’s suicidal connection between the death drive and erotic desire that can never be 
satisfied. To that suicidal point, Barthes (1978a) spells out precisely the current 
undertaking in this chapter which is being the very “destruction of the Author” as “an 
empty process, functioning perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled with 
the person” of materialist ideology (p. 145). Of course, the only addition to this would be 
that Lacan fully extends the logic of the subject to the person, which is also true of 
Burke’s bodily act. And Barthes finds himself in league with the fullness of these 
“deaths” by further vanquishing the possibility of originality (p. 146). 
Barthes brings his textuality into the very heart of the human. Just as Burke could 
not escape the auto-motion of the subject and Lacan manifested the vanishing gap of the 
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dream, Barthes trots out the declamation of interpretive being itself. He even has his own 
Burkean Babel moment: 
We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant 
antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it sets 
aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing its future, it is 
necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the 
death of the Author. (Barthes, 1978a, p. 148) 
 
 However, Barthes, like Burke’s doomed ontology, has already emptied out the reader as 
well but noting the emptiness of the subject. But, his positing of “the reader” subject 
position brings back an important constitutive rhetoric principle—that the individual 
finds sense in reading and being read. Barthes offers the reader as not the first persona 
critic but as the first persona analyst. This is the I that reads you for the sake of both you 
and I. This is a beautiful failure on Barthes’ part, but a fatal one nonetheless. There is a 
heavy reality to the subject that I do not pretend to alleviate—particularly in the context 
of suicide. As Lacan (1978) notes, “the real brings with it the subject, almost by force” 
(p. 54). This is the “tuché” he speaks of, the very chance for the subject. It is the way in 
which we discover the yearning of our hearts amidst our mounting anxieties of 
awakening to the world.  
Barthes (1981) puts the plight of the subject, the heart of its impossibility, 
beautifully by explaining the “disorder […] revealed by my desire to write on 
Photography, corresponded to a discomfort I had always suffered from: the uneasiness of 
being a subject” (p. 8). Within this resistance some of us find hope. Our dis-ease could 
suggest an alternative if we let it, but the terrible risk of this gesture is the risk of one’s 
complete unraveling, one’s always lurking potential suicide by way of no longer 
repressing our beginning as failure. What distorted form does our lack take? 
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Identification as Demand 
What is the “successful” human response to this overwhelming lack? For Burke, 
it is the redemption found in identification. For Lacan, it is the affirmation in 
psychoanalytic transference. For Barthes, it is the pleasure of reading. But, for Barthes, 
reading is also bound up in mourning. As he writes, “to mourn is to be alive” (Barthes, 
2005, p. 10), but mourning is also the process of letting go of one’s false sense of control 
over meaning (p. 14). Thus, while to read is to mourn towards the third meaning as a 
form of hope, it is also the threat of mourning towards hopelessness. This hopelessness is 
the danger of our regard. 
Barthes (1981) declares, “It is my political right to be a subject which I must 
protect” (p. 15). Burke (1969b) argues, “A doctrine of consubstantiality, either explicit or 
implicit, may be necessary to any way of life” (p. 29). Gunn (2008b) explains that 
consubstantiality is both the promise and the desire passed between two individuals that 
can neither be delivered nor satiated (p. 140). Inherent in Burke’s argument is the very 
meaty notion of what it means to matter and what it means to gather in mass. It is also 
arguably the meat of his search for motive. But, it also speaks to a fundamental truth 
about the drives—that they constitutively cannot be satiated or else they, and thus we, 
will cease. The drives perpetuate the denial of and insistence upon lack. 
Lacan (1978) explains this phenomenon as “souffrance” in which “Reality is in 
abeyance” and “awaiting attention” because of the “constraint” that “governs the very 
diversions of the primary process” (pp. 55-56). Souffrance begins to underscore the 
importance of Lacan’s point that, “Descartes apprehends his I think in the enunciation of 
the I doubt, not in its statement, which still bears all of this knowledge to be put in doubt” 
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(p. 44). A successful unified analysis requires discretion. As already noted, when Lacan 
speaks of encounters, he is actually speaking of missed encounters. Thus, “souffrance,” 
meaning to be both held in suspense and held in pain, operates as Lacan’s description of 
the subject’s most real experiences, which the subject representatively repeats as a 
method of diversion from the painful suspension that is its reality of lack. In other words, 
“I must be” is not the statement of fact that Descartes would have in his “I am,” but a 
statement of desire within a context of doubt brought about by the existence of the Other 
who is presumably operating as the “not me” answer to our ontological inquiry that we 
can only hope to know.  
It is for this reason that “in order to cure the hysteric of all her symptoms, the best 
way is to satisfy her hysteric’s desire—which is for her to posit her desire in relation to us 
as an unsatisfied desire—leaves entirely to one side the specific question of why she can 
sustain her desire only as an unsatisfied desire” (Lacan, 1978, p. 12). In short, Lacan is 
spelling out the meaning of “the talking cure” as is often the descriptor of psychoanalytic 
therapy. But, he is also describing a particular understanding of transference that occurs 
in psychoanalysis. As Judith Butler (2005) observes in Giving an Account of Oneself, 
which is an ethical account of the loss of self, the psychoanalyst plays the you to the 
analysand’s I (pp. 50-51). But, transference in psychoanalysis is a matter of the analyst 
only allowing the patient-subject to view the analyst as the “objet a” of desire in so far as 
it is clearly known that the analyst is not the object of desire that actually desires the 
patient-subject. It is pure representational and theatrical catharsis. And, Lacan is not 
merely discussing therapeutic practice; rather, Lacan is discussing the nature of the 
subject and thus the nature of interpretive being within the context of our dialectical 
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existence. You, for me, is the you that I desire to be in such a way that validates my 
understanding of me. But, then, I am the same for you and both are ultimately and 
necessarily empty gestures if we are to go on being as we currently are, and as 
importantly, want to be.  
 Barthes’ estimation of the photograph is driven by his dialectical system of 
studium and punctum. As you may recall, Barthes is off in thinking of this photograph as 
an Encounter, but he has a point in regarding this photograph as the Real. Barthes is using 
“this” to indicate any photograph that seems to appeal to us, that calls the subject forth in 
some way and becomes a capital “P” photograph. He is off because it is clear that Barthes 
is attempting, in Camera Lucida, to articulate the difference between photography and 
other visual images in such a way that posits the Photograph as more real so that we 
might understand this Photograph as an actual encounter with the real. But, of course, this 
is only Barthes’ explicit desire, and this desire mirrors the very reality of subjectivity. 
However, Barthes is ultimately more right than wrong. We may view the photograph as 
very much the remarkably accurate representation of our missed encounter with the real. 
This Photograph precisely freezes our Missed Encounter. Barthes’ assertion is a rather 
sophisticated one, and this sophistication emerges within his productive discussion of his 
aforementioned dialectical system. 
 His initial explanation of studium is, “application to a thing, taste for someone, a 
kind of general, enthusiastic commitment, of course, but without special acuity. It is by 
studium that I am interested in so many photographs, whether I receive them as political 
testimony or enjoy them as good historical scenes: for it is culturally (this connotation is 
present in studium) that I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, 
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the actions” (Barthes, 1981, p. 26). It could be argued that studium is akin to cultural 
hegemony—the effacement that occurs in the naturalization and transformation of myth 
into reason by way of Lacan’s signifying synchrony. Punctum, on the other hand, “is the 
element which rises from the scene, shoots out from it like an arrow, and pierces me. A 
Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, this mark made by a pointed 
instrument” and also a “sting, speck, cut, little whole—and also a cast of the dice” (pp. 
26-27). In these two concepts, Barthes offers an exposition on the elements at play in the 
kinds of photographs that specifically catch our I/eye. Barthes captures the idea of 
Lacan’s souffrance in his photographic thought—the subject, both looking subject and 
the photographed subject, is held in abeyance. What is significant in this dialectical 
system is very much the same as Biesecker’s point about the internality of Burke’s 
action/motion differential. A reader of photography can locate an external representation 
and mechanism for the internal process at work when the reader regards certain 
photographs. In other words, Barthes’ studium/punctum articulation of this photograph is 
both a metaphor for and initiation of the internality and externality of subjectivity in the 
way that punctum casts doubt.   
However, there is the potential of a reversal at play here that must be given some 
attention. Intuitively, one might consider Barthes’ “studium” to be most akin to Burke’s 
“motion;” and, likewise, Barthes’ “punctum” would be reflective of Burke’s “action.” 
The assumption here would be that the studium is representative of the general morass 
and the punctum is representative of what makes a photograph stand out as a unique 
individual. But, upon closer examination, you discover that it is the studium that “I 
participate in” and the punctum that is the “accident,” which would be a direct inversion 
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of Burke’s action/motion differential. Barthes (1981) furthers this reversal of sorts in a 
way, though, that actually finds a clear home within the Burkean logic with the following 
description of studium that speaks well to Burke’s sense of form: 
To recognize the studium is inevitably to encounter the photographer’s intentions, 
to enter into harmony with them, to approve or disapprove of them, but always to 
understand them, to argue them within myself, for culture (from which the 
studium derives) is a contract arrived at between creators and consumers. (pp. 27-
28)  
 
This is reminiscent of the Burke’s logic that communication between the estranged must, 
in some way, be thought of as possible for mystery to take hold. It is in studium that the 
viewer can safely articulate success or failure and move on as an intact subject. But, it is 
the punctum that threatens with a failure that lingers. And, so, when a photograph 
contains both studium and punctum, it contains both the lure and the hook from which we 
try to renegotiate and pull away. This photograph shows both repetition and failure in 
such a way that the repetition-and-failure stands out. It is in this instance, though, that we 
find the harmony of the seeming reversal. In the accidental fall, the punctum presents 
itself as the possibility of choosing a different and thus presents the potential for the 
subject to fully emerge. But, it is also in this hopeful promise of action that the 
automotive reality of studium, and thus our ultimate and collective failure to fully be 
subjects, is revealed. And it is for this reason that individuals often intentionally surround 
themselves with photographs that present only the single element of studium. As Barthes 
(1981) observes, “The unary Photograph has every reason to be banal, ‘unity’ of 
composition being the first rule of vulgar (and = notably, of academic) rhetoric: ‘The 
subject,’ says one handbook for amateur photographers, ‘must be simple, free of useless 
accessories; this is called the Search for Unity’” (p. 41). It is best to not distract from the 
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success of form one might say. And, so we return to the place of the subject, which is the 
dream.  
 But then, when speaking of psychoanalysis, it is always important to note that, “it 
in no way allows us to accept some such aphorism as life is a dream. No praxis is more 
oriented towards that which, at the heart of experience, is the kernel of the real than 
psycho-analysis” (Lacan, 1978, p. 53). This is, on the one hand, Lacan’s way of insisting 
that psychoanalysis is far from some sort of Platonic Idealism. On the other hand, it is 
perhaps the most important and complicated notion to grasp in psychoanalysis, which is 
precisely beginning as failure. Lacan (1978) argues that: 
The real may be represented by the accident, the noise, the small element of 
reality, which is evidence that we are not dreaming. But, on the other hand, this 
reality is not so small, for what wakes us is the other reality hidden behind the 
lack of that which takes the place of representation—this, says Freud is the Trieb. 
(p. 60) 
 
This could be understood as a Lacanian articulation of the Freudian reality drive, not to 
mention a clear parallel to Barthes’ punctum/studium dialectic, because “Trieb” is the 
German term for what is meant by “drive” in psychoanalytic parlance. But, first, think 
about what Lacan is specifically suggesting here. The real, for the subject, is defined by 
that which punctuates, thus ends, the subject’s ability to wholly remain as the subject sees 
itself in its representations; and it is this small but significant failure that drives the 
subject to be as it represent itself in the place of its lack because it is the subject’s 
representations that allow it to safely make sense of the world as an individual. But, the 
subject does so with help through identification. 
 Again, Burke’s (1969b) pathway to identification passes through suicide. 
Specifically, he revs up to identification with a treatment of Coleridge’s line of poetry, 
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“Victorious Murder a blind Suicide.” “This statement,” he argues, “suggests a point at 
which murder and suicide can become convertible, each in its way an image for the same 
motive” (p. 10). He goes on, “You need to look for a motive that can serve as ground for 
both these choices, a motive that, while not being exactly either one or the other, can 
ambiguously contain them both” (p. 10). Now, we rhetoricians know that he is 
adventuring towards “identification” because that is the most important thing to emerge 
from this text. However, it is important to take note of the path he takes to get there: 
A term serving as ground for both these terms would, by the same token, 
‘transcend’ them. The battlefield, for instance, which permits rival contestants to 
join battle, itself, ‘transcends’ their factionalism, being ‘superior’ to it and 
‘neutral’ to their motives, though the conditions of the terrain may happen to 
favor on faction. The principles of war are not themselves warlike, and are 
ultimately reducible to universal principles of physics and dialectic. Similarly, a 
poet’s identification with imagery of murder or suicide, either one or the other, is, 
from the ‘neutral’ point of view, merely a concern with terms for transformation 
in general. (pp. 10-11) 
 
Not only does Burke articulate “transformation,” rather than an encounter of individual 
identities, as the root of “identification,” he does so with the violent imagery of war in the 
space of the neutralizing text. The “poet’s identification,” then, is a violent 
transformation of what would seem senseless, the actual threat of mystery, into order. So, 
in returning to the series of dialectical systems (e.g., punctum/studium, action/motion, 
and psychoanalytic transference), a profound understanding emerges: that the very 
syntactical act of being a subject is both suicidal and murderously self-sustaining. The 
real, the punctum, the central lack must be overcome by the automotive certainty of a 
repetitive failure that sustains the subject. The subject cannot allow itself to be as it is 
because it is precisely lacking, and the subject cannot allow the same for its Other. I must 
be is the violent underlying transformation within the claim that “written into the 
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Rhetoric is an ontology of the social, an ontology of collective being” (B. A. Biesecker, 
2000, p. 40). As such, I must be is the underlying principle of the identification, which is 
a process of transformational desire. Identification is a demand. I eliminate my self by 
becoming a we so as to validate my I. We academic writers that struggle with my voice 
knows this transformative failure very well. 
 Burke establishes the idea of identification through writing, both the book he is 
producing and the work he is discussing. In other words, the very process by which the 
individual transforms itself into a myself, a subject, is done primarily in the absence of the 
listener (or reader). The demand is to make sense of us as an individual as much as it is to 
make sense of the individual as an us. Lacan works at this understanding through the 
game of “Fort-Da.” The phrase translates into “Gone-There,” and is a reference to 
Freud’s musings on a game he observes a child playing in which the child uses a cotton 
reel to cast about his crib (Lacan, 1978, p. 62). Lacan explains that, “the game of the 
cotton-reel is the subject’s answer to what the mother’s absence has created on the 
frontier of his domain—the edge of his cradle—namely, a ditch, around which one can 
only play at jumping” (p. 62). He goes on, “This reel is not the mother reduced to a little 
ball by some magical game;” rather “it is a small part of the subject that detaches itself 
from him while still remaining his, still retained” (p. 62). In other words, the subject 
creates desire for itself within “objet petit a” as the practice of “objet a.” 
If I think of punctum as a departure from unity, then I enter into an unbearable 
possibility of isolation and nothingness, which drives me to declare, like Barthes’ child of 
tathata pointing her finger, “that, there it is, lo!” I insinuate myself as a replacement for 
lack via my methods of projection and transference. Or, in the Lacanian algebra, the petit 
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a: “It is with his object that the child leaps the frontiers of his domain […] that it is in the 
object to which the opposition is applied in act, the reel, that we must designate the 
subject” (Lacan, 1978, p. 62). What I cast out is “not me,” but it orients the possibility of 
an I without resistance. Thus, it is through the narrative repetition of departure that the 
constitutive transformation of the individual into a subject occurs. That which is other 
than myself invokes me, and in the other’s departure I map myself out. And, it is in this 
way that Lacan (1978) concludes: 
It is the repetition of the mother’s departure as cause of a Spaltung in the 
subject—overcome by the alternating game, fort-da, which is a here or there, and 
whose aim, in its alternation, is simply that of being the fort of a da, and the da of 
a fort. It is aimed at what, essentially is not there, qua represented (pp. 62-63). 
 
“Fort-Da,” then, is another way of saying “objectivity at the behest of subjectivity” and 
that an objective act “out there” somehow validates a subject “in here.” 
 And this form of rhetorical textuality is, in part, a violent act. In other words, the 
Burkean conceptualization of rhetoric, and I argue any conceptualization of rhetoric, is a 
violent transformational elaboration of the cotton reel justified only by the consubstantial 
desire for the individual existence of validation. We rhetorically produce the logic of our 
selves through our individual sensations in the guise of an epistemological objectivity—
meaning we objectify one another. This is why I enjoy Barthes’ (1981) deceptively 
simple statement that “cameras, in short, were clocks for seeing” (p. 15). In these words, 
he captures so much of what is meant by terms such as “visual rhetoric” or the “scopic 
drive.” The camera, for Barthes, is a manufactured managerial machine that represents 
and reproduces the abbreviated visual evidence of visual reality itself in the same way 
that a clock represents and reproduces the abbreviated sequential evidence of time itself. 
They recollect what we forgetfully cast out in order to manage our self-sustaining 
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histories. What I gather and manage from “out there” is also the demand that I must be 
that I place outside of me because it shows that what makes me the I that I claim to be 
can also be objectively claimed and captured precisely because it resists me in a way that 
affirms me rather than the unconscious resistance that dispels me.  
In a more charitable light, one might rethink the violent demand of identification 
as the mourning of our own subjective deaths. Along this line of thinking, Barthes’ 
(2005) concept that he labels “the Neutral” formally emerges in a lecture series that he 
prepared within the same time frame of his mother’s death and subsequently during his 
mourning process (p. 13). The Neutral is Barthes’ operationalization of mourning as the 
context for the emptying out of the subject. Barthes’ Neutral is marked by the event of his 
mother’s death in that the idea preceded her death, but, like Barthes himself, was 
radically altered by that death. The Neutral comes to fruition prior to, within, and 
following mourning in such a way as to posit mourning as the true anchor of his 
meditation, even as his meditation refuses the logic of an anchor. In other words, Barthes 
posits the Neutral as process and in flux, but it is continually, almost statically, haunted 
by the traumatic return of his mother’s death and consequent absence/departure. We may 
move past the accepted or acknowledged period of mourning, but we cannot escape the 
death. Both the mourning and the death formulate the Neutral even if both do not 
comprise it. 
Barthes is not simply mourning his specific loss in this procession of the Neutral. 
He is naming inspiration and mood. He is experiencing out loud the thing that has been a 
lifelong intellectual meditation on death. He adds a bit later in his lecture notes: “To read 
the dead author is, for me, to be alive, for I am shattered, torn by the awareness of the 
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contradiction between the intense life of his text and the sadness of knowing he is dead: I 
am always saddened by the death of an author, moved by the story of the deaths of 
authors. […] To mourn is to be alive” (Barthes, 2005, p. 10). Barthes brings to mind his 
essay while simultaneously mourning real authorial deaths that continuously reach out to 
him as a conscientious and vital reader. For here, as in the aforementioned essay, the life 
of the text always ultimately exists in the critical, perhaps vital even, reader. Reading is 
mourning. We mourn the loss of authority as we begin to find our own. This is perhaps an 
underlying reality of our life text—a conceptual suicide in its own rite. Barthes declares, 
“only death is creative” (p. 10). Because a death, like unconsciousness, is unmoving in 
and of itself, it holds its place forcing all else to rhetorically, interpretively, and 
narratively move around it. It is in that idea, that deathliness, the Neutral begins to take 
shape—a display that continuously repeats authorial suicide.  
To make this idea as clear as possible, consider the studium/punctum system in 
the Neutral/mourning context of time and we can begin to see the full brilliance of the 
camera qua clock. Time itself is timeless. But, in our subjective context, time is the very 
reality of our ultimate demise. In the same way, photographic studium may appear to be 
an eternal capturing of the subject until the punctum reveals the failure of such an 
ambition. In this way, punctum reminds the viewer of a history of the failure to be 
timeless. Now, place that idea back into Barthes’ articulation of the written text as the 
space where all identity is lost. As Barthes (1978a) notes of the authorial demise, “The 
Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his own book: book and 
author stand automatically on a single line divided into a before and an after” (p. 145). 
His proclamation is also the demise of the reader qua subject because we are all defined 
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by the before and after of the eventual text that is read here and now which obscures our 
subjective emergence but certifies our objective end. Barthes concedes this without intent 
when he declares, “We know that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 
‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space 
in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (p. 146). One can 
see Barthes’ idea of the text in a way that spells out Burke’s notion of identification as a 
multi-dimensional space in which a variety of subjects, none of them original, violently 
transform and mourn one another as a means of survival. To mourn is, again, to be alive. 
 I constantly read and write how I am read within an historical process of 
identification. We establish form as the demand for the confession of “not me.” But, in 
each repetition, my failure to be an I am as opposed to the more desperate and uncertain I 
must be is also repeated, because each repetition is always another missed encounter no 
matter its level of elevation. As Lacan (1978) maddeningly posits, “The enclosed aspect 
of the relation between the accident, which is repeated, and the veiled meaning, which is 
the true reality and leads us towards the drive—confirms for us that demystification of 
that artifact of treatment known as the transference does not consist in reducing it to what 
is called the actuality of the situation” (p. 69). Just because the illusion is revealed as an 
illusion does not mean that we can escape it. But then, why would we want to escape this 
illusion? It is the small pleasure that temporarily alleviates a great suffering. There is 
comfort in the idea that we know it is traumatic repetition, pure construct within the real 
as opposed to the real as ideal form, the pleasure derived in the Burkean form as the 
arousal of the appetite to be safely satiated as the beautifully empty validation. In other 
words, we are back to the hysteric who maintains her desire as unsatisfied desire, which 
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is to say the will-to-live and the desire in mourning. As Lacan puts it, “Let us conclude 
that the reality system, however far it is developed, leaves an essential part of what 
belongs to the real a prisoner in the toils of the pleasure principle” (p. 55). 
The demand of identification locates, for the subject, its individual place by 
transcending the individual. In the acceptance of the madness of subjectivity, the subject 
objectifies the other in the place of the object of our desire, the “objet a” transformed in 
the “objet petit a,” while also demanding that the other remains the “objet a” as the 
beholder of our subjectivity. In other words, the subject insists upon the punctum so that 
it might reject the punctum because, again, the subject emerges in the resistance to the 
subject. Failure, in the identification demand, must be simultaneously observed and 
overlooked. But, then, the failure is itself an illusion that results from our dialectical 
exchange, and, as such, this manifestation of suffering is not merely self-inflicted. The 
disconstituent no longer bears the process of the interpellation of the subject that has been 
demanded. Take, for instance, Burke’s (1969b) aforementioned tortured attempt at saving 
the subject in the dialogic identification of A and B. Shortly after, he returns to his 
suicidal formalism to lay out a violent, albeit metaphorical, understanding of 
identification: 
As seen from this point of view, then, an imagery of slaying (slaying of either the 
self or another) is to be considered merely as a special case of identification in 
general. Or otherwise put: the imagery of slaying is a special case of 
transformation, and transformation involves the ideas and imagery of 
identification. That is: the killing of something is the changing of it, and the 
statement of the thing’s nature before and after the change is an identifying of it. 
(pp. 19-20) 
 
Again, here is a point with a before and after in the clutches, or denial, of mortality. And, 
again, we are reminded that Burkean identification is a type of transformational violence. 
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Further, individual subjectivity is itself problematically and necessarily normative. Burke 
moves from this A and B identification to a larger collective and destructive 
identification, which is presumably at odds with another web of identifications. In this 
way, the creation of an us requires the creation of a them on the macro level as a way of 
easing individual divisions within an us on the micro level, which creates a condensation 
of the various signifiers surrounding the nucleus that constitute the individual and 
collective subjectivities at play and at odds. 
Physical violence, and thus an existential threat, erupts at the point at which the 
subjective affirmation is threatened—the point beyond internal resistance at which the 
you negates the I or the them negates the us. The very assumption of an us, identification, 
is already a transformative violence. As Burke (1969b) suggests, “Identification is 
compensatory to division” (Burke, 1969b, p. 22). Identification effaces. Put another way, 
“myth is read as a factual system” (Barthes, 1972, p. 131). The transformation of myth 
into fact, of interpretive being into interpretive knowledge, is the transformation of I must 
be into we must be, and that is no longer an innocuous subjective desire but a normative 
one which is a demand in mass. And, so, rhetoric emerges as the collective ontological 
desire and reach by way of the demanding violence that is the epistemological effacement 
of the unconscious reality that of an internal division, or our resident rift, externally 
projected. In other words, while the resident rift is repressed, it returns as a normative, or 
corrective, suspicious interrogation of the other. 
 Both the disconstituent and the normative constituent subject fail to be the 
subjects that normative subjectivity demands. It is just that the latter individual is more 
successful at repressing the instances in which the unconscious reality, the punctum, 
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reveals itself. The normative constituent subject is more adept at missing the 
incriminating encounter with its own otherness. It is Burke’s act in the fall, the making of 
the fall into a choice (and then looking around to make sure no one saw). It is not a matter 
of recovering from the fall but of tirelessly re-covering the fall again and again. This is 
why Lacan (1978) emphasizes that for Freud, and psychoanalysis in general, repetition 
cannot be equated with reproduction (p. 50). Lacan observes that for Freud, and again 
psychoanalysis, “nothing can be grasped, destroyed, or burnt, except in a symbolic way, 
as one says, in effigies, in absentia” (p. 50). This argument is not necessarily a 
denigration of the realness of bodily suffering so much as a description of how subjects 
act within a network of signifiers that can only ever be missed encounters. Namely, 
Lacan thinks of the act in the same way that Burke conceives of action, and more 
specifically symbolic action, in that any human act must be seen as symbolic if it is to be 
considered anything more than “mere motion.” This is how and why, from a 
psychoanalytic standpoint, “Repetition first appears in a form that is not clear, that is not 
self-evident, like a reproduction, or a making present, in act” (Lacan, p. 50). Repetition is 
always symbolic even when it does not immediately register as such, and all acts are 
repetitions even when they do not register as such. 
 Lacan (1978) etches his argument out further through the analogy of honor 
suicides, or “seppuku” (p. 50). This final act, for Lacan, is the last in a series of 
repetitions for it is an act set into motion long before the actual event occurs. The suicide 
is the ceasing of the repeated subjective failure through an act that simultaneously 
represents the subject at its solstice and annihilates it (p. 50). Lacan continues by drawing 
our attention to the fact that the German word that has been translated into “repetition” 
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within the psychoanalytic lexicon is very close to “to haul” so that one might think it 
“very close to a hauling of the subject, who always drags his thing into a certain path that 
he cannot get out of” (pp. 50-51). Here, Lacan captures the very idea of the repeated 
desire for and denial of real encounters. The subject cannot encounter the real in the way 
the subject thinks it should because the subject is not what it thinks it is supposed to be, 
and this repeated failure drives the subject to distractions that cannot ultimately satisfy its 
unrealistic demands to prove that we are what we want to be, but we identify these 
distractions as our proof nonetheless.  
This sense of identification as a forced hauling of the subject compares well to 
Elkins’ (1996) notion of  “inconstant seeing,” which he describes as “a way of looking 
that skips over some parts and emphasizes others in the service of some unrecognized 
anxiety or desire” (p. 92). Much like subjective contour completion, inconstant seeing is a 
way of forcing the world, including the other, to conform to my/our expectations of it. 
But, while the disconstituent may or may not know that no one can fully conform to these 
expectations, the disconstituent is tragically aware that s/he cannot because s/he is 
consumed by the piercing punctum that is brutally engulfed by the studium. 
 In Barthes’ (1978b) A Lover’s Discourse, he proffers a one sided dialogue from 
the perspective of “A Lover’s” as opposed to “The Lovers’.” Possession is key to his 
treatise with particular attention to having the last word—as he writes, “What is a hero? 
The one who has the last word” (pp. 208-209).This is a fairly extreme variation on the 
normative constituent subject that has been laid out to this point, but it is seemingly 
common. If placed in the context of Lacan’s ruminations on seppuku, an intriguing 
nuance develops that requires some attention. Here, we have an idea of suicide as a 
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power play. Even in its annihilation, the subject finds its solstice, its pinnacle. It controls 
its narrative exit and thus its own rendition of the tale. However, Barthes is articulating 
the trap of control through mastery. In the tragedy, the hero is lost—a common theme 
among those who survive a loved one’s suicide.	  
The Disconstituent and the False Confession 
No matter the sincerity of identification, it is a demand for a false confession. In 
the context of an actual suicide, this violent demand validates survivor’s guilt. The final 
section of this chapter focuses on the entrance and exit of the disconstituent. More 
specifically, this section focuses on the disconstituent choice to cease failing at the 
rhetorical game of Fort-Da. To make sense of this, consider Biesecker’s (2000) point that 
“motive is precisely that which effaces itself in the midst of its material appearance” (p. 
29). Biesecker is pointing towards the ontological motive as opposed by the 
epistemological motive. It is, in fact, the epistemological subjectivity that effaces the 
ontological subjectivity in that the subject presents itself not as proof of itself but as 
knower of proof while simultaneously repressing how it came to be—or, more accurately, 
how it came to pass. If the subject acknowledges its lack of an ontological basis, which 
drives its subjectivity, then the subject can only see its inherent failure. The disconstituent 
brings to the fore this inherent failure on some conscious level via the subversion of the 
motive effacement. In other words, the ontological subjectivity, the resident rift, 
continuously short-circuits the epistemological subjectivity because the failed subject 
only encounters empty gestures of a false faith in the self. The disconstituent is stuck in 
“not me.” 
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Generally, within Burke’s writings, identification is a means of redemption. In 
crossing from “not me” to “me,” the human being atones for the initial failure to be a 
correct “me” through the process of “self-abnegation,” or “mortification.” This is one of 
the ways in which the negative plays out. In fact, the negative, as typically described by 
Burke, is not simply a matter of “not” or “not me.” Instead, the negative is the “Thou 
shalt not” or the “command” of “don’t” (Burke, 1966, pp. 9-11). This is a crucial follow 
up to the “not me” experience. “Not me” suggests me, and identification processes affirm 
this new sense of me with the addendum of “don’t be not me” as a variation on 
identification by antithesis (p. 12).  
This particular aspect of identification is clear in Burke’s (1969b) consideration of 
the biblical tale of Abraham’s near sacrifice of Isaac (pp. 244-267). For Burke, the point 
of God’s request likely boils down to Abraham’s “willingness to sacrifice [italics 
Burke’s]” the “most precious” representation of himself—Isaac, his only son (pp. 252-
253). Thus, Abraham proved his faithful production of his (God) given identity (e.g., 
interpellation and identification) by being willing to symbolically sacrifice himself with 
Isaac as his substitution. Burke calls this symbolic sacrificial suicide, or “willed variant 
on dying [italics Burke’s]” both “self-abnegation” and “mortification” (p. 266). “Self-
abnegation” is a particularly interesting terminal choice. “Abnegation,” of course, means 
“self denial.” So, “self-abnegation” can be translated into “self self-denial.” Further, the 
prefix “ab-” is itself a variant of the negative, so “self-abnegation” can also be translated 
into “self-denial denial.” Somewhere within these two possibilities is the potential of 
redemption. Either I sacrifices what I fears itself to actually be in order to participate in 
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sociality, or I sacrifices the initiating “not me” to validate and position itself on one side 
of a social division. 
 The two redemptive options constitute what I mean by the false confession that is 
demanded within identification. The idea of the false confession of a self is not a new 
idea. Foucault (1978) argues that Western cultures value confession as one of the “most 
highly valued techniques for producing truth,” and that the “Western man has become a 
confessing animal” (p. 59). He further argues that the human is an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question” (p. 143). Judith Butler (1993) observes 
that Althusser’s sense of interpellation is not a simple hailing, but one that is issued from 
the police as a reprimanding question (p. 81). For Foucault, his argument about 
confession is regarding the medico-complex that forces bodies to confess themselves. For 
example, he introduces Herculine Barbin, a “hermaphrodite” whose body was 
interrogated by a doctor and a priest in order to determine Barbin’s “true sex” (Foucault, 
2010, pp. xi-xii). Foucault explains that ultimately Barbin completed suicide because “he 
was incapable of adapting himself to a new identity” (p. xi). In Gender Trouble (1990), 
Butler argues that Barbin’s existence calls into question the normative gender categories 
that largely constitute us (pp. 31-33).  
Barbin may, in fact, offer an excellent future case study as a disconstituent, but 
only because of his suicide. This is because it seems clear Barbin attempted to fully 
participate in identification processes of signification until that final decision based on 
Foucault’s analysis. To label Barbin’s life as disconstituent because of Barbin’s body 
when he sought to assimilate may very well be a highly questionable repetition of the 
same logic that led to his suicide. Further, there are two factors that separate the 
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discussions of Barbin from a disconstituent as depicted in this dissertation. First, Butler 
and Foucault place Barbin within a larger institutional politics of sex and gender 
enforcement as the primary discursive locale. While Foucault (2010) suggests Barbin 
lived much of his life as a “non-identity,” it was largely a practice of assimilation within 
a local community until the medico-juridical apparatus intervened (pp. xiii-xiv). Second, 
and most importantly, it is clear in both Butler’s and Foucault’s analyses that Barbin’s 
suicide is not what undid the us of that situation. Instead, it was Herculine’s very 
existence as an uncertain body that undid the social iterations of us. Thus, Barbin’s 
suicide was not a withdrawal or a sacrifice of an us. A we very clearly sacrificed Barbin 
for the maintenance of its us that culminated in Barbin’s suicide. Rather than a 
disconstituent, Barbin may be better represented as a victim of alienation.  
Similarly, Butler’s (1993) observations of institutional hailing involved in 
interpellation ultimately leads to a discussion of “catachresis,” or “misrecognition,” that 
sets up her own account of disidentification as a politically charged site of resistance (pp. 
165-167). The subject who is hailed is misnamed and must suffer under the wrong sign. 
The woman as the “lost referent” is a matter of being alienated and marginalized within a 
patriarchal regime (pp. 163-166). Disidentification practices, then, are a means of 
politically challenging the order of the patriarchal code by embracing the uncertainty 
within misrecognition as a repetition of semiotic breaks. The disconstituent, however, is 
not a political position even if the disconstituent may also be a product of alienation in 
various instances. 
What does tie the disconstituent to Barbin and the misrecognized subject of 
interpellation, however, is that a confession of a false self is demanded of each of them in 
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such a away that rises to an intensified level within conscious being. The corrective logic 
of the demand of identification is captured in Burke’s (1969b) commentary on the 
capitalist drive of competition (p. 131). He argues that competition, as it plays out in 
society, is not a matter of presenting better differences as a way of standing out; rather, it 
is a matter of out-conforming or out-imitating one another within the confines of 
identification (p. 131-132). Barbin attempted to imitate, and the misrecognized attempt to 
reform the identification process in such a way that gives them recognition, but the 
disconstituent stops competing altogether. 
This idea of the disconstituent also plays out in Barthes’ notion of the “scriptor” 
as the replacement for the author. Specifically Barthes (1978a) posits, “the scriptor no 
longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this 
immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does 
more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that 
is lost, infinitely deferred” (p. 147). Here, Barthes’ “scriptor” exists in very much the 
same way one might imagine the disconstituent to be. Barthes places the reader in the 
epistemological subject position as the subject that knows as well as the ontological 
subject position that is epistemologically assumed (or effaced) to be. This subjective 
reader, then, projects its self into the neutral text in order to know the scriptor other as the 
reader’s other. Indeed, the scriptor only represents a fictional subject to a fictional 
audience. The scriptor-persona, as a lost persona, is caught somewhere in between the 
reader’s sense of self and the reader’s projection of an expectation of an Author. But, 
again, if the scriptor is specifically read as the disconstituent, then the scriptor qua 
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disconstituent has already departed from the “mutual dialogue” and remains only as an 
empty space where the reader’s cotton reel cannot reach. 
 We can bring the disconstituent into further focus through Barthes’ (1981) 
treatment of the photographic subject of portraiture: 
The portrait-photograph is a closed field of forces. Four image-repertoires 
intersect here, oppose and distort each other. In front of the lens, I am at the same 
time: the one I think I am, the one I want others to think I am, the one the 
photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes use of to exhibit his art. In other 
words, a strange action: I do not stop imitating myself, and because of this, each 
time I am (or let myself be) photographed, I invariably suffer from a sensation of 
inauthenticity, sometimes of imposture (comparable to certain nightmares). (p. 
13) 
 
Here, Barthes articulates quite well the difficulties of the false confession, the knowing of 
beginning as failure, in the action/motion differential of being the subject of a 
photograph. Whereas the constituent subject may be driven away from this nightmare, the 
disconstituent is driven into the nightmare because there is no epistemological illusion 
that successfully effaces the inherent ontological lack that constitutes its subjective 
failure. The nightmare of constant failure is the nightmare of constantly trying to hold 
still for the camera. 
  In Kristeva’s (1982) exposition on Céline and the abject, she lays out the 
potential threat of the disconstituent as one who “displays an ingrained love for death, 
ecstasy before the corpse, the other that I am and will never reach, the horror with which 
I communicate […] which dwells in me, spends me, and carries me to the point where my 
identity is turned into something undecipherable” (p. 150). The extremes that Barthes and 
Lacan put forth are exciting and they do carry the subject to its peak. This is the meeting 
place of the pleasure principle and the reality principle—why Lacan and so many other 
practitioners of psychoanalysis love talking about fucking, which is to reach towards 
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what is beyond one’s reach in the most shocking, immediate, physical, and 
metaphorically present way. It is the desire to wake up and know you have finally gotten 
it right. But, the beyond is always just beyond and it is only an illusion of being shocked 
awake. Yet, it is in the beyond that the subject places its faith and justifies the violence of 
its transformative reach. The invocation, the making present, of what-is-not in the 
moment that the lack is revealed is the most frightening failure of the subject and the very 
thing that the demand for identification only attempts to overcome. 
 Barthes’ answer to the subjective trap of control and mastery is his own brand of 
orientalism; namely, “this is what the Zen master did who, for his only answer to the 
solemn question ‘What is Buddha?’ took off his scandal, put it on his head, and walked 
away: impeccable dissolution of the last word, mastery of non-mastery” (Barthes, 1978b, 
p. 209). Like a disconstituent, the Zen master withdraws and refuses to continue on the 
path of a false confession. To ask, “What is Buddha?” is to ask what it is to awaken and 
the Zen master only knows that he cannot. For Barthes (1981), “the Photograph (the one I 
intend) represents that very subtle moment when, to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor 
object but a subject who feels he is becoming an object: I then experience a micro-
version of death (of parenthesis): I am truly becoming a specter” (p. 14). As the subject 
becomes increasingly aware of how completely it misses, the nocturne slowly becomes 
only the sensation of night. 
Identification can also mean understanding, even empathy. There is a risk of 
contamination and loss of self in identification that may very well be mutually curative 
rather than entirely normative. To operate from the standpoint of beginning as failure is 
to risk becoming a lost persona as well. But, if the work of a student of rhetoric is to cast 
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a gaze into the abyss in such a way that orders observations so that we may risk 
identification in even our darkest wounds, then there is the hope that a sandal atop one’s 
head may carry us into some sort of light. Perhaps we may answer Caruth’s (1996) call to 
“the ethical imperative of an awakening that has yet to occur” (p. 112). That awakening 
and form of identification may find its definition in the difference between alienation and 
disconstituency, which is the way some of us care for the disconstituent. 
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CHAPTER 3: A VANISHING METHODOLOGY 
 An Episcopal priest, other than my father, recently told me a story that offers 
another element of context to this dissertated nocturne regarding the jouissance of 
mourning, which is to say the failure to completely mourn. A fellow parishioner had been 
talking about how people need to “move on” after a certain period of time, and both the 
priest and I were countering with the argument that “to live is to mourn and to mourn is 
to live.” Less philosophically, we were also pointing out that the deep loss in the wake of 
a loved one’s death never really goes away and always has the potential of returning as if 
the loss had only occurred yesterday even if years had passed. For the priest, “moving 
on” was a matter of faith—the faith in resurrection and redemption. He proceeded to tell 
the story of his son in the wake of a pet goldfish’s death, which was also his son’s first 
encounter with death. After a responsible discussion that one might expect from a 
collared parent, the priest felt good about this important lesson that was taught. The 
goldfish was in heaven and only with us in spirit, so we might as well bury the body that 
the goldfish no longer requires. Ideology achieved. However, shortly thereafter, he saw 
his son walking to the backyard where the pet had been buried with full rites. His son was 
carrying a shovel. He reminded his son about their talk and the fact that the pet was with 
God now. The son replied, “I know, but this is a magic shovel.” The priest thought this 
was great because his son was thinking on such an imaginative level about what is one of 
the greatest struggles in being human. For me, though I didn’t say it at the time, the 
“magic shovel” was likely to become the actual traumatic event, because in it the boy was 
about to discover not only his own failure of resurrection but the failure of his 
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understanding of his father’s faith in redemption as well. But, then, that’s my story, and 
I’m still working out what “moving on” means to me. 
 If Chapters 1 and 2 offered an answer to what it means to regard suicide from the 
standpoint of beginning as failure, which is to say the validation of the disconstituent 
perspective, then the remaining chapters present a method for grappling with the 
implications of our failed regard and the subject’s desire for redemption. Chapter 1 
introduced the entirety of the project by focusing on the constitutive dilemma of the 
constitutive failure presented by both suicide and the disconstituent as a lost persona for 
those who attempt to give their regard to this lost persona. Chapter 2 argued that any 
regard begins as failure because the subject of identification is always already dead on 
arrival and subsequently caught up in a continual collective and individual demand for a 
false confession of the negative not me to be violently transformed, or identified, into a 
me. The disconstituent withdraws from this interrogation leaving the interrogating 
subjects with only the fragments of their interrogations. Chapter 3 offers a method for 
regarding within this initially failed regard, the demand for a false confession that is no 
longer answered, and the final three chapters are designed to allow this new method of 
regarding to once again fail before our eyes in a way that hopefully approaches an 
awakening at the end of this nocturne.  
To understand the kind of regard at the heart of this dissertation, one must 
understand a certain kind of approaching weight that accompanies this regard. Elkins 
(1996) apparently enjoys the nocturnal sensation of lying in his darkened bedroom 
“feeling the force of vision everywhere in the room” (p. 70). Like Barthes’ photographic 
adventure, Elkins imagines objects that animate him—his “objet petit a” that signifies his 
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self-perpetuating subject. As is often the case with Barthes, the contradiction for Elkins 
only appears to be present. His belief, or lack there of, is really his desire. The “feeling 
the force of vision,” is the way that he describes this object of desire. Elkins’ “objet petit 
a” is not so much “lifelike” as with Barthes’ sense of the photograph. Rather, Elkins’ 
“objet petit a” remains an object while still capturing the unconscious reality that 
subjectively being a human being is like being a photographic subject being 
photographed. No actual force is being exerted exteriorly. Elkins is imagining his self-
reaching subjectivity being reached towards and captured by objective exterior forces that 
he might reciprocally bring into his interiority to give it weight. 
I feel this weight when I look at family pictures. My family portraits are always 
already marked by suicide—before and after. As Annette Kuhn’s (2002) memory work in 
Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination  attests, family photographs are like 
crime scenes in which interrogating subjects, as “detectives,” gather up “evidence” (pp. 
13-15). Each photograph before the event is read for clues of clues—clues that leads the 
subject to the proof of a soul. Thus, the tragedy for my family is that each photograph 
after Kryn’s suicide displays the proof of an absence that places the desire for a spiritual 
reality in anxious abeyance. In other words, I don’t want my brother to go to Hell. But, of 
course, no matter when the photograph was taken, the absence is always already 
presented and the uncertainty about what to desire creates an inconstant looking that is 
more about missing than selecting. Like Barthes’ Neutral, each photograph continually 
offers another possibility that can radically alter the order of things. The notion that there 
is a better way than ours at every event is continually presented and represented—not in 
the sense of a progressive politics so much as a mysterious “what if…?” In other words, 
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Barbie Zelizer’s subjunctive voice haunts the series of photographs found in any family 
album, because each picture leads to and from the “about to day moment.” Punctuation 
drags itself into the next sentence as an act of defying its definition even as it defines the 
enunciation of what preceded it. 
As I look upon this particular photograph (Figure 1), a specific weighty 
experience takes shape—one that I am attempting to share with you in the forthcoming 
methodology. Barthes (1981) argues that studium is a “half desire” that “mobilizes…the 
same sort of vague, slippery, irresponsible interest one takes in the people, the 
entertainments, the books, the clothes one finds ‘all right’” (p. 27). Studium is 
representative of what a spectator has been taught, disciplined, to both visually read (or 
interpret) and expect. Conversely, punctum is disruptive because it appears to require 
something more of the viewer, of me, which threatens the quotidian comfort of studium. 
It repeatedly resurrects within me the not me. But, studium and punctum are both 
mutually threatening and mutually elevating. Each threatens to swallow up the other, yet 
for either to carry with it any individual significance, the other must exist. This 
photograph (Figure 1) is your typical picture for a Church directory. It is what one 
expects to see. It is also the only picture of my brother that I keep. It is a picture of an us 
that never really existed. That is one story it tells. Another story that it tells is a story of 
an us in which at least one member fully believed to be absolutely real. This us was 
bigger than the family. It was the Church and the congregation, and it was deeply trusted. 
I suspect this trust may have existed in the hopes of all of the individuals in this 
photograph. 
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Figure 1: Womesldorf Family Portrait 
 
In her discussion of punctum, Michele White (2006) argues, in line with Barthes, 
that “the shocks and moments of intimate engagement, which he experiences through 
aspects of photographs, eventually dissipate” (p. 112). This suggests the temporariness or 
fleetingness of the punctum and the eventual, sooner than later, desire for some other 
distraction or respite within the confines of studium. White acknowledges Barthes’ 
realist, documentarian, and evidential approach to viewing photography in his 
consideration of studium, but she notes, “his use of punctum goes beyond the evidential” 
in the way that he posits individual spectatorship as a form of disrupting “unified social 
conventions” and “larger cultural conceptions” that are rational (pp. 153-154). Thus, 
White suggests punctum is a difficult experience to share even as we feel that we must 
share it. How do we share the sentiment that this photograph lies to me for me in a way 
that productively unravels us? It seems too dangerous. However, White later points to the 
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penetrative operation of punctum in which “there is pleasure, pain, and bodily 
fragmentation when punctum undoes traditional forms of spectatorship” (pp. 159-160). In 
other words, punctum qua souffrance is a forceful experience for the spectator insofar as 
the spectator is always free to look away until punctum is once again revealed. Of course, 
it is often at the moment of punctum’s arrival that subjects most desperately want to look 
away—or, at least, reduce its gaze to a sideways, peripheral glance so as to return to the 
“irresponsible” comfort of studium. The older boy in my picture hanged himself while 
the rest of us posed. This is Jean Baudrillard’s (2007) logic of the “Non-Event” in his 
reflections on 9/11; namely, we love the excitement and identification involved in great 
tragic (so-called “real”) events until we start to realize that I am implicated to which we 
respond by reducing the event to just another subjective signifier (pp. 113-118). We 
becomes a collective of survivors, deep wells who understand tragedy. 
Kuhn (2002) observes that while she may look at photographs or images that 
might be separated into private and public, memory and convention make this separation 
“less readily” available (pp. 15-16). Indeed, the enterprise of her work is to carry private 
memory (punctum) into the public (studium), not for display as much as for 
identification. In other words, private memories and public memories continually expand 
and contract within each other as a matter of discourse precisely in the same dialectical 
way as studium and punctum. 
This (Figure 2) is happening. Kryn Womelsdorf hates life, not death. He is in the 
throws of the abject. He is Kristeva’s (1982) “stray,” her “dejected” (p. 8). “Chas,” the 
little me, is too small to understand this. We all are, being typical, losing his or her or its 
genuine smile because the picture took just a little too long, a little too much from us. 
 113 
There is nothing unusual in this picture other than a looming suicide and a scopic desire 
for subjective knowledge. But then I have not set out to merely repeat such effacement 
even if it is largely unavoidable. Nonetheless, I embrace the visual metaphor in the 
presentation of my findings. I proceed towards my own map with my own magic shovel.  
 
Figure 2: Womelsdorf Family Portrait in Traumatic Repetition 
 
Speaking of things that have shafts and heads that we use to penetrate into what is 
Other, there is the fact that this dissertation claims to be psychoanalysis in a desexualized 
manner. For some, this may be problematic. As Lacan (2008) himself argues in My 
Teaching, “The psychoanalytic truth was that there was something terribly important at 
the bottom of it, in everything that gets hatched up when it comes to the interpretation of 
the truth, namely sexual life” (p. 17). He goes on to say that “psychoanalysis is all about,” 
what he calls a “hole in truth,” which is “the negative aspect that appears in anything to 
do with the sexual, namely its inability to aver” (p. 22). But, it is in this logic that one can 
begin to see that Lacan himself had no need for sexuality in psychoanalysis beyond its 
usefulness as an embodied metaphor. Psychoanalysis, at its basic point, is about this little 
hole that cannot reach nor be reached but which the subject subjectively desires to yearn. 
Additionally, “truth” is a tricky thing in the Lacanian vocabulary because he insists that a 
psychoanalyst must specifically know that “he does not know,” and that the practice of 
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psychoanalysis is to be psychoanalyzed oneself (pp. 110-111). What is the analyst’s 
desire? In other words, psychoanalysis is a matter of pushing back against one’s own 
epistemological subjectivity and its accompanying ontological effacement. 
 And Lacan (1978) further establishes this point in declaring, “The real is 
distinguished […] by its separation from the field of the pleasure principle, by its 
desexualization, by the fact that its economy, later, admits something new, which is 
precisely the impossible” (p. 167). He further clarifies: 
The pleasure principle is even characterized by the fact that the impossible is so 
present in it that it is never recognized in it as such. The idea that the function of 
the pleasure principle is to satisfy itself by hallucination is there to illustrate 
this—it is only an illustration. By snatching at its object, the drive learns in a 
sense that this is precisely not the way it will be satisfied. (p. 167) 
 
It is clear that sexuality, in this context, is in fact only an embodied metaphor caught up 
in the impossible, which is to say the hole in truth that is the apex of the subject’s missed 
encounter. Lacan (2008) explains that the commonly used concept of “castration anxiety” 
only suggests that desire “cannot be both being and having” (p. 42). The radical 
suggestion here, then, is that subjects’ bodies themselves become missed encounters in 
the subjective frame and even become the instruments of the ontological understanding of 
objectivity. Our bodies become objects pursuing other objects at the behest of our 
subjectivity. Therein lies the centrality and hindrance of sex and sexuality in 
psychoanalysis. It is an exceptionally powerful metaphor, but the power of the metaphor 
overtakes the discourse. Of course, it probably says something about me that I choose to 
adventure away from sex and sexuality in my approach to psychoanalysis. I am, after all, 
being psychoanalyzed as the analyst. 
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Self-confession in analysis is not only a critical move for those challenging 
epistemological objectivity, it is also an inevitable lie that can be actively represented not 
as the alibi but as the exemplary display of coming out. I too am not me. And, it is 
abundantly clear how significant self-analysis is to Lacan (1978) in his discussion of the 
fact that his beloved Freud “would not have been able to advance” the field of 
psychoanalysis “if he had not been guided in it, as his writings show, by his self-analysis” 
(pp. 47-48). It is in this thinking, this standing back and thinking, that one finds the point 
of departure between what Lacan deems as hermeneutic research and what he purports as 
psychoanalytic findings. In both, the analyst goes over a matter repeatedly, but a 
researcher bound up in the hermeneutical demand is looking for something other than 
what has been found in the pursuit of the new. However, for the Lacanian psychoanalyst, 
every return is a new finding. Lo! There it is! Every recurrence is the opportunity to 
speak the psychoanalytic truth of the subject. It is the opportunity to lift the weight. For 
me, castration is largely a matter of my disintegrating memory of that moment on the 
bench and my inability to speak the truth of my failure to bear mourning, which is to say 
my failure to be able to bear regarding Kryn’s suicide. 
 Elkins (1996) simply observes the overwhelming truth that “you can never 
inventory a landscape, not even in a lifetime, because most of the objects you think you 
see are only rough guesses” (p. 98). On the one hand, one might say that the world is 
maddeningly unclear when considering Elkins’ point. On the other hand, one could also 
say that the world is maddeningly clear. Either madness drives us towards that searching 
epistemological range of subjectivity. As Barthes (1978a), in the wake of this reality, 
counters, “an activity that is truly revolutionary” is “to refuse to fix meaning” (p. 147). 
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This is his revolution and revelation. It is a large part of Barthes’ psychoanalytic truth. It 
is an impossible truth. It is an impossible truth that I try to share in a way not unlike his, 
by making my self  “the measure of photographic ‘knowledge’” (Barthes, 1981, p. 9). 
When I consider Kryn’s suicide filling our casket, it is an impossible truth that I 
cannot help but want to know, to search for, so that I might share it as a way to offer a bit 
of light in this nocturne. It is this context of this suffering weight that I am attempting to 
approach in this method, the suffering that identification not only acknowledges but also 
forces. More specifically, it is the establishment of the disconstituent’s withdrawal—
meaning both how the disconstituent withdraws from the social body and how the social 
body withdraws from the disconstituent even within the toils of a potentially mutual 
yearning. This is Barthes’s disorder, Burke’s Babel, and Lacan’s dream. 
 In his regard of the “Burning Child” dream, Lacan (1978) offers the following 
missive: How can we fail to see? In his discussion of identification, Burke (1969b) notes 
the “active, reflexive, and passive forms of death” to be “killing, self-killing, and being 
killed” (p. 13). What does it mean for the reflexive, thoughtful, form of identification to 
be so closely aligned with being suicidal? And Barthes (1981), in his regard, realizes that 
“each photograph always contains this imperious sign of my future death that each one, 
however attached it seems to be to the excited world of the living, challenges each of us, 
one by one, outside of any generality (but not outside of any transcendence)” (p. 97). 
Of Burke’s quest for the ontology of the social, Biesecker (2000) points out 
Burke’s occasional seeming distaste for much of psychoanalysis and its oversexed ways 
which miss “the true underlying motivational locus” (p. 44). And, again, Lacan (2008) 
does not disagree with the heart of Burke’s critique as is clear in his continued 
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explanation of the castrated organ: “So, the organ serves, perhaps a purpose that 
functions at the level of desire. It is the lost object because it stands in for the subject qua 
desire” (p. 42). Psychoanalysis, at least as forwarded by Lacan, is always about the 
activity of specifying “the true underlying motivational locus,” which is to say the real; 
and just as Burke finds himself to be up against the action/motion differential that 
Biesecker refers to as a “resident rift,” so too does Lacan find himself I/eyeing a “little 
hole” not unlike Barthes’ camera. The “lost object,” and the “lost persona,” present an 
unbearable weight for all of these little holes. The vanishing methodology promised by 
this dissertation must first be placed in the context of a more thorough understanding of 
the psychoanalytic concept of “the gaze” so as to apply this understating to Peggy 
Phelan’s (1997) articulation of the “Vanishing Point.”  This metaphor can then aid in the 
crafting of a reformatted of Gunnian approach to Freud and Lacan’s positions of the 
Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real fathers. 
The Gaze 
 Lacan (1978) explains, “The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of 
the signifier that governs whatever may be present in the subject—it is the field of that 
living being in which the subject has to appear […] that the drive is essentially 
manifested” (p. 203). It is in “the chain” that find the magic shovel can be found as well 
as the territory to be mapped out within the gaze that longs for its formal home within the 
Other. As is clear in the scopic drive, opticality is critical to the psychoanalytic venture.  
Elkins’ (1996) gives a basic breakdown of Lacan’s Mirror Stage theory: “It could be that 
the first few times I glimpsed myself in a mirror, when I was too young to speak, I 
realized in some infantile way that I had a certain shape and a certain look and that I was 
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not just a few flashing limbs or a crying sound—that I was like my mother a little, and 
different from her as well” (p. 71). A very direct parallel between Lacan’s gaze and 
Burke’s divisive understanding of identification is, if in a very basic manner, abundantly 
clear. The subject sees in the separation from and consubstantiality with the other its self 
as collectively and individually constituted. Elkins’ observes another way of thinking 
about the “objet a” as seeing oneself  “in the other person’s gaze” (p. 71). In so doing, 
Elkins bears out the basic foundation of the gaze. The gaze is not merely an extension of 
sexual desire and control as is sometimes assumed. These elements may often be present 
in the gaze, but the gaze is more so conditioned by subjective information processing. It 
is the process of putting subjectivity out there—and, yes, in there too. But it is also that 
more hidden desire to take in the Other because the Other’s assumed successful 
interpellation appears as proof of the subject’s own subjective failure.  
Lacan’s explicit ontology is only concerned with the reality of the subject, which 
is the reality of being an interpretive being. And as he says, “it is not between the visible 
and the invisible that we have to pass” (Lacan, 1978, p. 72). Rather, it is between being 
and not being that the analyst and analysand must pass, between what we have 
interpretively become and what is tucked away behind our lack so as to make the lack 
decentralized. In other words, psychoanalysis is about the process of facing the centrality 
of lack—the unconscious. Phelan (1997) comes close to this understanding when she 
states that “the syntax of loss” may very well be “hard-wired into the psyche which 
structures our encounters with the world” (p. 5). The problem with leaving it at “loss” is 
that this already implies something that was once present rather than presented. “Lack” is 
more accurate. However, “loss” does offer a performative utterance as this is precisely 
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the lie that is syntactically softwared into the subject. Further along these wares and 
wires, the gaze can be understood to be the syntactical nature of the rhetorical audience 
who watches with constitutive desires.  
As in Phelan’s articulation of loss, Burke’s (1969b) metaphorical murders imply a 
before that was present, that was a living thing vanquished for the sake of sociality rather 
than a constructed thing animated out of the foundation of the unconscious reality. 
Specifically, he argues that “Taken at face value, imagery invites us to respond in 
accordance with its nature” (p. 17). This is the arousal of the appetite that is the heart of 
the formal appeal. The gaze is something that is also pulled out of the subject in that it 
reminds the subject of its insatiable lack. In his discussion of Ego construction, which is 
really the construction of one’s identity, Lacan (1978) argues that “The return of need is 
directed towards consumption placed at the service of appetite. Repetition demands the 
new” (p. 61). He goes on to explain, the need for meticulous repetition “can be seen in 
the child […] at the moment when he is formed as a human being, manifesting himself as 
an insistence that the story should always be the same, that its recounted realization 
should be ritualized, that is to say, textually the same” (p. 61). So, the demand for the 
new is merely the demand for new territories to be rendered the same—to con-form in 
such a way that forces the Other to fail at imitating my correct imitation.  
But, then, that is the inevitable and necessary failure of the gaze: “This 
requirement of a distinct consistency in the details of its telling signifies that the 
realization of the signifier will never be able to be careful enough in its memorization to 
succeed in designating the primacy of the significance as such” (Lacan, 1978, p. 61). This 
failure of the gaze is what Lacan means by the fact that the subject of psychoanalysis 
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does not pass through “the visible and invisible.” It is more precise to say that the subject 
of psychoanalysis passes through what it sees and what it fails to see. Lacan (1978) 
explains that, “In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way 
of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is 
transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it—that is what 
we call the gaze” (p. 73). The gaze, then, not only carries with it the subject’s subject and 
the subject’s lack, but the gaze is the failed subjectivity that transforms what is other from 
the standpoint of this failed regard. 
The gaze is not limited to objects, “things” as Lacan says; rather, other human 
beings are objectively transformed—identified. As Burke (1969b) conceives, “put 
identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just 
where one ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to 
rhetoric” (p. 25). This rhetorical nature of the gaze is at the heart of this chapter. Lacan 
(1978) could be speaking of the rhetor as he pronounces the force of the gaze as “the 
regulation of form, which is governed, not only by the subject’s eye, but by his 
expectations, his movement, his grip, his muscular and visceral emotion—in short, his 
constitutive presence, directed in what is called his total intentionality” (p. 71). Of course, 
he could also be speaking of the silent majority as the implying “implied auditor” who 
sees. It is from this rhetorical position that the vanishing point emerges as a powerful 
metaphor, a position that successfully fails to construct the subject while nonetheless 
animating it as an outward and inward moving force. 
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The Vanishing Point 
 Phelan’s analysis offers another chance to rethink identification, and thus the 
gaze, as the pursuit of redemption in the wake of our findings, to map out a passage from 
a you to an I within a text that decidedly claims there is not the we that you and I would 
normatively cohabitate. In fact, Phelan (1997) opens up her chapter on the vanishing 
point with a reflection on redemption asking, “In our own age of despair […] What does 
it look like from the standpoint of redemption if you are the Redeemer? If you are in 
despair?” (p. 23) The ambiguity of her relationship with the image is a powerful 
expression of something like Barthes’ Neutral or “third meaning,” of a neutralizing 
textuality in which the direction of the redemption is uncertain because the “redemption” 
is somehow affixed between the positions of the “Redeemer” and the one “in despair” in 
a manner that precedes them though not quite transcendently. The standpoint is not 
“you,” nor is it the other position, nor is it a matter of the redeemed. Rather, Phelan asks, 
“what does it look like from the standpoint of redemption?” Regardless of what position 
“you” maintains, Phelan asks us to premeditate the image, the idea of images, from a 
place somewhere in between even as she understands such a task to be “increasingly 
unfathomable” (p. 23). The gaze, as Lacan posits, “is the split through which that 
something, whose adventure in our field seems so short, is for a moment brought into the 
light of day—a moment because the second stage, which is one of closing up. Gives this 
apprehension a vanishing aspect” (Lacan, 1978, p. 31). Here, the vanishing aspect is both 
an effacement and a truth. What finds its way “into the light of day” is the subject’s 
desire laid bare as a desperate desire for itself—the redemption of the promise held in the 
false confession that is guided by a false interrogation. 
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One can at least begin to imagine in an objective way “that something,” that 
“standpoint of redemption,” within the concept of the vanishing point: 
Put simply, the vanishing point was derived from a theory of optics based on the 
illusion that parallel lines converge at a point in the distance. The painter placed 
that convergence at the optical center of his or her composition; that became 
known as the vanishing point. The vanishing point gained depth and significance 
because it presupposed a parallel point outside the frame called the viewing point. 
(Phelan, 1997, pp. 23-24) 
 
Phelan is explaining a static variation of parallax. More importantly, the vanishing point 
and the viewing point can also be understood as two vanishing points so that we, scriptor 
and reader, might inhabit, as best we can, the space of redemption, which is neither the 
place of the redeemer, nor the redeemed, nor the redeemed to be that a Cartesian logic 
might proffer because none of these places actually exist. Each is only relatively present, 
or as Biesecker (2000) puts it, where “the action/motion differential makes its appearance 
in symbolic action, as a structure it resides in the human being” (p. 29). It is an imaginary 
ratio of exchange. This imaginary quality also allows us to avoid the math.  
Phelan (1997) explains the Foucaultian perspective on the history of the 
“vanishing point” as being one practice in which the “human subject becomes a 
theological concept” (p. 24). It is largely the same argument that Barthes articulates on 
the rise of the Author as the authority and divining individual. Particularly important in 
Phelan’s observation is the requirement of belief in the construction of the human subject 
as posited by Foucault in his consideration of the historical emergence of the human 
subject in the Classical Age. Phelan explains that the vanishing point is really a matrix of 
substitutions where “Christ the son stands in for God the father; in language, the signifier 
stands in for the signified; in perspective, the vanishing point stands in for the illusionary 
convergence of parallel lines” (p. 25). She continues, “the stand-in itself is not only a tool 
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in the construction of ‘man’ as a theological concept, but it too is a theological concept. 
The foundation of the epistemology of the stand-in is the vanishing point: the hole that 
launches the illusion of perspective underlies the Classical Age’s ordering system” (p. 
25). In this way, Phelan argues that the vanishing point is precisely the lost object, the 
little hole that cannot be reached or avoided, the weight.  
Lacan (1978) clarifies between the function of the eye and the function of the 
I/eye that is the gaze as “the stain” (p. 74). The “stain” is precisely that point of contrast, 
which one could also say of a painting that operates as a phenomenological stain—that is 
to say it stains more than the canvas. One such painting would be Velasquez’s famous 
Las Meninas (1646). The viewer sees the painting from the viewpoint of the royal 
subjects being painted, which is evidenced by their image in a mirror holding the position 
of the vanishing point within the painting (Phelan, 1997, pp. 25-26). Phelan suggests via 
Foucault that a resistance to power dynamics is at play in this usage of the vanishing 
point because the King and Queen’s “image cannot be rendered except as reflected in the 
gaze of their subjects”(pp. 26-27). As important as Phelan qua Foucault’s particular 
observation with regard to power is the fact that the king-and-queen’s subjective mirror 
image is precisely the vanishing point and the representation of the subjective viewing 
point that vanishes.  
Just as Foucault subverts power, the notion that the viewer point is also a 
vanishing subject allows the vanishing point to subvert the subjective gaze, which is 
perhaps Elkins’ (1996) very meaning in the title of his book The Object Stares Back. This 
falls in line with Barthes’ (1978a) reader as “the space on which all quotations that make 
up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its 
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origin but in its destination” (p. 148). Except, all of it is always already lost, which is to 
say lacking. Barthes positions the reader as the constituent other to be a subversion of the 
authority bestowed upon the Author—the you that takes over the I position, which is akin 
to the “audience turn” in rhetorical circles. Phelan qua Foucault is making this point as 
well with regard to the royal subjects of the painting while allowing the genius of 
Valesquez, who the viewer also sees in the painting, to remain intact much like 
McKerrow’s critic. To take Barthes to his previously and multiply mentioned end, the 
entire scene empties out the viewer because the viewer is asked to view a mirror 
reflection that forces the viewer to face the emptiness that this reflection implies no 
matter which subject holds the place of the viewer point. Would the king and queen be 
behind the viewer or in front? Would the viewer be one or both of them? Are they 
reduced to being their own royal subjects? Are they viewing their viewpoint as the 
subjects of themselves? Are they them? Is it Valasquez’s viewpoint of their viewpoint or 
is it all only his mirror image? Each possible subject position can believe itself to be 
implied, but each is left empty because each position holds the place of the vanishing 
point. 
Otherwise put, “That in which the consciousness may turn back upon itself—
grasp itself […] as seeing oneself seeing oneself—represents mere sleight of hand. An 
avoidance of the gaze” (Lacan, 1978, p. 74). The illusion that is the vanishing point is the 
lie that is the subject. Most important, perhaps, is the reciprocity of identification at work. 
Something is given and something is taken within the exchange of vanishing points.  
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Phelan (1997) continues: 
Las Meninas, in Foucault’s argument, issues from the discovery that the human 
subject’s “depth” isolates him from God. This isolation dramatizes the human 
subject’s doubt about his or her position within the order of things more generally. 
Foucault’s thesis that the Classical Age creates human subjects who become 
theological concepts (a becoming made possible through reciprocal logic and the 
economy of substitution), also requires that theological concepts become human 
subjects. Thus, the Classical Age required stories dramatizing God becoming man 
and man becoming God. (p. 27) 
 
The illusion stands in the way of the illusion so as to prove or disprove both. Or as 
Barthes (1981) says, “It is as if the Photograph always carries its referent with itself, both 
affected by the same amorous or funereal immobility, at the very heart of the moving 
world: they are glued together, limb by limb, like the condemned man and the corpse in 
certain tortures” (pp. 5-6). That which the subject would have as proof, the evidence that 
the subject presents to itself, is a most precise deathblow. Phelan concludes, “Perspective 
is a theatrical technology and a technology of the theatre” and “The ‘as if,’ the illusionary 
indicative that theatre animates, allows for the construction of depth, for the ‘invention’ 
of physical interiority and psychic subjectivity” (Phelan, 1997, p. 27). This theatricality, 
like Zelizer’s subjunctive voice, is present in the everyday life of humans being. It could 
be argued, and will, that we subjects name this theatricality “art” as an effacement of its 
accurate display. 
 Within this framework, subjects place the demand for one another’s gaze within 
various substitutions that may also include their own subjects. One can consider the 
burning child and the father in the dream to both be the substitute awareness of the 
dreaming father’s failed regard. Neither the child nor the father in the dream are precisely 
subjects. Instead, they are both signifiers of the dreaming father and his consciousness 
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that is aware of the actual burning that is taking place in the very next room. Lacan 
(1978) explains: 
that this split is still there only as representing the more profound split, which is 
situated between that which refers to the subject in the machinery of the dream, 
the image of the approaching child, his face full of reproach and, on the other 
hand, that which causes it and into which he sinks, the invocation, the voice of the 
child, the solicitation of the gaze—Father can’t you see… (p. 70)  
 
What sees between the vision of the dream and the father’s closed eyes, and what is being 
seen? The split, the blind spot, sees and is seen. Phelan (1997) shifts her attention to 
Caravaggio’s The Incredulity of St Thomas and the lack that not only remains present in 
resurrection but emerges there as well. Phelan argues, “Caravaggio’s Christ is uncertain 
who he is after the resurrection, and especially who he is in relation to the men with 
whom he had shared a history and with whom he had tried to forge a collective body” (p. 
28). Christ takes on the position of the burning child in a way that reflects the burning 
child’s own emergent lack. The viewer of Caravaggio’s Christ comes to “know” this 
through the symbolic code that also moves the viewer beyond this lack into a substitute 
presence. The viewer divines his and its presence to be. The child, like Christ, is conjured 
as a measure of self-affirmation because the father knows that the child in the dream is 
not his child lying dead in the next room. Yet, the child in the dream appears to him as 
proof that his child is both on fire and was once with him as a living subject. 
 Biesecker (2000) explains, “the symbolic (and its concomitant logic) is itself the 
form in which the social, indeed history itself, approaches sense” (p. 50). The symbolic 
presentation allows the human being to fixate upon the external other as opposed to the 
internal other because the internal other defies a subjective sense of the world. The 
external other offers at least the perceived opportunity for redemption while the internal 
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other is the subject’s undoing. The burning child, the uncertain Christ, is the failed 
subject’s redemptive substitute. Lacan (1978) puts it this way: “It is no doubt this seeing, 
to which I am subjected in an original way, that must lead us to the aims of this work, to 
that ontological turning back” (p. 72). Here, Lacan is articulating the psychoanalytic 
mission as he sees it. It is the work of re-membering the sociality of the subject in such a 
way that accounts for the “lost object” without allowing the “lost object” to completely 
consume the psychoanalytic subject. On the one hand, then, one might think of the 
symbolic aspects of the gaze within a psychoanalytic exchange to be curative. On the 
other hand, though, the symbolic carries with it the violence of a corrective. 
 Phelan (1997) offers a helpful, but problematic, observation: 
Western theatre is itself predicated on the belief that there is an audience, an other 
willing to cast in the role of auditor. The “act” at the heart of theatre making is the 
leap of faith that someone (that ideal spectator some call “God”) will indeed see, 
hear, and love those brave enough to admit that this is the movement that keeps us 
from our deaths (or at least from permanently dark houses). The psychic problem 
raised by theatre is that it remains a perpetual rehearsal. The one for whom the 
theatre maker makes the piece never arrives for the performance. (“Nobody/bears 
witness for the/witness”). This is why theatre remains an art rather than a cure. (p. 
31) 
 
This is partially problematic because of the curative possibilities of the curating subject, 
of the one who actively displays the failure to be. There is also the powerful display of 
mutual witnessing between two fragmentary vanishing points—the backstage and the 
gallery each bearing false witness to one another’s reality. But, I take her point that it is 
the symbolic substitution taking place in the theatre that precisely allows for this false 
witnessing. In other words, in the gaze as constructed through twin vanishing points, we 
are dealing with the method of psycho-subjective contour completion and collective 
inconsistent seeing. Within the symbolic, subjects agree to the illusionary power of the 
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vanishing points as a substitution for their redemption. It is not simply a matter of 
inconsistent seeing, but also of inconsistent showing, all of which is played off as 
consistency. Likewise, Barthes (1981) observes, “I possess only two experiences: that of 
the observed subject and that of the subject observing” (p. 10). The gaze is the cotton 
reel, which is to say the gaze is the subject, and the eye may very well capture the 
interlocution of subjects as filtered through the mutual denial of the unconscious reality 
of lack. 
 Herein lies the impossibility of the wound that is the view from the standpoint of 
redemption. Phelan (1997) opens this wound: 
The wound in Christ’s body opens up to an interiority that painting cannot expose. 
The absolute limit of the look is underscored here: even at the moment that 
heralds and “proves” the narrative endpoint of Redemption, the physical body 
nonetheless remains partially inaccessible to vision. The redemption of painting, 
Caravaggio seems to imply, requires, as does Thomas’ doubt, that painting go 
through the body, to penetrate its interiority and to display that. But such a 
penetrating cannot happen without a cutting, a tearing, a wounding, of the 
painting’s skin. (p. 35) 
 
In short, Phelan is describing Lacan’s notion of jouissance within this visual metaphor. In 
so doing, Phelan also captures the rhetorical illusion of identification and the false 
promise, or confession, of order. She goes on, “Caravaggio’s painting holds the viewer’s 
eye in the vanishing depth of the image of a wounded body. That image serves as a 
mirror capable of reflecting the eye’s own longing to be arrested, to be still, to be done 
with looking, to be held” (p. 35). Here, Phelan precisely captures the weight that Elkins 
seeks in his bedroom. Phelan’s psychoanalysis argues, “The eye we make from the 
wound is an eye that is slit open, an eye the viewer seeks in order to constitute herself as 
an ‘I’” (p. 40). In her observation of this invitational wound qua eye that offers the 
promise of the constituted subject, Phelan also finds what has been sought only to reveal 
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the subject qua wound, because redemption is ultimately the subject’s undoing—the end 
of all desire is the hysteric’s most avoided curative confession which is also the cessation 
of the illusion of failure. 
 And so, the methodization of the vanishing point must be a method of dissolution, 
of deterioration. As will be revealed momentarily, it is from a point of deterioration that 
Lacan elaborates upon the idea of the “Name-of-the-father” as captured in the symbolic 
father’s relationship to the imaginary and real fathers. But it is also the point that 
demands to be terrifyingly dissolved by those who follow Lacan. Phelan (1997) 
concludes:  
But even as I transform the wound in Christ’s body into an eye, I also blind 
myself to the truest terror of the painting and the story that lies behind it. When 
his friends and mother go to look for Christ in the tomb, it is empty. The form, the 
skeleton, the very corpse that held Christ’s body is gone. The interiority of the 
tomb will not yield the form they seek. Nobody is there. The failure of the body to 
remain a solid set of remains is underscored by Caravaggio’s painting as it 
encourages the viewer to transform the wound into an eye. This transformation 
reflects the changing and seemingly endless slipping away from us that the dying 
do. Not even the dead will hold still: they do not leave us all at once, which would 
be horribly violent but clear. They fall away from us piece by piece until we 
cannot bear the withering decomposition of their form of relation to us. It is the 
lack of form, the lack of anything to hold onto in death, that inspires the drama of 
love that can offer us only bodies with holes in them. The radical formlessness of 
the beloved’s body (its utter failure to remain static) creates the wild terror of 
Caravaggio’s painting. (p. 41) 
 
The beauty of her writing justifies a lengthy quotation. Even the most real formality of 
the subject we can see, the body, vanishes. And though subjects may utilize symbolic 
representations of this functional reality as a pretense for mastery, the fact of its own 
living curative failure remains. It is the madness of the subjective relationship to the 
unconscious reality. The next section will attempt to offer a rapidly vanishing structure 
for analysis through the use of the vanishing point, Sands’ “shoes,” and Freud’s “primal 
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horde” within the overall context of a regard that begins as failure, identification as the 
demand of false confession, and the withdrawal of the disconstituent. 
The Vanishing Fathers 
 Unlike Jenkins and Cisneros’ (2013) “love,” Phelan’s “redemption” does not hold 
still in a “common” position for verification. Neither do the vanishing subject positions of 
her painting analysis nor even the bodies that hold their weight. In a regarding that 
undoes us, it is the us that becomes marginalized in a traumatic disappearance. People 
often present themselves with paradoxes, with things that seem impossible, to express 
pointlessness and to simplify their next steps. Can God make something too heavy for her 
to lift? Doctor, it hurts when I do this. Don’t do that. But why does calling God a “her” 
still reify the patriarchy? Sometimes, though, paradoxes contain more than a point. As 
Elkins’ (1996) observes, “If we look at looking too long, it falls apart” (pp. 120-121). 
Here, Elkins presents something more than an analogy in which the way we human 
beings subjectively see is a metaphor for how the we physiologically see and how we 
physiologically see is also a metaphor for how we subjectively see. These ideas of 
perspective actually inform one another in their mutual articulation. This way of thinking 
offers a glimpse into the gaze that precedes and follows the eye. So, when Lacan (1978) 
declares, “It is in no way necessary that the tree of science should have a single trunk,” he 
may very well be offering much more than a binary logic in his bi-petal metaphor (p. 8). 
Namely, we have our very own bifocality as a way of seeing to suggest our understanding 
of an “optical unconscious” (Elkins, pp. 120-121). Neither I/eye is completely correct. 
Caruth (1996) explains that “In opening the other’s eyes, the awakening consists not in 
seeing but in handing over the seeing it does not and cannot contain to another (and 
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another future)” (p. 111). This is what Gunn and Treat (2005) mean when they argue that 
the repressed materials of the unconscious are not completely lost to us because others 
have the potential of seeing them. In particular, traumatic images offers the radical 
opportunity to think us seeing us think the way we see in the fragmented context of the 
unconscious reality 
In his essay, “Father Trouble: Staging Sovereignty in Spielberg's War of the 
Worlds,” Gunn (2008a) playfully offers the correction, “Lacan’s immediate answer to the 
rhetorical question ‘What is a father?’ is unsurprisingly cryptic: ’It is the dead Father,’ 
Freud replies, ‘but no one hears him’” (p. 8). In the same way that Burke offers a series 
of suicides as merely a series of formal appeals, Gunn observes Lacan’s (qua Freud) use 
of a series of fathers: “Lacan implies that there are many other kinds of fathers; the father 
figure is a composite of many things that need to be disarticulated from one another to be 
better understood: the symbolic father, the imaginary father, and the real father” (p. 8). 
Gunn goes on to point out that Lacan is referring to Freud’s depiction of the “primal 
horde” (p. 8). Both Gunn and Lacan are specifically referencing the Totem and Taboo 
(1918) version of this primal depiction (Gunn, p. 8). As mentioned earlier, however, 
Freud’s (1939) “primal horde” retelling in Moses and Monotheism is more narrative in 
nature and accordingly nuanced in its expansion. 
Freud’s pattern tends to be one of moving out of the multitude into the individual 
and back into the multitude. In this way, he offers an outline for understanding his 
narration of the primal horde within the structure of individual trauma: “Early trauma—
defence [sic]—latency—outbreak of the neuroses—partial return of the repressed 
material” (Freud, 1939, p. 101). This is itself a psychoanalytic rendering of ideological 
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interpellation. It is the ideology of the subject. Not me, don’t be not me, we’re all a bunch 
of me’s, maybe we’re not me. For the purposes of the proposed methodology, The 
Imaginary happens within the defense, The Symbolic in the outbreak of neuroses, and the 
Real (as in the missed encounter) in both the early trauma and partial return. Latency is 
that moment between dreaming and awakening. It’s worth to noting that it is Lacan who 
clarifies the three fathers out of Freud’s primal horde.  
In the first half of his essay, Gunn (2008a) discusses the political philosophies of 
“the state of nature” and its more current variation of “the states of emergency or 
exception” which “are premised on the fear or worry that a communal order can collapse 
into some primary, albeit mythic, default chaos” (p. 4). In other words, Gunn posits 
Burke’s Babel as the sublime context for Lacan’s reading of Freud’s horde. Freud’s 
(1939) own primal fantasies, his urfantasien, are revealed in the opening of the story as 
much as anything, but he lays out “early trauma” as a combination of what one might 
begin to consider the Real and the Imaginary (The Imaginary Real; Originary). It’s the 
story of the first tyrannical dad who has sex with anyone and everything he wants, and he 
kills, castrates, or drives out anyone who defies him or makes him anxious (Freud, p. 
102). It is an imagined narrative of a fictional complete control carried out in the most 
brutal, or primal, of ways that can be understood as the representation of a traumatic 
event—a missed encounter. Additionally, one can go a bit further with the crafting of the 
Imaginary to include its emergence as occurring within the psychic defense of the 
brotherly horde, which is to say the internalization as representative thought. More 
crudely, Freud offers murder and cannibalism, “The next decisive step towards changing 
this first kind of ‘social’ organization lies in the following suggestion: the brothers who 
 133 
had been driven out and lived together in a community clubbed together, overcame the 
father, and—according to the custom of those times—all partook of his body” (p. 103). 
Freud is articulating a very crude imaginary depiction of identification. In so doing, The 
Imaginary takes on the shape of an impossible legacy of control. The brotherly horde 
wants to be what they know they cannot be by claiming pieces of it and consuming it.  
This imaginary shape is not to be confused with a symbol. As Gunn (2008a) 
argues:  
Unless one separates the imaginary father as an image and the symbolic father as 
a function, it is easy to get the two confused. In fact, it is this confusion that Lacan 
suggests is typical of psychosis, broadly conceived. Understanding the story of 
the primal horde as a useful myth, the imaginary father is first represented by the 
tyrannical father who imposes the incest taboo, and later the as the friendly ghost, 
the ideal father. (pp. 9-10) 
 
Particularly useful here is the ideal image that Gunn proffers which combines the 
“tyrannical father” with the “friendly ghost” as a binary frame for desire. Out of the 
murder of the Imaginary Father, the Symbolic Father, or functional father, begins to 
emerge as the repetition, and thus substitution as opposed to reproduction, of Imaginary 
memory. In Freud’s (1939) tale, this involves the substitution of spirit animals to which 
the brotherly horde attributed the symbolic subject of the father as a manner of carrying 
his memory (p. 104). Accordingly, Gunn moves back into Lacan’s re-articulation of 
Freud’s fatherhood with particular attention of the functional father: 
Later in his work Lacan would combine the protective and legislative function of 
the father in terms of the ‘symbolic father.’ Unlike the idealization or image of a 
father that we harbor early in life (viz., the imaginary father), the symbolic father 
has more to do with signification as such and less to do with a real person. (p. 9) 
 
Whereas a subject’s early thoughts of its Imaginary parental units, or bigger humans, are 
rather magical in their fictive total control over the subject’s environment, the symbolic 
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parent emerges as the operator and symbolic master of the symbolic world. They stand in 
for the imaginary because they fail to be the imaginary and they impose this limitation 
upon the subject, which is to say they are the outbreak of neuroses as repetitious 
substitutions for what is denied. Namely, each of the brothers “renounced the ideal of 
gaining for himself the position of father, of possessing his mother or sister” (Freud, p. 
104) In other words, the Symbolic Father is the Lacanian representation known as the 
Name-of-the-father, which in the form of a human being is the symbolic made fleshly 
stand-in for the authoritative subject (Gunn, p. 9). Or as Gunn magnificently puts it, it is 
“the functional father who precisely responds “Because I say so!’ […] because it is not a 
living being, but rather an operation” (p. 9). 
The Symbolic Father is not the partial return, the supposed Real Father, nor the 
purely Imaginary Father, but it is the one institutionally caught up in the symbolic; the 
space in which subjects aspire to be authorial, in the sense of being able to write its own 
unique narrative, but knows and collectively reaffirms that desire to be an impossibility 
thus alleviating the shame in its repeated internal failures. Still caught up in the symbolic, 
“The next step forward from totemism is the humanizing of the worshipped being. 
Human gods, whose origin in the totem is not veiled, take the place previously filled by 
animals” (Freud, 1939, p. 105). One can begin to see the parallel of Freud’s primal 
acculturation in “Foucault’s Classical episteme” as articulated by Phelan. Theological 
certitude stands in the way of human connectivity to the animal and corresponding 
subjective uncertainty in the same way that authorized subject of the symbolic stands in 
for the Imaginary. 
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The emergence of The (impossible) Real Subject is Jesus (Freud, 1939, pp. 109-
110). The Real Father is actually the son—the father made flesh. Freud sets out on 
establishing the parallel between the sacrifices/murders of Moses and Jesus which is very 
interesting and has a place in the suicide narrative. However, the Real Subject, the notion 
of the constituent subject in the forthcoming method, begins to emerge within the 
following passage: 
Paul, a Roman Jew from Tarsus, seized upon this feeling of guilt and correctly 
traced it back to its primeval source. This he called original sin; it was a crime 
against God that could be expiated only through death. Death had come into the 
world through original sin. In reality this crime, deserving of death, had been the 
murder of the Father who later was deified. (Freud, p. 109) 
 
This passage brings in the inherent guilt of the implicated self, implicated directly based 
on constituency, or identification, itself, and the paradoxical reality that this guilt-driving 
identification is, in fact, a constituent denial of the subject’s lack, the unconscious. 
Caught up in the real, too, is the fleshed out reality of death. 
Substituting Paul for Jesus in the fatherly trio is also my departure from both 
Gunn and Lacan. Gunn (2008a) finishes his Lacanian triumvirate with “The father as an 
actual person—that individual which is said to be the biological father of a child—is the 
‘real father,’ and should be sharply distinguished from the symbolic father, which, as a 
function or operation, is ‘dead’” (p. 9). The very phrase, “real father” is a symbolic 
designation continually caught up in a patriarchal repetition. The “biological” is code for 
one particular system of logic and objectivity in and of itself. I don’t disagree that this is 
the point at which the “real father” emerges, but I do disagree with the ease of its 
enunciation. Freud’s “Paul,” though, offers a departure from the genetic code of 
patriarchal order even if Paul is still a man. 
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But, within the context of the subject, aside from the mythic horde, who or what is 
murdered? Gunn (2008a) offers the following: 
Like the stories of Oedipus and the primal horde, War of the Worlds demonstrates 
the interplay between the imaginary and the symbolic father, announcing at the 
onset that it is another tale of the dead father by underscoring paternal failure at 
almost every turn. In the widest narrative context, the failure of the State 
represents the patricide that leads to the state of emergency and a regression 
toward the state of nature (psychosis); the film thus collapses  (or confuses) the 
imaginary and symbolic fathers in the figure of Ray, who becomes the paternal 
imago for the spectator. Ray is literally an imaginary father insofar as he is a film 
character (hence his ‘bad father’ and eventual ‘good father’ personae are 
stereotypes). As the world becomes chaotic on the screen, Ray also increasingly 
becomes a representative of the symbolic father. From a psychical standpoint, the 
film thus represents the way in which the fallen father or State is regurgitated 
by—or the way in which the paternal metaphor is integrated into—the broken but 
nevertheless functional family; War of the Worlds represents the triumph of the 
rule of law, the persistence of the dead father. (Gunn, 2008a, p. 10) 
 
It may be that Gunn, in actuality, confuses Ray’s and the State’s imaginary and symbolic 
failures for the very real failures of the Imaginary and the Symbolic as housed within the 
failure of the Real Subject. Perhaps, though, one might shift myths. Could this also be the 
phoenix rising from the ashes—the “real” identity emerging from the death (burning 
away) of the symbolic and the imaginary? The real subject emerges at the point that 
Samson’s two pillars of the symbolic and the imaginary fall leaving an analyst with the 
human being subject. What Gunn suggests as psychosis here may in fact be the vanishing 
real. It is the repetition of the decayed ideal and its forced resurrection from the failed 
foundation of the denial of our lack. This is what answers the 9/11 spectatorial desire in 
his analysis of Spielberg—the validation of spirit as pure spiritual parallax. In other 
words, all of these ideological moving parts create a sense of depth because they can so 
easily be conceived of as layers. 
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In fact, Gunn (2008a) creates the opening for this common reality of subjective 
movement through the different fatherly identities:  
The figure of the mother is invoked here in terms of her prohibitive function: Ray 
sarcastically acknowledges his lack of authority by referring to the true parental 
power. In other words, in the opening diagetic space of the film, the mother 
represents the symbolic father. The plot is thus announced as a process of 
substitution: how will Ray escape his status has the bad father to replace the 
mother as the representative of the law? (p. 11) 
 
Gunn opens up the possibility for both subjectivities to find their selves in the movement 
through the imaginary, symbolic, and real with each representing a passage of 
deterioration. The mother doesn’t only play the role of authority, she also represents the 
ideal in the wake of a real absence. Ray is caught up in the subjective desire to fill this 
very same absence even as he is always threatened by his inevitable failure. Both are 
supposed to be doing the holding for their subjective spawn (their two kids) and both are 
trapped in the dilemma of their denial of that impossible task. They are caught up in the 
belief that they must be subjects for the subjects that they brought into the subjective 
frame.  
 In further agreement with this logic, Gunn (2008a) argues:  
In life, the primal father was powerful and was the law. However, in death he 
became even more powerful, for life is no longer a pre-condition for demands. 
For Lacan, this ghostly father that rules from beyond the grave is really no person 
at all (he is dead, after all), but the function of signification as such. What the 
myth of the primal horde and the dead father teaches us is that even if imaginary 
and real fathers represent the law, they cannot be or fully embody the law; the 
primal father was killed at the moment his corpse became the metaphor for the 
law of exogamy. In more common parlance, Lacan’s understanding of the 
symbolic father as a legislative function articulates the ‘rule of law’: that no-one 
is above or beyond the law, including those who claim to represent it. (p. 10) 
 
Embedded in Gunn’s argument is the failure of the real subject as well as the imaginary 
and symbolic because the real subject cannot attain the status of either in its 
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epistemological search for ontological validation. Most importantly, this threesome 
locates the vanishing point, the constituent signifiers standing in for the uncertainty 
signified, and the viewer point that also vanishes within the calculation of subjectivity.  
Out of this inherently psychotic sense of repudiation, Gunn’s (2008a) contention that 
“War of the Worlds can be read as a negotiation of the anxieties of subjectivity itself at 
multiple levels” as is clear in that “the father-imago of Ray is fashioned to help audiences 
negotiate social anxiety about the paternal function and to accept the Law, even if its 
representative—or, rather, especially because its representative—is a flawed human 
being, a former dead-beat” (p. 13) can be escalated. By escalation, I mean that we might 
continue to desexualize this essentialist understanding of the subject and begin to imagine 
the commonality of the neurosis and psychosis held within all subjective proclamations. 
As Burke (1969b) morbidly makes clear, “an adolescent, eager to ‘grow up,’ is 
trained by our motion pictures to meditate much on the imagery of brutality and murder, 
as the most noteworthy signs of action in an ideal or imaginary adult world” (pp. 17-18). 
Gunn’s insistence to maintain the language of Lacan and Freud is merely filmic 
reification of psychoanalysis’s sexist bite that one might muzzle. All cuteness aside, 
following Gunn’s findings leads to a very helpful way of furnishing a rapidly 
deteriorating methodization of the vanishing point through these vanishing fathers qua 
subjectivity. 
For the rhetorical purposes of this method, Burke’s (1969b) discussion of a few 
classical classifications of rhetorical form based on Aristotle and Cicero (and taught by 
Quintilian) are also helpful—namely, Burke lists Aristotle’s classifications (deliberative, 
forensic, and demonstrative/epideictic), and both Cicero’s “offices” (to teach, to please, 
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to move or “bend”) and styles (grandiloquent, plain, and tempered) in the context of past, 
present, and future (pp. 69-78). At the beginning of this particular area of analysis, he 
further contextualizes these classification arguing, “Considered broadly, in terms of 
address, an audience can have three primary purposes in listening: to hear advice about 
the future, or to pass judgment on some action in the past, or merely for the sake of 
interest in a speech or subject as such.” (Burke, 1969b, p. 70) Mapping this basic logic of 
the rhetor and the audience out, there is a clear emergent pattern that that can also be 
understood as making up the rhetorical structure of the subject (Table 1). 
Table 1: Rhetorical Structure of the Subject 
Imaginary – Future – Deliberative – Grandiloquent – To Please 
Symbolic – Past – Forensic – Tempered – To Teach 
Real – Present – Epideictic/Demonstrative – Plain – To Move/Bend 
 
The subject in this structure represents both the individual audience member and 
the rhetor. Additionally, I have added the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real to offer further 
context to the subject positions. The imaginary rhetorical subject is not yet constituted. It 
is deliberating about itself for the future emergence and attempting to entice others into 
its identification. The symbolic rhetorical subject has been encoded and transmits its 
historical emergence through careful repetition. The real rhetorical subject attempts to 
throw off the pre-tense of appropriate code in order to get to the heart of the matter.  
Barthes (1972) is also helpful in discussion of “the reader of the myth” in which 
he outlines the three subjects of myth production: the “producer,” the “decipherer,” and 
the “reader” (p. 128). Combining the logic of the deliberating rhetorical subject with 
“producer” of mythic texts offers a creative sense of subjectivity that I label the 
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“Authorial Subject” because this iteration of the subject portends to write its own 
narrative into the future out of nothing but itself. The “decipherer” is also the critic and 
the one who then professes the word. In the forensic domain, the “decipherer” also takes 
on the corrective activities of one who has been authorized to do so. Thus, the symbolic 
subject is the “Authorized Subject.” Here, the symbolic emerges as the process of forced 
signification—authority. Herein lies the precise space of epistemological subjectivity that 
effaces the ontological lack within the Imaginary and the Real. This effacement is the 
work of the authorized subject as the normative navigator and ultimately failed symbolic 
master of the symbolic. Last, Barthes’ “reader” connects the real to embodied 
constituency as his reader qua destination. It is the “Constituent Subject”—the plain 
fleshing out of subjectivity whose very body suggests the metaphor for the subject. Table 
2 displays the added elements to the rhetorical subject. 
Table 2: Rhetorical Structure of the Vanishing Subject 
 
Authorial Subject  – Imaginary – Future – Deliberative – Grandiloquent – To Please 
(Early Trauma – Defense – Birth) 
 
Authorized – Symbolic – Past – Forensic – Tempered – To Teach 
(Outbreak of Neuroses) 
 
Constituent – Real – Present – Epideictic/Demonstrative – Plain – To Move/Bend 
(Early Trauma – Partial Return of the Repressed Material – Death) 
 
 
Of course, there are several other elements in this second table including the 
addition of the word “vanishing.” The new elements within the structure of the vanishing 
subject are intended to play out the deterioration that is at work in driving lack of the 
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subject. Barthes (1981), in his way, spells out the social functioning of the vanishing 
subject is his further discussion of studium: 
The studium is a kind of education (knowledge and civility, ‘politeness’) which 
allows me to discover the Operator, to experience the intentions which establish 
and animate his practices, but to experience them ‘in reverse,’ according to my 
will as a Spectator. It is rather as if I had to read the Photographer’s myths in the 
Photograph, fraternizing with them but not quite believing in them. These myths 
obviously aim (this is what myth is for) at reconciling the Photograph with society 
(is this necessary?—Yes, indeed: the Photograph is dangerous) by endowing it 
with functions, which are, for the Photographer, so many alibis. These functions 
are: to inform, to represent, to surprise, to cause to signify, to provoke desire. And 
I, the Spectator, I recognize them with more or less pleasure: I invest them with 
my studium (which is never my delight or my pain). (p. 28) 
 
While a bit confusing, the “Photograph” itself can be understood as the authorial subject 
and the “Photographer” as “Operator” can stand in for the authorized subject. Placed in 
the context of the following passage and the suggestion of the vanishing subject, 
something interesting happens: 
It can happen that I am observed without knowing it, and again I cannot speak of 
this experience, since I have determined to be guided by the consciousness of my 
feelings. But very often (too often, to my taste) I have been photographed and 
knew it. Now, once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything changes: I 
constitute myself in the process of ‘posing,’ I instantaneously make another body 
for myself, I transform myself in advance into an image. (p. 10) 
 
The “consciousness of my feelings” is like the consciousness of signifiers. In this 
fascinating moment, he’s describing the process of moving from real (constituent) subject 
to symbolic (authorized) to imaginary (authorial) in a reversal of the map. But that is 
precisely the point, to articulate this failure. Punctum occurs in and as the failure of this 
transformation, which seems to rupture disconstituency when it actually, ultimately, 
affirms it. 
 In fact, one can see Barthes’ (1981) photographic subject desiring the creation of 
the vanishing point again and again. Shortly after the above point, he goes on stating, 
 142 
“But since what I want to have captured is a delicate moral texture and not a mimicry, 
and since Photography is anything but subtle except in the hands of the very greatest 
portraitists, I don’t know how to work upon my skin from within” (p. 11). At the point of 
the real, the subject reaches for the ideal because the real does not hold the subject in the 
way it thinks it should be held. The subject encounters the same failures in the painting in 
its self.  Barthes lends himself  “to the social game, I pose, I know I am posing, I want 
you to know that I am posing, but (to square the circle) this additional message must in 
no way alter the precious essence of my individuality” (pp. 11-12). Again, Barthes 
captures the Real, if not the Encounter. And, in so doing, he captures its deterioration. 
Otherwise put, Barthes (1978a) announces the constituent subject as not that which 
constitutes the viewer, but that which constitutes the text in his argument that “this 
destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, 
psychology; he’s simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces 
by which the written text is constituted” (p. 148). This unconscious reality, for the 
subject, is the abject reality of suffering. 
Kristeva (1982), in classic psychoanalytic fashion, announces the narration of 
early formational trauma: 
The scene of scenes is here not the so-called primal scene but the one of giving 
birth, incest turned inside out, flayed identity. Giving birth: the height of 
bloodshed and life, scorching moment of hesitation (between inside and outside, 
ego and other, life and death), horror and beauty, sexuality and the blunt negation 
of the sexual.” (p. 155) 
 
More bluntly, she captures the “stench of me” as evocated by Céline’s articulation of the 
mother giving birth to the failed subjectivity, “When Céline locates the ultimate of 
abjection—and thus the supreme and sole interest of literature—in the birth-giving scene, 
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he makes amply clear which fantasy is involved: something horrible to see at the 
impossible doors of the invisible—the mother’s body” (p. 155). As problematic as this is, 
as Céline is, the evocative image normalizes the traumatic recurrence of abjection. It 
announces a truth about the real body in the subjective frame. Our bodies tell many of us 
a lot about ourselves that we do not like. 
Barthes (1981) argues, “ ‘myself’ never coincides with my image; for it is the 
image which is heavy, motionless, stubborn (which is why society sustains it), and 
‘myself’ which is light, divided, dispersed; like a bottle imp, ‘myself’ doesn’t hold still” 
(p. 12). As Elkins (1996)  clarifies, “Vision is not a simple act of volition. We want to 
see, but we cannot; we try not to see, and we see in spite of ourselves; we try to see 
everything, and we see next to nothing. Seeing is not easy: it is not easy to do, it is not 
easy to control, and it is certainly not easy to understand” (p. 124).  
Diana Sands’ (2009) tripartite model of suicide bereavement offers a way of 
thinking about what hides in the parentheses in Table 2. The disconstituent does not undo 
us without our help. We try on the disconstituent’s shoes. We walk around in the 
disconstituent’s shoes. And we take off the disconstituent’s shoes. Or, at least we try. 
Like Sands’ model, the vanishing method of regarding the disconstituent moves from one 
position to another in a nonlinear fashion but can be articulated separately as if by stages. 
Following Freud’s traumatic outline, the method fails at each point to hold still. The 
analyst, or brother, tries on the shoes only to find them impossible to fill. As Sands’ 
notes, it is all too shattering and too irrational to imagine. Thus, even with the shoes that 
cannot be filled, the survivor analyst attempts to meticulously piece everything together 
“Like a forensic investigator” only to fail once again and again (Sands, pp. 13-14). 
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Finally, the lost analyst can only remove the shoes in the effort of trying to “move on” 
with living. But even this can only fail because too much of the emptiness in these shoes 
has been revealed. But, then, there is always the Zen master’s withdrawal, shoe atop his 
head. 
The final three chapters elaborate upon each deterioration, each subjective 
suicidal departure. While each element can be found in each artifact, each chapter will 
only focus upon the primary deterioration of its regard. Chapter 4 will focus on the 
deterioration of the authorial subject into the state of disconstituency. Chapter 5 will 
focus on the authorized subject’s participation in both constitutive and disconstitutive 
rhetoric. And Chapter 6 will focus on constituent subjects’ relationships with 
disconstituent individuals. As a definitional aid, the disconstituent is the lost persona 
which is lost to and by the subjective practices of identification. Disconstitutive rhetoric 
is false interrogation and false confession that creates the state of disconstituency which 
inhabits the regarded disconstituent. 	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CHAPTER 4: GUS VAN SANT’S LAST DAYS 
What makes the authorial subject so simultaneously threatening in its tyranny and 
hopeful in its control is that it is not entirely impossible to conceive of it. It is “the 
concept” itself. It is made plausible through the image, through the imagined interiority 
of the subject, the soul. The Christ structure offers a hint about this: “Cast as the ultimate 
stand-in, Christ had already given his body to the script, a script that had him say, ‘This is 
my body, take and eat,’ in an effort to dissolve the boundary between a divine body and a 
fallen one” (Phelan, 1997, p. 28). Here, Phelan makes an important observation that falls 
into place with the overall structure. Namely, the Christ story is preordained by the 
trauma of the social itself. Christ never was the subject of his own body. Christ was a 
spirit hitching a ride in his body for us. It is believable because there is something to it 
that seems to stand apart from the symbolic and the real as a disembodied divination. It 
requires imagination because it is an assumption prior to realization. Dr. Lanny Berman, 
former executive director of the American Association of Suicidology explains, “Suicidal 
people have transformation fantasies and are prone to magical thinking like children and 
psychotics” (Friend, 2003). Unless everyone is suicidal, this logic is not specifically 
suicidal at all and is deeply shared on a massive scale. However, a suicide can force the 
surrounding subjects into a state in which the magical and transformative foundations of 
their identification structures crumble. 
 Imagination, in and of itself, offers the subject the illusion of both singularity and 
agency. The ability to simulate the images in one’s head in the plane of symbolic 
exchange subjectively demonstrates creative power. It suggests that, prior to the subject’s 
ability to manipulate the world around it, there is something that conceives the possibility 
 146 
of that manipulation—in short, the assumption of genius. This is the idea, the idea of 
“genius,” at the heart of Barthes’ authorial critique—the “Author” with the authorial 
powers of creative genius that he kills off. The space of the authorial subject, the domain 
of the ideal image of the subject as constituted in the imagination, serves as the 
foundational state for disconstitutive rhetoric and the disconstituent—the state of 
disconstituency. Chapter 4 explores this particular point in the vanishing structure of the 
rhetorical subject as the authorial subject deteriorates into both the symbolic and the state 
of disconstituency in the example of Gus Van Sant’s (2005a) film Last Days. Whereas 
the authorial subject is defined by the imaginary, future-oriented, pleasure-driven, 
grandiloquent deliberation of the subject, the state of disconstituency is the parenthetical 
suicide pill of early traumatic birthing abjection and the primal attempt of a doomed 
defense. 
 Last Days is the final installment of what is informally known as Gus Van Sant’s 
“Death Trilogy,” which features three films based on tragically real events (Edelstein, 
2005). Thematically, it could be argued that this trilogy is a reversal of the underlying 
order of this dissertation beginning with the constituent, or real, subject and ending with 
the authorial, or imaginary, subject. The first film, Gerry (Sant, 2002), reduces the 
subject of the film to its most base form of survival by following two friends on their 
tragic trek through the desert in which they completely lose their bearings. Gerry, in a 
performative gesture, brings the audience into this sense of lost bearings through various 
film techniques of parallax disorientation. In other words, there are several times when 
the viewer cannot tell whether the actors are coming or going, which character is leading 
or following, and if they are close to the viewer position (the camera) or far away from it. 
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It mirrors the idea of the leap that Lacan places in question with regard to the 
unconscious and the subject of the unconscious. Additionally, the audience is not given 
names for the two characters beyond their slang usage of “Gerry” referring to each other 
as “Gerry,” someone else as “Gerry,” and using it in various other grammatical positions 
along the lines of “Gerry up that mountain, Gerry.” In short, the subject is completely lost 
in this desert of the real. The film culminates in the two characters reduced to lying on the 
ground on the brink of dying. Their bodies, like Phelan’s bodies, have already begun to 
decay and disappear during their walk. Matt Damon’s character rolls on top of Casey 
Affleck’s character and strangles him to death. The assumption is that this is a mercy 
killing. But the actual traumatization is that a family arrives shortly after this to save the 
remaining character. He must live with his actions because he is saved, but not redeemed, 
and the audience can only watch as he is driven away from the desert presumably at the 
beginning of a very dark variation on survivor’s guilt.  
The other two installments of the trilogy require less initial explanation because 
they are both based on well-known events. The second film, Elephant (2003), resembles 
the more familiar 1999 Columbine, Colorado massacre and follows several high school 
kids around on the day of the tragedy culminating in the massacre itself. The film is 
arguably an expression of the symbolic relations of the authorized (and yet to be 
authorized) in the way that it depicts teenage angst and conformity as related to authority 
figures in the guise of teachers, administrators, and dysfunctional parents as well as 
popular culture and localized kid culture. It teaches with a big stick. The anywhere-ness 
of the high school and the characters authorizes the trauma as one of identification—it 
visually screams, “this could be us” and “don’t be not me.” Everywhere, the viewer looks 
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for order to turn the inevitable away. But Van Sant resolutely allows his film to stand-in 
for the cultural trauma of Columbine in such a way that still allows the viewer to “move 
on” without the feeling of being implicated. Finally, there is Last Days (2005a), which, 
according to the closing credits, is “inspired in part by the last days of Kurt Cobain.” In 
other words, the film is inspired by the last days leading up to Cobain’s suicide. 
 Inspiration is itself a form of what is meant by the authorial subject as it is a 
component of conception. Obviously, the film is a realization of a concept, which means 
that it is operating within the symbolic representation of the concept through the activity 
of real people embodying roles for the eventual pleasure of an audience of real people 
playing their role as the individuated universal audience. That being said, the goal here is 
to suspend that reality in the same way that viewers often do as filmgoers and embrace 
the imaginary space at hand. Last Days is an excellent case study for this experiment 
because it so clearly aspires to be conceptual. In the DVD bonus feature, The Making of 
GUS VAN SANT’S LAST DAYS (Andrew, 2005), actor Lukas Haas states, “There’s no 
script, it’s literally all creation.” In the same short, the film’s producer, Danny Wolf, 
refers to the work as “pure presentation” and “not manipulative” (Andrew, 2005).This 
idea of ideation is repeated in various ways throughout the bonus material. These 
comments seem to be attempting to both glorify and explain Van Sant’s directorial 
vision—not just for this installment, but the entire trilogy. Each film is not simply 
inspired by the real events in a way one might find on the Lifetime Channel. Rather, they 
are all presented in a very realist documentarian style that reeks of unscripted 
improvisational acting. Both the audience and the performers are being asked to try on 
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the shoes. The audience is never clearly directed towards specific conclusions. The films 
are not meticulously forensic in its approach.  
Van Sant works to create the effect of just being the silent passenger, the 
consciousness that creatively gazes. The camera follows the banality of the characters’ 
lives in an almost cold and detached manner. It leads us as it follows them. It shows. The 
Director of Photography on all three films, Harris Savides, explains that the camera work 
and overall style of lingering shots requires an “active audience” (Andrew, 2005). It 
requires the viewing subjects to gaze their own gaze as the accompaniment to van Sant’s. 
Gus Van Sant, himself, contends that his approach is attempting to subvert the 
“shorthand,” the authorized symbolic gesturing, that is typical in film making in order to 
encourage the viewer to “really watch what it is” in such a way “as if you were in the 
car” (Edelstein, 2005, p. 1). Specifically, Van Sant is likely referencing a couple of very 
lengthy camera shots in a couple of cars at the beginning and end of Gerry, but the idea 
remains true for the other films and the overall approach. It is not the car that is 
important; rather it is the idea of being in a car as the viewing subject is driven towards 
and away from a site of untimely death. It is a remarkably literal approach to the death 
drive as a form of finding what a thing is in its end. So, from top to bottom, Last Days 
and its filmic siblings are explicitly deviating from the more traditional, authorized, 
oeuvre of movie making in that they attempt to actively force all players into the 
inspirational, conceptual, or authorial role—to simply be or be with the idea in a 
participatory creative manner. But, Van Sant is inviting the viewer to gaze into the 
vanishing point in such a way that the viewer is actively within the gaze while not being 
able to act out the gaze within the frame. The viewer is only allowed to imagine. 
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 Cobain serves as both the “primal father” and the “lost persona.” On the obvious 
level, the disclaimer in the end credits directly states that the film is “in part” based on 
him just as every description of the film does, whether you are looking at the back of the 
DVD case or at the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) entry. Interestingly, Van Sant seems 
to be attempting to lose Cobain’s persona in his creation of a lost persona. But there is 
also the image (Figure 3) on the cover of the DVD, promotional poster, and IMDb entry. 
It is the same image at every entry point. If you are at all familiar with Kurt Cobain and 
Nirvana, then the hair, beard stubble, and sunglasses immediately scream at you. Reading 
the image in combination with the words of the title, “Last Days,” the casual observer is 
immediately sent on the imaginary adventure of Cobain’s suicide. On the DVD, beneath 
the title, there is also the added future-oriented caption, “Rock and roll will never die.” 
Michael Pitt, the actor in the image, reciprocally gazes at the viewer point from behind 
those characteristic sunglasses as though they are the latent sheen between the viewers’ 
sense of reality and the filmic fantasy. They are latent in that they give the viewer the 
chance to imagine rather than confront what’s behind them. They allow for individuated 
nostalgia for a fashioned past. They hover in the awakening gap without forcing the gap 
into view by remaining as a blind spot. Further along these lines, the primary film 
locations are a large house in the woods and an accompanying detached studio that are 
reminiscent of the images in the journalistic aftermath of Cobain’s actual suicide. The 
connotation of Cobain’s suicide story is virtually inescapable in the way that the film and 
the audience reciprocally linger on these images. 
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 Figure 3 Theatrical Poster for Gus Van Sant’s (2005b) Last Days  
 
All of these images, though, are connotative. This is an important clarification in 
this analysis because it also demarcates a point of departure from the implied past of the 
film. The film, itself, always drives towards an inevitable future suicide and its aftermath 
based on that implied past, but that implied past is not necessarily what the film shows. 
Again, Van Sant’s directorial approach is not meticulously forensic. As the full 
 152 
aforementioned disclaimer in the credits attests, “Although this film is inspired in part by 
the last days of Kurt Cobain, the film is a work of fiction and the characters and events 
portrayed in the film are also fictional” (Sant, 2005a). Michael Pitt is not playing the role 
of “Kurt Cobain;” he is playing the role of “Blake.” “Blake” looks like the idea of 
Cobain, and the cast of surrounding characters also compliments the “Grunge” idea of the 
norm subversion surrounding Cobain as well as certain persons of interest in the 
investigation of Cobain’s suicide. However, none of these characters are any of those 
things.  
In fact, there is another wrinkle. While Michael Pitt’s character is named “Blake,” 
most of the other primary characters follow a different pattern: Lukas Haas plays the role 
of “Luke,” Scott Green plays “Scott,” Nicole Vicius plays “Nicole,” and Asia Argento 
plays “Asia.” Clearly, the characters’ names, their nominally identifying symbols, in the 
film are not as important as the idea of the characters. Furthermore, there is very little 
dialogue to carve out specificity of characterization throughout the film. In two of the 
more revealing dialogic character moments, the content has as much to do with the 
actors’ lives as it does with the characters’. First, there’s “Scott’s” talk with “Blake” in 
which “Scott” asks for money and a “jet engine heater” to heat up the large house in the 
woods. As we learn in the bonus feature, this was a semi-joking request made by Scott 
Green in his complaint about the actual house being cold, and Van Sant and Green 
decided to include it in “Scott’s” lines. “Luke,” while requesting help on writing lyrics to 
a song, tells a story to “Blake” about a woman “Luke” jilted in Japan. And this story, as 
we again find out in the bonus feature, is taken right out of Lukas Haas’s life. The actors 
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are only trying on the shoes without committing to the specificity of those shoes. In short, 
the film is not a reproduction. It is better understood as a deliberative repetition.  
The film is, in fact, very elliptically deliberative. It is a group of individuals 
collectively and individually thinking through a situation that can never truly be resolved. 
There are two groups of individuals seeking this impossible resolution. First, there are the 
cast members, crewmembers, and audience members, who are the subjects of Van Sant’s 
experiment, thinking through the situation. Second, there are the characters, the other 
subjects of Van Sant’s film, thinking through the situation as well. As Van Sant puts it, 
“the movie is about putting you in the moment with a man who has lost all sense of time 
– whose grip on the present is ‘decomposing’” (Edelstein, 2005, p. 2). Here, again, Van 
Sant drives the viewers towards a future death by specifically attempting to “decompose” 
the present. This is why “early trauma” is part of both the state of disconstituency and 
disconstituent parenthetical underwriting of the authorial and the constituent subject 
positions. Both embark within the always already too soon, too early, trauma of the lost 
present. The future decomposes the present, and the present decomposes itself into the 
future.  
Edelstein (2005) paraphrases Van Sant to argue that “the film is more of an 
abstract meditation on the loss of the natural world than it is about the real suicidal rock 
star” (p. 2). Further, like Phelan’s redemptive meditation on the vanishing point, Van 
Sant’s meditation is also an assumptive regard of “loss” that asks the viewer to consider it 
from the standpoint of an abstract condition along the lines of redemption. Additionally, 
the loss is the loss of the state of nature positing the present as a point of deterioration 
into a doomed future. The present that is lost in the future-oriented death drive is the 
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abjection of birthing—the messy gateway into being, or the attempt to depart from the 
stench of not me. As such, the viewer sees both the inspirational past and deliberative 
present decomposing in its death driven state of disconstituency into the repetitive future 
of a traumatized survival of loss. The “primal father” was not murdered by the horde, at 
least not directly; Kurt Cobain completed suicide. The authorial subject, “Blake,” will 
also complete suicide. 
Before deteriorating the authorial subject further into a state of disconstituency, a 
quick review of the situation may be helpful. Namely, this is a good point to clarify the 
authorial subject as a point within the subjectification of this film. All of the characters 
are vaguely reminiscent of other role players in the implied “real” past. While the viewer 
of the film and the bonus feature is given a sense of how each character was born for the 
film, each birthing can never actually be seen or even completely recalled as anything 
more specific than a procession of events built upon layers of repetitions. The viewer 
may very well project a sense of “it must have been like this” onto a great deal of the 
basis of this film, but this can only ever be a projection. This is not just a commentary on 
the film, but also a commentary on the formation of the authorial subject in general. Our 
own human births are very much like the “births” of these characters. To take that idea a 
bit further, many subjects think of themselves as authorial at some point in their lives in 
that there is a Lukas Haas creating and orchestrating the character, “Luke,” as he goes 
about his life, and that this authorial creative action began at the moment of the 
individual’s birth. But, the fantasy of the film is not simply the idea of the actors 
controlling their fates. Rather, the fantasy of the film is that all subjects can deliberatively 
create and control this world that they will encounter because of the fantasy that other 
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people did it in the past. There is another fantasy worth observing: the fantasy that this 
film is somehow more real than other movies and that the viewer is being driven towards 
that reality. This fantasy mirrors the subjective experience in which the subject suspects, 
or magically believes, there is something more real down the road. 
But, then, why not “Mike?” Why did Michael Pitt play the role of “Blake” 
instead? Pitt thinks it is an “arrogant” idea that he would somehow “understand Cobain 
more by playing Blake” and that the importance of the lack of specificity to the names 
and time within the film, to Pitt, is about allowing “people to look at a human being in 
that situation” in a similar vein to Van Sant’s car (Canavese, 2005). But, the distance 
between “Mike” and “Blake” is less readily available. There is, though, a distance. At one 
point in the film, “Blake” plays a song on an acoustic guitar that is eerily reminiscent of 
Cobain’s voice. It reminds me of my own drooling strums on a guitar and what I might 
imagine a rehearsal for Nirvana’s “Unplugged” session to resemble. The lyrics of the 
song, at least what the viewer/auditor can make out, also reflects the filmic situation at 
hand as well as the dark, murky spiritual core of a youthful angst found in a large portion 
of Cobain’s own lyrics. If you listen closely, you can make out phrases such as “last gasp 
left,” “should I die again,” and something about “tears.” More clearly, the viewer/auditor 
can make out what seems to be a chorus, “it’s a long lonely journey from death to birth” 
that ultimately builds to the words, “I know I’ll never know until I come face to face with 
my own cold dead face.”  These lyrics are remarkable representations of the both the 
project of the film and the project of this dissertation. At this point in the film, the first 
time I watched it, I felt like I was witnessing brilliantly “in-tune” character work. I 
thought, “Here was the genesis point of the creative genius. This is what happens when 
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you ask a great actor to channel the biographical spirit of an artist. This is how the idea of 
a song appears.”  
At another point in the film, the camera watches from outside through the window 
of the in-home music studio—the detached studio is a studio in the sense of an 
architecturally open space rather than music production. Through the window, the viewer 
can see “Blake,” presumably, moving from instrument to instrument. It seems that the 
viewer/auditor can hear what’s happening musically in the room. It sounds as if “Blake” 
is somehow adding each instrument to a layered, or looped, recording. Out of the initial 
chaos, like Burke’s mystery into order, a possible song begins to emerge. All of the 
disconnected sonic elements mimic a type of invocatory identification within the gaze 
from the external viewer point. However, Helder Filipe Gonçalves (2009) argues that the 
sounds that we hear are in fact non-diegetic, meaning not being produced by what 
viewers are seeing in the film, and that the soundscape may very well be meant to 
represent what’s happening in the character’s mind (p. 7). Once again, Van Sant is 
inviting the viewer to contemplate the imaginary and to participate in his authorial vision. 
In fact, a great deal of the film operates with a non-diegetic soundscape approach. One 
hears bells, doors opening and closing, and voices throughout that have no clear source 
other than perhaps an abstract representation of some internality. It is as if Van Sant 
wants the audience to imagine what life is like inside the mind of a mad genius. Or, in 
terms of Freud’s burning child dream, the sounds may simply be remnants of past events 
in “Blake’s mind” caught in a mental loop. The specifics, again, are not as important as 
the idea of “Blake’s mind.”  
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There is a remarkable disconnection here. The viewer watches, or follows, a 
muttering character around with a strange soundscape as a sort of internal guide that 
seems to have nothing to do with what is being seen. In other words, much of what 
viewers are seeing is also what the character is seeing, and what auditors are hearing is 
possibly representative of what the character is thinking and has nothing to do with what 
the character is seeing as far as the audience can know. On the one hand, the viewer 
might imagine this to be along the lines of a musical genius being able to hear something 
other than the immediate soundscape in his or her mind in such a way that makes sense of 
that immediate soundscape on a higher level than the ordinary world listener. On the 
other hand, the viewer might imagine the character to be so lost in his genius thoughts 
that he is oblivious to his immediate soundscape, which would certainly represent a 
common conception of genius as well. Further, this latter view syncs up quite well with 
the idea that this film is about society’s overall loss of the natural world—that even when 
subjects are immersed in nature subjects can no longer connect with it. But, then, are the 
viewers and characters even seeing the natural world at all? Is what is caught up in the 
collective gaze natural? It is certainly not real. Even if the audience imagines these 
thoughts to be “Blake’s,” these are not the thoughts of Pitt. Even if these sounds happen 
in the audience members’ heads in thoughtful ways, these are not their own creation. 
Indeed, many of these sounds, which are largely from Hildegard Westerkamp’s 
soundscape composition entitled “Doors of Perception,” were not even made for this film 
(Jordan, 2007, pp. 4-5).  In other words, any connections, or encounters, are only 
arranged and imagined. Van Sant is bringing his audience into the precise experience of 
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missing, and the miss is unavoidable whether the subject keeps regarding or renegotiates 
its position by turning the film off and looking away.  
Even the aforementioned song sung by Pitt qua Blake qua Cobain is merely an 
arranged, imaginary, and thus missed encounter. It is easy to be fooled by the realistic 
camera gaze into believing that Pitt is inventing something right then and there within the 
character of “Blake.” Even if it took more than one take, the thought of this is impressive. 
But, if anyone really wants to know the actual and full lyrics, anyone can find them 
associated with Pitt’s band, Pagoda, because Pitt wrote this song several years before the 
making of Last Days (Canavese, 2005). Further, Canavese (2005) observes that Pitt was 
reluctant to use this song in the film because, as Pitt says, “it was mine.” Whether or not 
the song was ever about suicide, the connection to Cobain’s suicide, like everything else 
in the film, is once again inescapable. The idea of individual genius deteriorates within 
the gravitational pull of the tyranny of Cobain’s suicide. The fucking genius killed 
himself. Nothing is original, not even the Pixies. Even Cobain’s adult, heroin drenched, 
parental suicide is lost in the currency of Christian Slater movies as nothing more than 
teenage angst with “Wave of Mutilation” (1989) playing in the background. For those 
unfamiliar, “Wave of Mutilation” is a song by the group Pixies and is featured in the 
movie, Pump Up the Volume (1990), which also feature Christian Slater. The point here 
is that the distance between “Mike” and “Blake” is the desire for distance, for division, in 
the midst of identification. It is the desire for distance in the guise of close attention, the 
subject’s renegotiation of its regard. The state of disconstituency is the state in which the 
myth of the authorial subject inescapably deteriorates, the point at which the individual 
qua subject can no longer be a voluntary or active participant in identification because the 
 159 
resident rift has been irrevocably revealed as the emptiness of the subject. For Michael 
Pitt identify with this lost persona, this disconstituent, is to ultimately risk becoming 
suicidal himself. To identify with this suicidal ideation is to acknowledge that what others 
identify within the subject does not exist and that the subjective future within this 
identification is always already doomed. To identify with this is to be in a state of 
disconstituency—to arrive upon an encounter that suggests that the only real option is to 
withdraw from a social body that the subject finds itself incapable of satisfying as an 
interpretive being. 
Last Days is a powerful expression of this state. The viewer can never settle into 
the subject of its gaze because the object is only ever imagined—it is the big hole that is 
the lost persona. The film is a vanishing point that vanishes within the viewer point. It 
reflects back the emptiness of the viewer’s identification as projected onto the screen 
because the film was never that which it appears to be; and, yet, its appearance cannot be 
denied. All of the subjects are doomed to fail. The viewer is haunted and driven by what 
is shown and sonically invoked even as what is being seen and heard is not and never was 
what it interpretively is. It is not simply a reflection on a man’s loss of the natural world, 
nor is it the story of Kurt Cobain’s suicide, because even those who experience or 
experienced them can only ever imagine these things. The film opens and closes with The 
King’s Singers’ version of “La Guerre,” which is a celebratory song written in the 
remembrance of a French military victory over the Swiss, and the song culminates in the 
French soldiers exclaiming, “Victoire,” and a Swiss mercenary lamenting, “All is lost by 
God” (Janequin, 2008). Just as the song captures the victory and failure that is survival 
and death, so, too, does the film, rotten with perfection, capture Burke’s violent notion of 
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identification. There is no way out for “Blake” except the inevitable suicide. There is no 
way out of this for any of us. 
This narrative of inevitable suicide plays out even as the viewer leaves behind the 
promotional poster, DVD cover, or film description. When the detached studio comes 
into view, the bells in the soundscape and possible interior of the mind crescendo like a 
Pavlovian arousal of an appetite for the suicidal sacrifice—the false confession of me not 
not me. Lo! There it is! “Blake” emerges with a shovel, perhaps a magical one, as if to 
dig his own grave in this death drive of a movie. But, he does not dig a grave. Instead, the 
viewer is led to believe that he has dug up a box of shotgun shells protectively contained 
within a plastic bag that had been previously buried. The objectivity of the past is dug up 
as a predictable reminder of the chiming future like an old black and white photograph. 
Then he has the shotgun “itself.” In what appears to be a woman’s undergarment, he 
answers a phone and hears a voice pressuring him to go on tour, “86 dates…world is 
gonna fall apart on this….you gotta play the dates.” This is the first time the audience 
hears the name, “Blake,” but it is already too late to save him. He has been forcibly 
identified as the person everyone knows he is. He wanders around the mostly empty 
house dressed like Elmer Fudd dragging an identity around, hauling the subject, and 
pointing this gun at the other characters performing sleep. He is a dream. Like a child, he 
makes the gun noise with his mouth as he pretends to shoot. But, “Blake” is not a 
murderer. He is a metaphorical rape victim and the fans and producers, us viewers and 
reviewers, are the metaphorical rapists. One knows this from the Cobain’s (1993b) song, 
“Rape Me.” We empathize as we sing along with “me.” “Smells Like Teen Spirit” reeks 
of the stench of not me as it demands, “Here we are now, entertain us,” and “Load up on 
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guns” (Nirvana, 1991). Cobain (1993a) sings, “Throw down your umbilical noose so I 
can climb right back.” Blake serenades, “It’s a long lonely journey from death to birth.” 
But, of course, only one of these lyrics is happening in this film. 
In arguably the most realistic moment in the film, “Blake” interacts with 
Thaddeus Thomas. Thomas, not in quotation marks, is a real phonebook sales 
representative who happened to show up at the house during the filming of the movie 
(Andrew, 2005). In this interaction, Thomas asks “Blake” if he would like to renew an ad 
in the phonebook for a locomotive parts shop that presumably has something to do with 
the actual previous owner of the house. Who’s going to walk away from this train wreck? 
When Thomas asks about the success of the original ad, “Blake” responds by saying, 
“success is subjective.” When asked about any partners, “Blake” says he has none, and 
Thomas concludes their conversation by suggesting, “you should achieve the same level 
of success” and “see you next Tuesday.” It is a remarkable exchange of lies. Later, 
“Blake” is writing something down out loud. He says, “I lost something on my way to 
wherever I am today. I remember when…” He repeats the last part as if stuck, as if not 
remembering. These are not words taken from Cobain’s suicide note, but they sound like 
a suicide note when you know it’s a suicide note. It sounds positively lost, which is very 
different from loss. We are all demanding something of him that he doesn’t have. Even a 
character, a record executive played by Sonic Youth’s Kim Gordon, who seems to be 
trying to help “Blake” forces an image on him and asks him if he wants to be a “rock and 
roll cliché” as she attempts to guilt him into going to rehab for the sake of his child. Be 
the imaginary father. Be the authorial subject. Don’t be real. Don’t choose the real option. 
Play with us. But, this is not just the authorial subject’s deterioration into a state of 
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disconstituency. This is also the authorial subject’s deterioration into the symbolic that 
emerges from the latency of early trauma and defensive repression.  
Finally, there is a traumatic gap in the film. At what could be considered the 
climax of the film, the viewer gazes beside “Blake” in the detached studio as the other 
characters leave the property in another car. “Luke” looks towards us, sees the living 
“Blake,” maybe us. The next scene follows the gardener walking around the detached 
studio. The gardener looks through the glaze of the glass doors and sees the body, the 
corpse, lying there. There is no detail. Barthes might say, “How tasteful,” as he sips his 
cup of studium. But, the punctum is there no matter how fervently Van Sant and the 
viewer might renegotiate this collective regard. The gardener, with us gazing alongside, 
watches as a naked and opaque Pitt climbs out of “Blake’s” body and up an invisible 
ladder. Is it Jacob’s Ladder? Was this all a dream caught in limbo? Who won the war? In 
the next scene, the other characters are at another home. “Scott” franticly says, “We’re 
going to be implicated, they’re going to say we were there.” They drive away with 
“Luke” playing a song on his guitar in the back seat, a song that Lukas Haas is credited 
with writing.  
Van Sant seems to tell the audience, and many conspiracy theorists, that they 
were, in fact, not there. More importantly, he seems to tell us that neither were we. 
Within his “meditation on the loss of the natural world,” he is also telling us that we are 
never even here. However, Van Sant’s choice of not showing the moment of suicide is 
more about the depth of our cultural disregard towards suicide than anything else. 
Michele Aaron (2014) argues that suicide is itself a cinematic vanishing point because 
suicide is so stigmatized that it is nearly impossible to show, let alone see (pp. 91-92). In 
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Gerry, the strangulation scene is intense and rather lengthy. It is suffocating. Equally 
disturbing is the massacre in Elephant. The viewer is not protected from the gory details 
of kids murdering kids and broken down adults. Both movies are gruesome in their 
executions. Everyone’s vulnerability is laid bare. Yet, Last Days shields the viewing 
subject’s regard from the coup de grâce and goes so far as to even provide the potential of 
escape in the form of life after death and a literal getaway car—all while the King’s 
Singer’s celebrate victory and its corresponding defeat as the camera safely watches, 
from a distance, investigators at the suicidal crime scene. If a suicide at the end of this 
death drive might tell us something about what it is, Van Sant would prefer to leave that 
to our imagination. And, maybe “Mike” is right. Perhaps anything more would be an 
arrogant effacement. Perhaps anything else would be as equally beside the point as us. 
Van Sant’s Last Days is a remarkable adventure into the state of disconstituency. 
It captures all of the elements of the authorial subject (imaginary, future, deliberative, 
grandiloquent, pleasure) and deteriorates each through an always already traumatic lost 
persona and primal father, defensive posturing of uncommitted shoes, and the 
abandonment of the messiness of birthing in the idea of a lost natural connection to the 
world. In the end, it leaves its viewers lost in the meaning of a victory song at the end of a 
death drive to self-abnegation. It leaves the viewing subjects gazing at the emptiness of 
the studio filled with Cobain’s and Blake’s suicide. The viewer has been shown not me, 
but the viewer is left without a clear path back to me. In short, Van Sant leaves us in a 
state of disconstituency wondering why we cannot see. 	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CHAPTER 5: VICE MAGAZINE’S AND SYLVIA PLATH’S “LAST 
WORDS” 
 
 Bodies are only ideas in the imagination of the authorial subject even as they are 
the material that produces their ideation. Bodies are lost in the state of disconstituency 
even as they are the sites of this state. In the case of the disconstituent as a lost persona, 
the state of disconstituency inhabits the disconstituent within the gaze of those who 
regard it. In other words, when regarding a disconstituent, the state of disconstituency at 
the very least threatens to inhabit you. In the symbolic economy of the authorized subject, 
though, bodies begin to matter as the result of the menace of becoming meaningful, of 
signification. The authorized subject speaks in the place of lack as the symbolic 
materialization of identification. The authorized subject has been given symbolic 
authority, accreditation, and centrality, because the authorized subject is the symbolic 
substitution for both the impossible ideality of the authorial and the latent encounter with 
the real. It is the place of the traditional constitutive rhetoric because the individual is 
pushed to the margins, and as an outbreak of collective neuroses by way of enforced 
repression, also the place of disconstitutive rhetoric. While the battle of the authorized 
and credited versus the unauthorized and discredited plays out, the disconstituent, as well 
as the constituent, subject is caught somewhere in between. It is in the symbolic that 
authorized and unauthorized subjects reach towards one another through division and 
epistemological effacement.  
 This chapter focuses on the authorized subject as the point at which the authorial 
subject is symbolically replaced in the wake of its failure to be. Its features are symbolic, 
past-oriented and forensic, tempered by reason, and the realm of the lesson. Its 
parenthetical poison pill is its own outbreak of neurosis, which is to say the driving fear 
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of being undone. To return to the logic of the formative relationship between a child and 
a parental figure, this is the point at which the child recognizes on some level that neither 
it nor the parental figure or figures can live up to the ideal of truly creating or controlling 
reality. This is not necessarily a linear progression. The authorized subject is also the 
substitution for the constitutive subject, which is merely the false promise of a subjective, 
or objective, encounter with the real. As the functional substitution for the individually 
embodied subject, the authorized subject transcends both the authorial and constituent 
positions of the subject and diminishes the body to the existence of a symbol. To be 
authorized, it is not enough to interpretively be, one must also be interpreted as a correct 
interpretation. In other words, the authorized subject is not simply read as an 
accumulation of history, but also taught as an accumulation of history. The symbolic is 
always already built upon a past. As such, its analysis is not prescriptive. It is descriptive 
at best and always the postscript. It is the suicide note. At the point that constitutive 
rhetoric is recognized as also disconstitutive, the note is already, at the very least, being 
written. In fact, to even enter into the symbolic through “ritual transformation,” which is 
to say to enter into identification, is already “a kind of self-immolation” (Burke, 1969b, p. 
11) 
 In his consideration of the classic butterfly dream in which Choang-tsu dreams of 
a butterfly and wakes up wondering whether the butterfly is dreaming him, Lacan (1978) 
concludes, “It is when he is awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their 
butterfly net” (p. 76). In other words, the symbolic, the realm operated by the authorized 
subject, is a subjective trap at the invocatory moment of identification designed to capture 
the authorial and constituent subject in a meaningful way that simultaneously expresses 
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and represses the butterfly as an embodied fantasy. To awaken within the social is to 
become trained in one’s own gaze and to be read as a symbol for one’s self. It is the place 
of competitive imitation resolved by the false confession. Within Barthes’ strata of the 
readers of myths, the authorized subject is the critic and scholar—the corrective 
rhetor/writer and the corrective audience/reader.  
It is from this understanding of the authorized subject that this chapter regards 
Vice Magazine’s “Last Words” fashion spread with particular attention to its depiction of 
Sylvia Plath. Unlike Last Days, “Last Words” does not attempt nominal distance in its 
representation of the suicidal subject. There was no pretense of separation from the 
implied past beyond a rudimentary re-contextualization within a fashion aesthetic. As 
“VICE Staff” puts it, “‘Last Words’ is a fashion spread featuring models reenacting the 
suicides of female authors who tragically ended their own lives” (Staff, 2013c). Namely, 
these images are meant to represent whom the viewers think they are meant to represent. 
However, I cite “VICE Staff” here to immediately articulate the defensive posturing of 
the imaginary, or authorial, subject within the symbolic exchange because of its overt 
nature. The fashion spread outraged readers and activists. The reaction was so strong in 
its collective reprimand that the magazine felt forced to take the spread down from their 
website. “VICE Staff” is obviously not a person and the entire staff did not write the 
statement that has been given this byline. This byline stands in for the individuals as the 
imaginary sacrificial being. It is a collective self-mortification, rather than the complex of 
self-abnegation, in the absolute form of not me. The represented bodies of this staff are 
neatly packed into this identifying symbol in a way that expresses and represses them as 
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well as the unruly creative spirit that is the oeuvre of Vice Magazine as is clear in the way 
the statement continues:  
The fashion spreads in VICE magazine are always unconventional and 
approached with an art-editorial point-of-view rather than a typical fashion photo-
editorial one. Our main goal is create artful images, with the fashion message 
following, rather than leading. (Staff, 2013c) 
 
In other words, the staff was being artistic, not realistic, and they did not mean anything 
by it. The models were elevated as artistic actors playing roles rather than the usual 
sexualized objects within the superficial fashion world. It was all just an idea. Further, 
they “will no longer display ‘Last Words’ on our website and apologize to anyone who 
was hurt or offended” (Staff, 2013c). One can see Staff’s logic at work in the images 
(Figure 4) and why many might find them offensive and hurtful. The “fashion message” 
does not “lead” in these disturbing images; rather the “fashion message” protects the 
viewing subject from these horrific images. 
But, what is protecting the models. An interesting lack is the overall lack of 
concern for the models in all of the responses. Unlike Michael Pitt, these women 
committed, or were committed, to the graphic representations of their lost personae’s 
suicides. They completed the image. These women are professionals at completing 
photographs. Looking at their expressions in these photographs, they seem to have 
captured a remarkable weight of lack in their own performative regards. They are each 
caught somewhere between meditation and orgasm, both of which are tiny deaths. What 
abyss do they see? What subjects are they in these pictures and what subjects are they 
when they see these pictures? What does the subjunctive voice, the “what if,” mean to 
them? Being symbols, whether authorized or not, seems so easy for these practiced 
women.  
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Figure 4: Vice Magazine’s (2013a) “Last Words”: Novelist Sanmao (right) and writer 
Dorothy Parker (left)  
 
 In the context of Zelizer’s (2004) subjunctive contingency and Barthes’ (1981) 
studium and punctum, these images of these models performing are exceedingly 
fascinating. They do not capture the typical “about-to-die” moment that Zelizer outlines. 
No one is about to die in these images other than perhaps Barthes’ sense of a 
photographic death. These images stand-in for the suicides they depict. What protects 
these models is the studium of fashion. For the viewer, the elements that give way to 
Barthes’ “third meaning” as described by Zelizer are those informational and symbolic 
elements that are easily read. The viewer can know through captions and methods who is 
being depicted. The viewer can look at the fashion concept and outline an understanding 
of what the fashion is attempting to impart. The models are protected by the fact that they 
are not actually performing suicides; rather, they are performing fashion. What one might 
think is the punctum of these images is not. The blood, the noose (Figure 4), even the 
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about-to-ness of the oven (Figure 5) of these images are the readable codes for whom is 
being depicted. The punctum, the contingency that disturbs the stillness of these images, 
that strikes me as a viewer is the eyes of the models. Whether closed in an almost 
cathartic pleasure, lost in a reflection on everything that has lead to the noose, or intently 
staring into the infernal machine, there is the hint of internalized performance in these 
models’ eyes that invites the viewer to take the very same journey that these models 
contingently may be taking. 
 
Figure 5: Vice Magazine’s (2013b) “Last Words”: Sylvia Plath  
 
But, for the sake of poetic efficiency and elliptical depth, this chapter focuses on 
Sylvia Plath’s image in order to elaborate upon the way in which the authorized subject is 
able to remain embodied yet safely beyond being real. For the vast majority of my adult 
life, I have thought of Plath as something like the ultimate punk rock heroine without 
really being familiar with her work. This is because of my association of the idea of her 
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with the simple fact of her suicide in the context of a vague understanding of her 
confessional style of poetry. In my mind, she was just speaking truth to power. But, then, 
I had only read “Daddy.” Her image (Figure 5) in the Vice spread made me reconsider 
my regard of her. 
As I subjectively gaze at this model qua Sylvia, Kryn’s suicide looms. Everything 
in this photograph is only a single symbol. It is normativity turned on itself. She gazes 
into the machinations of the normative “housewife” role as she prepares to leap headfirst 
into the void. I think of my brother’s note, his honest confession. I vaguely remember my 
father reading it to us in a hotel room. It always seemed final to me, and I’ve never 
returned to it until now. It’s written in a green notebook with not much else. It is dated 
“December 19.” He hanged himself on December 21, 1988. It reads as follows: 
Dear Dad, 
If you read this letter it will mean that I succeeded. It was for the best Dad. 
I loved you and Mom very much. It is just that my life ended a long time ago. All 
I have known for the last 3 ½ months, actually since Tulane is fear and anxiety. I 
am already dead. It is time to die. I hope God will forgive me. I still believe in 
God and I hope that sinners like me do get to heaven. Please explain to Ann and 
Chas that I was sick as indeed I am. It had nothing to do with them. I will always 
love all of you. You gave me the best of everything and I felt loved always. Please 
tell Whitney, Whitman, Thomas, Mike and Chuck how much they meant to me 
also (Womelsdorf, 1988) 
 
There is no period at the end. There is no signature. It just stops. Rather, the note gazes 
just before it leaps. The note authorizes the suicide. All one has to do is watch crime 
dramas long enough to know that the note closes the case. It had nothing to do with us. 
But, of course, that is a lie. That is merely a symbolic gesture. Within Kryn’s symbolic 
gesture, the authorized subject and its outbreak stands out. As he looked into his death 
driven future, he was consumed by an anxious past that passed a judgment on his crime, 
his original sin, of not me. Kryn was still bound up in the magical thinking of a normative 
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God-creator. He was sick of us. He understood the importance of meaning, even in his 
suicidality and felt the need, the demand, to offer how much people “meant.” Yet, his 
final act undid all of this meaning, all of this us. 
 Sylvia Plath’s final collection of poetry, Ariel, is the collection that made her into 
the mainstream symbol she is today (Kilkenny, 2014). Katie Kilkenny (2014) observes 
that “Sylvia Plath becomes herself” is how the collection was described at the time of its 
first publication. Plath herself wrote, “I am writing the best poems of my life. They will 
make my name” (Kilkenny, 2014). There’s an interesting ambiguity in “they.” Likely, 
Plath is referring to the poems alone, but there is also the possibility that the “they” 
represents future readers that would specifically include critics and scholars. “They” will 
not “make her.” They will “make her name.” “They” will make the symbol that stands in 
for her lost persona and decayed body. And it would appear that this symbol is what she 
aspires to become. Writing is, after all, a kind of suicide. The Sylvia Plath that stands in 
for Sylvia Plath, Sylvia Plath qua Sylvia Plath, is in the fashion spread. 
 However, the Ariel that made her name was not quite the Ariel that one could say 
she intended. Instead, the manuscript Plath left on her desk before killing herself was 
rearranged and amended with some other poems of Plath’s by her husband, Ted Hughes 
(Hughes, 2004, pp. xi-xii). According to Kilkenny (2014), Hughes was attempting 
“reflect his wife’s biographical arc” in such a way that culminated in a suicidal 
resolution. As retold by his and Plath’s daughter, Frieda Hughes (2004), Ted Hughes was 
just trying to make a good book with “a broader perspective in order to make it more 
acceptable to readers” (p. xvi). This is, itself, an interesting variation on Sands’ (2009) 
“walking” phase of the shoes. While it is a type of creative forensic piecing together of a 
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suicide narrative, its meticulous attention to detail is purely caught up in the symbolic. It 
is a corrective rationalization. However, as Sands describes this phase, it is in fact a way 
of negotiating “the blind spot that is the incomprehensibility at the core of suicide” (p. 
13). The “incomprehensibility” must be rationalized in order to eventually get those 
shoes safely off.  
Of course, this rationalized rearrangement of the sacred symbol, Sylvia Plath, 
created controversy. “Wintering,” the original ending to Plath’s manuscript as well as the 
accompanying “bee poems” according to what was left on the desk ended on a positive, 
even hopeful, note that looked forward into Spring, not the oven (Kilkenny, 2014). Taken 
together, however, these explanations and reactions reveal a fascinating point. Ted 
Hughes was simply adhering to form, because form, even suicidal form, is more palatable 
than the unconscious reality of the very real emptiness with which the actual suicide 
leaves us. Even more importantly, suicide must be final. It must be dark and sad and 
sacred. It must be kept in symbolic check and cannot be allowed to breath the same air as 
hope. Yet, there it is: “I hope that sinners like me do get to go to heaven” (Womelsdorf, 
1988). “What will they taste of, the Christmas roses? / The Bees are flying. They taste the 
spring” (Plath, 2004). They succeeded. The note is not the prayer. The note is for the 
reader. The nocturne, the hopeful prayer into the night, is the suicide itself. What Kryn 
sees in Sylvia’s oven has nothing to do with us. Nonetheless, we are implicated. 
 Disconstitutive rhetoric is constitutive rhetoric. Disconstitutive rhetoric is not the 
rhetoric of the disconstituent; rather, it is the way in which the disconstituent is 
symbolically disregarded. To be clear, disconstituency is the undoing of us. 
Disconstitutive rhetoric is the undoing of them even as they have already been undone. 
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This is not a matter of the “lost object,” it is the “jettisoned object” that is jettisoned 
because its confessional loss cannot be heard.  
In the identifying confession of us and them and all of the little winks along the 
way, people are captured in symbolic form. Because the symbolic is the most clearly 
substitutive subject area, the authorized subject is the functional judge of that for which it 
substitutes. I, Chas, know that “I” and “Chas” are merely the nominal symbols for my 
real existence, which is to epistemologically say I really do also exist as separate from 
both “I” and “Chas” which is why I know “Chas” is real. For this to have meaning, the 
authorized subject must symbolically transmit me not not me. Most of this is a protective 
lie. The subject of identification is a neurotic performance of repression. We neurotically 
projects we to make sense of the world together in such a way that posits life as 
meaningful so as to repress the unconscious reality in which we and I do not exist beyond 
an artificial method of interpretation. Intelligence may not be artificial, but identities are. 
There is a beauty to that, but there is also war. And the idea of intelligence is a divisive 
construct. When the subject symbolically projects onto others what it needs them to be in 
order for us to maintain its subjective reality, the subject projects onto them what they are 
not while telling them that this is what they are. But, both the authorial and the authorized 
subjects are impossible to precisely be precisely because they are both not real. Thus, any 
projection of us and them is a continual reminder to the disconstituent as a lived 
individuality that the disconstituent fails to successfully be either, which is to say that 
they fail to be what we desire on the most basic subjective level, all while “the people” 
compulsively carry out the illusionary performance of successfully being ourselves. The 
authorized subject is the painting. It is the empty denial of the emptiness of rhetoric. It is 
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the not me of I am, or at least that I must be. It is the not me that I competitively imitate. 
And, it is the law we most respect. Everything else is disregarded. 
 The “Last Words” fashion spread and the surrounding controversy repeat the 
disconstitutive rhetoric of constitutive rhetoric quite well. The repetition is exceptionally 
clear in the case of Sylvia Plath. As her daughter suggests of the two Ariels, “Each 
version has its own significance though the two histories are one” (Hughes, 2004, p. xxi). 
Even as she wishes for her mother’s poems to “speak for themselves,” they do not there 
is no way to let them (Hughes, p. xx). In fact, Hughes (2004) explains this herself very 
effectively: 
But the point of anguish at which my mother killed herself was taken over by 
strangers, possessed and reshaped by them. The collection of Ariel poems became 
symbolic to me of this possession of my mother and of the wider vilification of 
my father. It was as if the clay from her poetic energy was taken up and versions 
of my mother made out of it, invented to reflect only the inventors, as if they 
could possess my real, actual mother, now a woman who had ceased to resemble 
herself in those other minds. (p. xvii) 
 
When I think of Kryn now, I know we too were strangers—I am one of those strange 
inventors and Frieda Hughes is as well. As both Hughes and I attempt to walk in our 
disconstituents’ shoes, we each force meaning into our walkabout and onto our lost loved 
ones by retracing their steps in a meaningful way. This entire dissertation is a walking 
example of disconstitutive rhetoric. Even as I attempt to withhold judgment and let Kryn 
be, I am passing meaning along to maintain a division—don’t be not me. The blind spot 
cannot be negotiated. 
The outrage that Frieda Hughes observes in these inventors of her symbolic 
mother is remarkably similar to the outrage in the response to the fashion spread because 
of the truth that is repressed within these responses. When Ted Hughes chose the final 
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poems to be “Contusions,” “Edge,” and “Words,” he rather brilliantly chose phrases such 
as “The doom mark,” “The woman is perfected. / Her dead / Body wears the smile of 
accomplishment,” and “Words dry and riderless” (Plath, 2008, pp. 270-273). In 
“Contusions,” “The mirrors are sheeted,” and in “Words” there is the “Water striving / To 
re-establish its mirror” (Plath, pp. 270-271). Hughes seems to almost perfectly capture 
the suicidal symbolization of his wife through his selection of her own words. Even as his 
critics railed against him for his objective application of form, they did the very same 
thing in their critical musings over Plath’s work as being Plath herself (Hughes, 2004, pp. 
xvii-xviii). So too can one see this as Jenna Sauers (2013) describes these women’s 
suicides as “their lowest moments.” What authorizes her to make this claim about these 
women? As Carlotta79 replies, “decency and common sense” (Sauers, 2013). Even as 
Katy Waldman (2013) argues that “Authors such as Woolf and Plath endure in part for 
their unflinching honesty about what it is to face the dark,” and that “their problems don’t 
always have tasteful resolutions,” she “just sees authors turned into beautiful, violated 
bodies.” Both of the above writers, and many others, “get” the idea that Vice is 
attempting to be ironic in some way. These critics even read the “objectification” that 
they suspect Vice is attempting to overtly and artistically expose. But, even as they do 
this and praise the female authors whom are depicted, they subtly articulate a 
symbolically presumptive idea of those women’s suicides as not being the best 
performances of their selves. These critics are not simply being corrective viewers of 
Vice Magazine; they are curating the fashion spread with the corrective message that 
suicidal depression is an illness and cannot be treated lightly.  
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This normative curating of illness is itself a repression of a possible truth within 
the suicidal acts of the depicted women. My brother thought he was “sick.” He, and the 
women depicted in the Vice spread, may very well have been ill. But this illness may also 
have been a dis-ease with subjectivity, particularly the subjective existence represented to 
them within normative structures of authorized subjectivity. Their suicides may have 
been the most real and hopeful moments in their lives. Indeed, the symbolic artifacts they 
left behind may very well point precisely in that direction. But, in disconstitutive rhetoric, 
the collective more often than not disregards their suicides as unfortunate tragedies that 
should not be emulated. In other words, disconstitutive rhetoric is the normative 
repression and outright denial of the disconstituent position, which is the choice of total 
non-participation in identification practices beyond the symbolic gesture of resignation. 
This is not the not me of I am that the authorized subject should imitate or want to 
imitate. Disconstituency is a philosophical betrayal of authenticity. 
As forensic investigators hunting down the clues of how to not be not me, every 
poem written by Plath becomes a suicide note. Every photograph of Kryn is a clue. Each 
can be edited and rearranged to fit a certain narrative of the horde’s choosing. But, we 
don’t have to read them as only tragic. The bees will live in the spring without her. As 
Frieda Hughes (2004) suggests, “It comes down to this: Her own words describe her best, 
her ever-changing moods defining the way she viewed her world and the manner in 
which she pinned down her subjects with a merciless eye” (Hughes, 2004, p. xx).  
My favorite Plath poem, as the result of my newly negotiated regard of her, is a 
somewhat obscure one. It is titled “Nocturne” by Plath, and retitled “Night Walk” by The 
New Yorker in which it was first published (Bloom, 2007, p. 80). This is an accidental 
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connection on my part as far as connecting my metaphor with Sands’. Yet, for the 
bereaved reader of loss, the overlay is beautiful. While the suicides may be the 
disconstituents’ prayers, the night walk is the readers’ meditative nocturne. The poem 
begins, “Flintlike, her feet struck / such a racket of echoes from the steely street” (Plath, 
1958). Flames that offer a little light in darkness are a common feature in her poetry. I 
wonder which part of the nocturne, the prayer or the night, Plath is. Maybe she is both or 
neither. Maybe she is the subject or the redemption for which the subject prays. The 
poem follows this woman as she seems to escape, “Once past / the dream-peopled 
village, her eyes entertained no dream,” until “The whole landscape / loomed absolute” 
and “unaltered by eyes / enough to snuff the quick / of her small heat out” (Plath, 1958). 
In that moment, “before the weight / of stones and hills of stones could break / her 
down,” before the immense unconscious reality, “she turned back” (Plath, 1958).  
As Bloom (2007) notes, this poem represents, along with another of her poems 
that was simultaneously accepted, the first time she was accepted by The New Yorker and 
an important step in her arrival as the Plath we know (pp. 80-81). In it, I can read a sense 
of hope and fear and imagine her on the brink of suicide only to turn back at the last 
moment. I can see her looking at all of the delusional subjects around her as she just 
misses her encounter at the rift turning back to the security of the collective delusion. I 
hope that Kryn felt joy after he chose not to turn back into the fear and anxiety caused by 
the false confession of order. 	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CHAPTER 6: ERIC STEEL’S THE BRIDGE 
My brother, Kryn (1988), wrote these words: “My life ended a long time ago […] 
I am already dead.” I only pretend to understand what they meant for him. I, after all, am 
still a subject. My understanding, as a constitutive subject, is that Kryn could no longer 
pretend to be the “Kryn” that was being invoked by that name. He could no longer be the 
body in which “Kryn” stood for us. In this regard, he was a disconstituent. But, it is 
important to note that the state of disconstituency and the disconstituent can exist 
separately from the authorial subject, the symbolic subject, both constitutive and 
disconstitutive rhetoric, and the constituent subject. All of these terms are still 
machinations in the subjective trap no different than that symbolic oven. Imagine a 
human interpretively being not with us by choice from its beginning to its end, but 
interpretively experiencing the world nonetheless. My point is not to create some new 
ideal, but to disarticulate the disconstituent from the symbolic in order to better describe 
the constituent subject as being within the grasp of the real yet being no more real than 
the other subjective points.  
The constituent subject is the subject of the missed encounter that authorizes the 
authorized subject because the constituency most desperately believes in the constituent 
subject. The constituent subject is the subject that most certainly must be because the 
authorial and authorized subjects cannot, and yet I am still here in the present moment. 
The subject’s bodily presence proves itself to itself in way that is not unlike 
Kierkegaard’s spirited self that is in its own dialogue with itself and God. It is not just 
that a body bleeds; rather, my body bleeds and I experience myself bleeding as “Chas 
bleeding.” This is “Chas’ blood.” “Chas” is the way that I reach out into the world from 
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the moment that I conform, of confess, to “Chas.” “Chas” is merely a signifier for the 
subject that my body performs, and I venture out into the world collecting more signifiers 
for this constituent subject who must be. The disconstituent chooses to no longer, or 
simply not, collect these particular signifiers for the same reason that the constituent 
subject continues to collect them: because each signifier is yet another subjective failure. 
Each signifier is precisely not a real encounter. Each signifier is resolutely not me so that 
the subject can imagine each signifier resisting me.  
As Elkins (1996) puts it, “What is really happening, what I can never really see or 
else I will go mad, is that I am not the spider who weaves the web, and I am not even a 
fly caught in the web: I am the web itself, streaming off in all directions with no center 
and no self that I can call my own” (pp. 74-75). The constituent subject is defined as the 
presented subject that demonstrates the act that moves and bends the weight of the 
subject into being. Like the authorial subject, however, the constituent subject too is 
parenthetically haunted by the always already too soon decay of death’s looming threat. 
If the constituent subject is the repository for constituency, the real body that proves and 
produces collective being, it carries with it the repressed material that always threatens to 
undo subjectivity itself and in its entirety. The constituent subject is the aspect of 
subjectivity that threatens to wake up. 
 The trauma of suicide threatens the proximate survivors of loss with the 
possibility of actually seeing this awakening happening, which instigates the collective 
disconstitutive disregard. It’s not that the subject sees someone else going through this 
“happening.” It’s that in the subject’s failed regard of suicide, this “seeing” threatens to 
happen within the subject. Caruth (1996) has an endnote with regard to the “Burning 
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Child Dream” that latently introduces the devastatingly traumatic possibility of the 
father’s ambivalence towards the child. She writes: 
Lacan’s text suggests, I believe, that it would be necessary to rethink the drive 
through the curious resistance of trauma to symbolism, rather than through a 
conventional interpretation of the traumatic nightmare in terms of the established 
concept of repression and the traditional Oedipal theory of received 
psychoanalysis. One notion that such a rethinking would have to engage would be 
that of ambivalence, and specifically the possibility of the father’s ambivalence 
toward the child, an interpretation that Freud allows when he suggests that the 
father may feel some guilt at having left a man who was not up to the task to 
watch over the child. (p. 140) 
 
Here, Caruth is setting up the Lacanian departure from Freud. Where Freud insists on a 
substantiated subject, or ego, Lacan points to something other than a subject or the 
unconscious that also participates in the dream. It is his question of what or who he is 
between the moment of recognizing that he is dreaming and the restoration of his subject 
in his waking life. This is the space of ambivalence. But, to clarify the coldness of this 
untaught ambivalence, she goes on: 
Rather than addressing this ambivalence in terms of the individual father in a 
father-son antagonism, Freud seems to incorporate it into a larger problem of 
consciousness as such when he says that it is consciousness itself that does not 
wish to wake up. For in this case the wish to keep the child alive, which Freud 
originally reads as the motivation of the dream, indeed becomes secondary to the 
wish of consciousness to sleep, and may only serve the wish of consciousness, 
even in the face of the death of a child, to protect his own sleep. (Caruth, 1996, p. 
140) 
 
The significance of this endnote (both parts) is of the utmost importance and is 
representative of the reason I strongly dislike both endnotes and footnotes for more than 
their disruptive nature. Whether one regards this interpretation from a Lacanian or 
Freudian viewpoint, the possibility of real ambivalence is passed over, left in an endnote, 
rather like the knock, but left in its place nonetheless. This is a radical possibility that 
creates a remarkably disturbing direction for Caruth’s push towards awakening, because 
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it suggests a conscious reality as abysmal as the unconscious reality. When a subject 
regards the death of a loved one and fleetingly discovers that it actually could care less, 
that the subject may almost certainly have to care less in order to remove the shoes for 
the sake of survival as the subject it desires to be, that subject has had enough of that 
other in its self-reflection, in its constituent subject self, to sustain its identity within that 
other’s signifying context—so much so that the subject refuses its new potential 
understanding of that other and insists upon the false confession that was assumed, that 
fit, rather than the image  (real or imagined) with which the subject was left. The 
ambivalence is clearly found in the (impudent) child’s accusatory question: How can you 
not see? The father’s sadness, according to Caruth’s buried observation, is first the shock 
and sadness of loss, the father’s loss. To awaken to that conscious reality of lack, to see 
this happening as me, would, indeed, be devastating. 
 This is the failed regard within the constituent subject, which is the conscious 
locale of the potential calculation of both one’s subject and one’s suicide, that is the focus 
of this final chapter in its regard of Eric Steel’s (2006) documentary film, The Bridge. 
Whereas Last Days and “Last Words” were symbolic representations of suicides, The 
Bridge shows actual bodies falling, or leaping, to their actual deaths. While the film is not 
the real events by virtue of being a recording, it certainly captures something very real in 
a way that in part defies both the symbolic and the imaginary. The film is like Barthes’ 
camera, his “clock for seeing.” The camera is also disconstituent. It reaches without the 
feelings the subject feels it should have. The camera, as an I/eye, just is. It is hard to nail 
down the intent of this documentary or to precisely get a grip on what is actually being 
documented. The film credits Tad Friend’s (2003) article, “Jumpers,” as its inspiration. 
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The article is equally ambivalent. It closes with the following paragraph that encapsulates 
its ambiguity: 
As people who work in the bridge know, smiles and gentle words don’t always 
prevent suicides. A barrier would. But to build one would be to acknowledge that 
we do not understand each other; to acknowledge that much of life is lived on the 
chord, on the far side of the railing. Joseph Strauss believed that the Golden Gate 
would demonstrate man’s control over nature, and so it did. No engineer, 
however, has discovered a way to control the wildness within. (Friend, 2003) 
 
The “barrier” references an ongoing movement by some to create a physical barrier to 
prevent people from jumping, the “chord” is the beam where people climb outside the 
railing to jump, and Joseph Strauss was the chief engineer of the bridge (Friend, 2003). 
The article can be read as a call to action for a barrier, but Friend does not quite make that 
the only way to read the it in the same way that a camera does not do so. It is simply an 
observation of a relatively cheap and effective way to fix what some see as a problem. 
But it is difficult to argue, based on this article, that Friend thinks it is a problem. A 
reader could also argue that Friend buys into the romanticism and poetry of the bridge as 
an epic symbol for suicide that he discusses in the article. Whether intentional or not, he 
withholds judgment. His judgment appears to be held in abeyance, a souffrance of 
subjective uncertainty about how to order, or rank, his regard. 
In the first half of the article, Friend (2003) offers the story of Roger Grimes, an 
engineer who “agitated for a barrier” for over twenty years only to give up, “stunned that 
in an area as famously liberal as San Francisco, where you can always find a constituency 
for the view that pets should be citizens or that poison oak has a right to exist, there was 
so little empathy for the depressed.” People threw cans at Grimes and told him to jump. 
But, even as Friend operates as a constituent subject for Grimes and other activist and 
suicide experts, he also acts as a constituent subject for those who have gone over the rail, 
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for those who do not fear or hate them, and for those that do. There is a real liberality to 
his writing, a liberality that seems to say it is also okay for people not to exist. In fact, the 
conservative view is one that wants to freeze everyone in their subject positions so as to 
allow the conservative subject to freely change positions. The disconstituent only 
threatens this viewpoint within the viewer and not the position. The liberal view allows 
for everyone to have free movement. Both contain the risk for disconstituency, but it may 
very well be more threatening to a liberal position because of its constant teetering on the 
edge of unraveling. The liberal view is scary and uncertain. The conservative view is 
strict and unforgiving. One clings. The other lets go. Grimes clings. 
Like the film, Friend (2003) does not seem to take the power of his regard for 
granted. Friend couches his regard in statistics and expert witnesses throughout the article 
that point towards not jumping as the better choice without condemning the choice to 
jump. Choice plays an important role in the film as well. Interestingly, the narrative 
arrangement of the film articulates, whether intentionally or not, that death is the choice 
and life is the obligation—suicide is an action and living is mere motion. In fact, this 
message is repeated over and over. It is the standard response to someone who is suicidal 
really. You can’t kill yourself because of the people around you. You have to be stuck 
with us. Keep confessing the untruth like the rest of us. 
It is more accurate to say that the film is like the article even if the article likely 
comes to the attentive viewer of the film second. It is perhaps even more accurate to say 
that both the article and the film are like the bridge. As Friend (2003) writes at the 
beginning of the second to last paragraph, “The bridge comes into the lives of all Bay 
Area residents sooner or later, and it often stays.” It is a bridge that moves and bends like 
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the Neutral, like death. It is a suspension bridge after all. Like our bodies, the bridge is a 
metaphor that the disconstituent possibly reads for clues. The Bridge’s narrative arc 
begins and ends with the story of Gene Sprague’s suicide. The center is held up by the 
story of Kevin Hines’ survival—a story also referenced in the article. Throughout the 
documentary, there are several other stories of suicides that are captured by the camera as 
well as incidents of successful interference. 
If Friend (2003) tips his hat in a particular direction, it may be in the sentence, 
“Survivors often regret their decision in midair, if not before.” This sentence leads off a 
discussion that includes Kevin Hines. Friend does use the term “survivors” and does not 
make the assumptive leap of suggesting all “jumpers” often feel this regret. Still, the 
sentence is a bit of an assumption in that only two survivors are directly linked to the 
sentiment. Hines is an interesting figure in the documentary as well. He enters the 
narrative at almost exactly the midway point and is, initially, a shift in the film towards 
making the choice to live. He enters after a series of comments on “choice” and an 
observation about love being the only thing that would have saved Gene Sprague. Hines 
opens with the confession, “The ideas of suicide, if I’m completely honest with myself, 
have been there for a long long time.” What does it mean, here, to be honest with 
oneself? This is a young man who attempted suicide by jumping off of the Golden Gate 
Bridge who has agreed to be interviewed in a documentary about suicide attempts like his 
own. He does not choose to be anonymous as a couple of other individuals in the film do. 
He seems to be very honest based on all of this evidence. Arguably, the answer lies 
somewhere in the way his father discusses Kevin’s bipolar suicidal reality of having to 
live between “brackets” because he cannot survive outside of them. In other words, 
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Kevin may very well have to stay within a particular bracketed area of the symbolic in 
order to stay alive, which is to directly attempt to repress certain honest thoughts that 
threaten to be real. His authorial subjectivity falls into a state of disconstituency and 
requires a strict adherence to the symbolic order of the social. But, repressed material 
returns in distorted ways. Here, the repressed suicidal ideation returns as the truth. 
Kevin continues, “But the real thought process of actually going to do it and 
commit the act started in ’99 when I cut my wrist.” It is an interesting statement. It can be 
read as the “real thought process” beginning in the year 1999 that resulted in him cutting 
his wrists, or it can be read as the “real thought process” beginning when he cut his wrist. 
For Hines, there is a clear difference between “the ideas of suicide” and “the real thought 
process” of suicide. It’s the difference between suicidal ideation and suicidality. The 
former is an authorial fantasy that maintains his desire, his will-to-live, only through its 
failure to be. And, subsequently, the latter is his disconstituent act that has been de-
authorized within his symbolic, or familial, identification. Like the bereaved, he tries on 
the shoes first, and he walks in them next. He talks about writing a series of suicide notes 
only to decide they were too “mean.” He ended up choosing to simply write something 
“nice” along the lines of “mom, you’re not always right” and “dad, stop being so mean.” 
Beyond advice for life, this nicer version seems to be an indictment. Another way of 
thinking about the shoe metaphor is that the disconstituent might try on the shoes of the 
constituent subject and even walk around in them. In the end, the disconstituent takes off 
our shoes. 
But, then, Hines is not someone who completed suicide; rather, he is someone 
who almost completed suicide and arguably de-completed suicide. While his act may be 
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considered disconstituent to a certain degree, the above sentiment in his note can easily 
be read as an attempt to violently participate in the symbolic order of things—to be a 
counter-identifying constituent subject. Earlier in the film, Richard Waters, a 
photographer who stopped a woman from jumping, described suicide as the “ultimate 
shortcut to the next level.” He also says that he’s “sure she wanted to be rescued,” in a 
way that seems to be reacting to his being “freaked out” by her looking at him while with 
authorities. Waters says, “I didn’t expect her to look back” as if the way she looked back 
did not fit his rescue narrative. Her stare defied the victory of his “third meaning” 
subjunctive contingency that really happened. He literally changed the photograph almost 
as it was happening. She undid his new subjective identity as hero with a simple look. In 
Hines’ story, Hines looked back as his “hands left the bar” in the way Waters wanted to 
see his disconstituent survivor. Hines thought, “I don’t want to die.” 
However, if Hines story is meant to be the “real” story, the one not told by family 
and friends, then it still misses the encounter. He describes his jump in a very present and 
moving way. As he says of the moment after the impact with the water, “I was awake, I 
was alive.” He describes the position of his body at the moment of the impact and how 
water filtered through his boots, but these are just guesses and the moment between life 
and death is just out of reach. This is most clear in the fact that the “something” that 
brushed against his leg was not a shark. He says, Years later I found out it wasn’t a shark, 
it was a seal.” The seal kept him from drowning. Hines concludes, “You cannot tell me it 
wasn’t God, because that’s what I believe.” My point is not to discount his version of the 
event. It is to simply observe that in this very real encounter, the encounter itself was still 
missed and requires both symbolism and imagination for it to be pieced back together. 
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There’s something about this spiritual shift that chips away at his narrative ethos. His 
credibility gets lost in his explicit demand for effacement. Unlike Barthes’ explanation of 
the myth that is read as fact, Hines’ “mask of meaning” shows itself too much. 
Right after this moment, the camera shows a guy who has been on a cell phone 
suddenly cross himself, as if at church, and jump. Hines says, “It’s funny, my family 
thinks I still haven’t learned my lesson, but the lesson was learned a long time ago.” 
Heartbreakingly, he says, “It’s hard when you keep messing up and no one in your family 
believes in you anymore and trusts you.” Its as if he needs to believe in God being 
present at his side because even his own family cannot believe in him. It’s not that they 
are necessarily evil or uncaring. As he notes, they are “always worried, walking on 
eggshells.” In another heartbreakingly honest confession, Hines tells the camera that he’s 
tired of this treatment and that he wants them to know that he’s “the same guy, just a 
different soul, different ideals” as if to suggest that he’s the one they used to imagine him 
to be and now he has finally adjusted his imagination of himself to fit that authorized 
subjectivity. He pauses and then concludes, “I just wanna be normal again, but I never 
will be.” He can only be corrected, not corrective. He has been de-authorized. 
This normative sentiment is a steady trickle throughout the documentary even as 
the documentary doesn’t quite fully become normative itself. The first voice we hear in 
the film is almost startling. It comes in just after the camera watches the first actual 
suicidal leap in the film and a kite surfer goes through the scene. The voice is the voice of 
the kite surfer, Chris Brown. His description of his reaction is a little confused as he says 
he went over “just to see or maybe possibly help.” But, anyone who has passed a wreck 
on the interstate knows what he means. Most people can also understand his normative 
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assumption that this “person was at the lowest of the low in their life obviously.” But, not 
everyone might understand why it’s an assumption that is also normative. 
Another suicide that is captured in the film is Lisa Smith’s. Her mother, Tara 
Harrell, and sister, Rachel Marker, tell her story. Her brother, Lyle, also tells some of it 
but primarily from a position that refuses to accept that she completed suicide. For him, it 
was some other kind of death. Her sister and mother have no doubt. The two women 
struggle to articulate a shared account without correcting one another. Whereas Marker 
describes her deceased daughter as “more angelic” than her siblings, Harrell points out 
that their father’s untimely death “didn’t make us [her and her brother] mentally ill.” Lisa 
was different. She was diagnosed with schizophrenia. This seems important to Lisa’s 
sister in particular. When the two women discuss the fact that Lisa’s teeth became so 
rotten that they all had to be removed, Harrell concludes that her sister “looked funny” 
and her mother notes, “That was a problem.” Harrell is not necessarily a horrible person. 
She’s simply making a diagnostic observation that leads to her mother’s addition—or 
edition. Harrell confesses that she always thought of herself as “the strong one,” but 
marvels at the strength Lisa must have had to jump. Her mother thinks “it was a relief.” 
The mother concludes their collective retelling with, “She’s in a better place.” Harrell 
adds, “You have to look at it that way.” As one watches this exchange, an important 
difference clearly emerges. For the brother and sister, the story tends to lead back to them 
in some way, whether it is what they have to believe or how they are different. Again, it 
is not a matter of being a horrible person. It is a defensive measure by siblings who are at 
a greater level of risk for poor health now. “If Lisa killed herself, maybe it is genetic” is a 
likely thought process that is repeated more often than they would care to admit. I am 
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familiar with this thought, and this defense. For the mother, though, it is always about 
Lisa—at least the Lisa she projects. My mother is the same way. In each case, however, 
their memory of Lisa and need for her redemption is a substitute for who Lisa actually 
was. Another family who happened to witness Lisa’s suicide recalls that just before she 
jumped, she turned towards them and she was laughing. 
Hines tells the camera about an interaction between him and his father the night 
before he jumped. The camera has that effect. He told his father, “I don’t want to hurt 
anybody anymore, I have to go away.” His father responds, “ You have an obligation to 
me who raised you, who’s given you everything you want. You have an obligation to 
your brother, your sister.” As Hines says of his dad, “he was mad the whole time.” I can 
attest to both my own anger at Kryn and my own belief that he must have been brave. I 
often need to believe that he is in a better place that possibly involves him looking over 
me. Of course, I know that these are my projections. They are normative representations 
of my will-to-possess. It is difficult to let the choice to die be his alone. Just as Lisa’s 
brother looks for someone else to blame, my family has done so as well. Friends of our 
family have shared clues with us, but those clues have faded into somewhere beside the 
point. Other people’s desire to offer a chance of order to the mystery of Kryn is 
disappointing gossip. It’s not that I don’t think they care about Kryn and us. What bothers 
me is that their attempts to claim to know something about his choice efface his being. 
But, then, I could say the same of my family and me. We retrospectively perform Hines’ 
dad’s demands. He is still a father. He must be a father. He must transmit the message of 
the father who remains a father. My heart breaks for my dad. While he is still a father, he 
also transmits what it is to no longer be the father of Kryn. 
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Shortly after Kevin Hines confesses his desire and failure to be “normal again,” 
an anonymous woman confessing her own suicidal desire explains, “It’s a destructive act 
but there’s a lot of rational thought that goes into an act that a lot of people, you know, 
just consider irrational.” While there is a normative association between mental illness 
and suicide in the documentary, there is also a narrative thread that is somewhat counter 
to that assumption. For instance, in Philip Manikow’s parents’ retelling of his suicide, 
mental illness is really a metaphor for his struggle with life. Wally Manikow, Philip’s 
father, seems particularly empathetic. As he describes Philip’s suicidal ideation and 
suicidality as a “cancer of the mind,” he acknowledges that, “some days you think like 
that yourself; he just thought about it everyday.” When Philip frequently asked him if he 
thought suicide was a sin, Wally answered, “that was something man made up” because 
Wally “didn’t want [Philip] to feel like he was in a cage inside of himself.” Wally 
explains, “he thought his body was a prison.” Philip’s body, it would see, was his 
metaphorical understanding of his life. But, perhaps his body was telling him the story of 
the social trap of conformation.  
Mary Manikow, Philip’s mother, suggests, “He had this idealistic view of things 
and when it didn’t meet his expectations, after a while, it was like what’s the point.” The 
symbolic representation of the imaginary idealism can, at the constituent level, be 
remarkably disappointing. But it is devastating to the will-to-live when one feels that one 
particularly fails at achieving these ideals. Wally remembers Philip lamenting, “If you 
and mom are having problems, then what hope is there for me.” There is a temptation to 
blame Wally and Mary for showing too much, for being too honest with their “troubled” 
son. Mary considers what other people might normatively think: “What kind of parents 
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were they?” she hypothetically posits. But then, she recounts a friend saying, “It’s not all 
about you.” Kryn wrote this down. It is a strange thing to struggle to accept really, to 
struggle to accept that someone’s suicide really may have had nothing to do with you. As 
Wally observes a little earlier in the documentary, “But he still had to make a choice,” the 
camera watches as a bird dives into the water. Why were we not a better option? 
If there is a “main character” in this documentary other than the bridge itself, it 
would likely be Gene Sprague. Four friends narrate his suicide from early in the 
documentary until the very end. Three of these friends appear to be peers of his in the 
sense of age. All three fall into a similar category as Lisa’s sister and brother in that their 
retelling tends to be more about themselves as they struggle with the reality of Gene’s 
suicide. His primary narrator, however, is a delightfully insightful older woman named 
Caroline Pressley. She is more akin to Philip’s father, Wally. She, in a matter of fact way, 
opens her regard of Gene stating, “It’s hard to define Gene as a person.” When she 
suggests that Gene was, “not of this world as we know it,” this otherworldliness doesn’t 
ring as imaginary and hopeful as Marker’s description of Lisa as “angelic” and “in a 
better place.” With Pressley, it sounds like an observation rather than a wish. She is 
observing a lost persona that she knew as a lost persona. She notes Gene’s obsession with 
the color black and posits, “It’s as if he wanted no contrasts.” Perhaps, this was Gene’s 
defense against stain of corrective division. Perhaps being a lost persona is too difficult 
for some disconstituents to bear contrast. Whereas his other friends pass judgment in their 
diagnostic review of his life, Pressley offers her opinion without blaming him for having 
done something wrong. She is not corrective in her regard.  
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Pressley also acknowledges Gene’s death as his “choice.” She says, “Gene’s 
choice, his preference, had been made years before.” She doesn’t grant him agency as an 
authorized subject; rather, she, as a constituent subject, regards his agency as a 
disconstituent. If Pressley passes judgment, one could see that happening towards Gene’s 
mother. She recounts a moment when Gene confessed his suicidal thinking to his mother. 
Here, Pressley claims that his mother responded by, “in essence,” saying, “I didn’t invest 
a lifetime in you to have you die on me […] you don’t have the right to do that.” At the 
halfway point in the film, just before Hines’s entrance, she argues, “Only love, really 
love, feeling like he was loved and in love was gonna save him.” While pondering 
genetics, Pressley goes on to say, “Who’s to say that wasn’t the reason his mother chose 
to have this child because she too was depressed and knew that she could keep herself 
here and functional if she had a commitment and how do we know that it wasn’t on some 
inner level that he perceived this very young?” Here, reproduction, the stench of me, is 
also casted as a form of demand for false confession. In each instance, Pressley doesn’t 
come across as judgmental, but there does textually seem to be some judgment—
interesting this judgment is pointed at the obligatory approach to making someone not 
kill themselves, whether it is Gene’s mother keeping him or herself from making that 
choice. 
After Gene’s mother died of cancer, Pressley knowingly asks Gene “to promise 
not to go without saying goodbye.” This seems to be a subtle tactic of hers to delay 
Gene’s future suicidal act. Later, when he calls to say goodbye, she again subtly forestalls 
his suicide by requesting that he leaves a note in a plastic bag so that she can find him. 
Perhaps, though, that’s just a specter’s desire. Pressley’s lack of judgment can also seem 
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detached and cold, like the camera, the article, and the consciousness that requires no 
more. I want her to be on my side because she doesn’t seem to fully take any side. But, 
then, that’s why I want to be on hers. I am something akin to happy for Gene when I 
think about Pressley. I still want to be happy for Kryn. Another anonymous woman tells 
the story of her friend’s suicide recalling him telling her, “I’m so ashamed to tell you that 
I’m thinking about doing this.” I want to erase that shame, that fear and anxiety. More 
than Kryn’s suicide, I want to erase the thought of that feeling he could no longer 
tolerate. But, that’s my thought. The anonymous woman told her friend, “You are not in 
the category of people who get to kill themselves.” Who authorized her? Did this de-
authorization of his interpretive being make him more ashamed? I understand this 
anonymous woman. I wish I could have said the same thing to Kryn and that this would 
have solved his mystery. Then, in her sage way, Pressley answers my desperate 
epistemologically authorized subjectivity with the following:  
I don’t know why people kill themselves. And, yet, it’s a small step to empathize, 
to say [pause] because I think we all experience moments of despair, that um, that 
it would be so much easier not to do this any more. But for most of us, the sun 
comes out. And, then, oh well, tomorrow’s another day. 
 
Sounding remarkably like Lacan, Pressley argues, “I don’t have any answers, just a 
bunch of observations and a bunch of experience of feeling disturbed about that 
situation.” She only offers what she has found even as the camera demands more. 
In the lead up to the end of the documentary, Steel makes a similar move to 
Friend’s. He tries to stabilize the bridge as a moving symbol. Various narrators both 
reject and reify the romantic poetry of the bridge. My poetic self understands this impulse 
to look for something lifelike in what is lifeless. In pretending to give something a life of 
its own, I validate my existence. Just before the camera shows Gene’s suicide from the 
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bridge to his impact, Pressley says, “Why he chose the bridge? I don’t know. Maybe 
there’s a certain amount of release from pain by pain. Maybe he just wanted to fly one 
time.” One can almost hear the prompt in her answer: “Why he chose the bridge?” I can 
hear Steel’s desire for the bridge to be meaningfully authorized, to capture the 
imagination of the suicidal. Yet, Pressley disregards that authorial desire to “control the 
wildness within.” In her regard as a constituent subject, she lets her Gene remain 
disconstituent. While she is able to think through Gene’s ideation, and recount the details 
of his adventure into the abyss, she does not need to take his shoes off because she never 
seemed to have had to try them on. It was never about her. In this way, one might 
understand the perspective from the standpoint of redemption as the faithful attempt to 
give ourselves up in order to fulfill the promise of our failed regard. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 As I stand back and think, the images have begun to fade. I find myself left with 
only failed interrogations, an absence of confession, and a regard that will never be 
recognized by those individuals I am regarding. Like the disconstituent persona, like the 
object that is reached towards and the organ that reaches towards it, my regard is lost as I 
adventure it out into these missed encounters. Three things occur to me in this lost regard 
that normally should be shocking but are not. First, by the last time that I watched The 
Bridge, I often didn’t notice when I saw someone die on camera. I would be looking 
something else up, writing something down on my pad, listening to the audio particulars, 
sipping a drink, and I would barely think about the fact that one of these individuals, for 
whom I planned out a type of care and to whom I promised my regard, just jumped again. 
On my laptop screen, they leapt as I watched my wife sleep. It was as if they became only 
dreams somewhere near the edge of her unconscious machinations. These conscious 
happenings lurk about all of our unconscious machinations. They are the margins of our 
imagined centrality. Second, I experienced levels of suicidal ideation that scared me. I 
always knew I wouldn’t actually leap. I was never in a state of suicidality, but that 
potential new subject position threatened me. I found myself needing to walk away from 
ledges, choosing to not drive somewhere, and generally trying to consciously distract 
myself. Walking around in these shoes is a risky adventure. In taking them off, I am left 
with bare feet and the possibility of trying on my old shoes or looking for a new pair. 
Third, there were many times that I stopped caring about my brother as I wrote about his 
suicide and suicide in general. I thought of him as only text just as my analysis suggested, 
and I found that ambivalent consciousness staring out from my body. And that regard met 
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Kryn’s image. Maybe this is an aspect of healing, “moving on,” but it feels like a betrayal 
to me. There are several choices that are presented by the disconstituent, and each choice 
is a transformation. I can identify and imitate the form presented in the situation, create 
new meanings within the old identifications, reject the entire situation, or remain as 
barefooted as possible and feel for others who are also lost. 
The presentation of suicide, meaning all that a suicide makes present, is a 
rhetorical situation that occurs to an audience within the interstices of day-to-day 
constitutive practices of identification. The audience’s regard is caught in a state of 
disconstituency—left with the permanence of absence, the fleetingness of presence, and a 
unique undoing of identification that also identifies the constituency of a people 
presented by suicide. The very formality of the rhetorical situation, which is the being of 
the rhetorical forms within a situation, falls away. In other words, the practiced repetition 
of formative identification cannot maintain its grip in such a way that acknowledges the 
clinging that has been at play all along. The redemptive regard is a delicate balance of 
losing one’s self in a consciously responsive and active way just enough to momentarily 
be a compassionate ambivalence. Instead of choosing to fall in the midst of a stumble, the 
subject allows itself to fall away in its regard of a disconstituent withdrawal. It doesn’t let 
the disconstituent go; rather, this regard mirrors the disconstituent’s withdrawal in such a 
way that leaves the disconstituent persona as a state of disconstituency without forcing 
order upon it. In this way, a new rhetorical situation may emerge in which the regarding 
subject no longer says goodbye to the disconstituent being regarded, but acknowledges 
itself to be an old formality which is also withdrawing into a new transformative 
adventure.  
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Elkins (1996) concludes, “Perhaps death can be seen after all, but these pictures 
express only the warning pressure that makes us turn away when we might be in danger 
of seeing it” (p. 116). Like him, “I am not sure what can be seen and what can’t, but I 
know that seeing is sometimes extremely difficult” and that there are times when “We 
have looked directly at the thing and have not seen it, or we have looked away and seen 
too much” (pp. 116-117). Looking at a dead body is not the same as looking at death. A 
dead body is far easier to put in the ground. A dead body is more easily transformed into 
a site of information and demonstration about itself. But to look at death is to look at 
what a dead body tells us about ourselves. And looking at a death by suicide is very 
different from looking at any other form of death, because it tells us things about 
ourselves that we repress more deeply than death. In their discussion of the power of still 
photography, unfolding disasters in general, and Barbie Zelizer’s “about-to-die” venture 
into the subjunctive voice of images, Robert Hariman and John Lucaites (2007) argue 
that the moment of contingent recognition “can be a moment of denial, or one in which 
one catch’s one’s breath to absorb an impending emotional blow, or a cue for reflection” 
(p. 276). Like the various iterations of constitutive rhetoric, Hariman and Lucaites are 
concerned with a civic responsibility. The images that they deem worthwhile are those of 
significance, images that operate as identification itself in a way that demands a 
confession. As they put it, the photographs that they choose to regard “are used to orient 
the individual within a context of collective identity, obligation, and power” (p. 1). In 
Hariman’s logic, their images are held in a higher regard. They are the pictures one 
should hold in high regard, because “They have more than documentary value, for they 
bear witness to something that exceeds words” (Hariman & Lucaites, p. 1). However, 
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their sentiment is still salient with this dissertation’s sense of regard. The regard outlined 
in this dissertation is one that does allow for a moment to catch “one’s breath” and accept 
the “cue for reflection” upon bearing a site/sight that “exceeds” the false confessions and 
demands of collective subjectivity. To regard the disconstituent is to allow yourself to be 
transformed into an audience member who attempts to redeem the promise of 
identification that you halve already failed to give. The images and experiences that this 
dissertation regards are ones that present one’s regard from a standpoint that begins as 
failure, and this dissertation resolutely admits this failure. 
Though they often overlap, making meaning and making sense are different 
productions. Meaning making is a demand for a specific order to things. Sense making is 
a type of outward reaching, a hopeful inquiry with regard to order. But, making sense is 
still an additional subjective step like making meaning. It is still the subject’s gaze and a 
way of forcing order because order is what it seeks regardless of what the subject finds. 
The subject clings to itself in its outward adventure instead of giving itself up in the 
gathering of regard. As such, all formality only appears to be lost because the repetition 
of either meaning making or sense making is another false interrogation and false 
confession that also necessarily repeats the trauma of disconstituency. This is, in itself, a 
form of seeking resolution that can only be found in its release. Another transformation 
can occur to the audience of suicide loss. A new rhetorical situation can be located in this 
regard, and accepting implication can reshape the direction of such a fall. 
In Chapter 1, the regard that is given to the disconstituent suicide was recognized 
as being one that is both stigmatized and stigmatizing. Suicide is seen as a betrayal that 
stains those who survive the loss within its wake. This understanding was first couched in 
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a consideration of “regard” and “regarding.” This dissertation was designed to attempt to 
regard without ranking, without marginalizing the individuals being regarded. Chapter 2 
suggested a resistance to identification by arguing that order is itself a type of disorder of 
subjective dis-ease for both constituent subjects and disconstituent individuals. The first 
two chapters were focused on answering the first research question: what does it mean to 
regard suicide from the standpoint of beginning as failure? By recalibrating what 
resistance might be in a psychoanalytically driven approach to constitutive rhetoric, the 
idea of the individual person becomes truly powerful because individual people are able 
to deeply alter others by their simple acts of no longer regarding me. Thus, the answer to 
the first question is that, in regarding suicide, the subject attempts to ascribe meaning as a 
way of deflecting its undoing. The impulse is to shut the regard down. Thus, to regard 
from the standpoint of beginning as failure is to have already failed before and after the 
initial encounter because the encounter is always already missed. But, the challenge is to 
cease demanding the false confession of meaningful being inherent in subjective 
identification. The analyst must attempt to let go of the subject. This will likely fail, but 
the attempt itself can be analyzed. More importantly, the attempt can be lived. 
The remaining chapters attempted to create this failed contingency through a 
vanishing methodology of regard that relinquishes the demand of and for meaning. 
Chapter 3 proposed a methodology of regard in which subjectivity is rethought as a series 
of formative vanishing points. Through the metaphorical use of the painting technique, 
the Freudian “primal horde,” and the mythic reading of the photographic subject, Chapter 
three forged the Rhetorical Structure of the Vanishing Subject to articulate the rhetorical 
nature of its regard as an individual journey into a deteriorating collective identification. 
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Chapters 4, 5, and 6 each presented exemplary artifacts to offer a contextualized analysis 
of the three points of subjective withdrawal. Chapter 4 analyzed the deterioration of the 
authorial logic of the subject into a state of disconstituency by regarding the suicide 
narrative of Blake-not-Kurt in Gus Van Sant’s (2005) Last Days. Chapter 5 
contextualized authorized subjects’ constitutive rhetoric that can also be read as 
disconstitutive rhetoric through two connected artifacts. First, the chapter focused its 
regard on the viewing of and reaction to the still photographs in Vice Magazine’s (2013) 
“Last Words” fashion spread with particular attention given to the depiction of Sylvia 
Plath. Second, the chapter focused on Sylvia Plath’s rearranged final collection of poetry. 
The two events mirrored each other in such a way that suggested constitutive rhetoric is 
disconstitutive rhetoric particularly when its corrective nature of false interrogation and 
confession become terminally exposed as false. In other words, the “last words” disrupted 
the doomed reading of their own suicides. Finally, Chapter 6 focused on constituent 
subjects’ relationships to disconstituent individuals in Eric Steel’s (2003) The Bridge to 
discover the possibility of an ambivalent regard that still feels for the disconstituent. This 
compassionate ambivalence is a way of framing a regard that forestalls judgment on 
those who are regarded while still taking in the possibility of implication that may be 
worked out on some level. It is Burke’s ambiguity of adaptation—somewhere between 
motion and action. It is a conscious body embracing its fall without the demand of 
recovery. 
Judith Butler (2005) concludes her ethical account of the loss of self with the idea 
that “we must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of 
unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before us, when our 
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willingness to become undone in relation to others constitutes our chance of becoming 
human” (p. 136). Butler’s argumentation and analysis is caught up in larger institutions 
and identifications of a you that may materialize like Edwin Black’s (1970) second 
persona. Her response in the subject that she sheds is one directed towards political 
action. She suggests,  “If we speak and try to give an account from this place, we will not 
be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be forgiven” (p. 136). This dissertation is 
not focused on those “larger” political institutions and it does not necessarily suggest any 
particular action beyond a way of being in the presence of something or someone that 
undoes the “smaller” institutions of the individual subject relating to another individual 
subject through me, us/we, and them. But, like Butler, this dissertation embraces 
unknowingness and the hope for forgiveness. Both Butler and I are after an awakening 
that hopefully inspires a human awakening whose end may very well unite the 
consciousness of individuals gathered together within a mutual regard for each other’s 
sense of the world. This is also the awakening that Caruth seems to cherish—an 
awakening regard that reties individuals together through the traumatic events that have 
broken their collective and individual certainty.  
 The awakening outlined here, however, is not necessarily a rainbow after a storm 
in the way that some might hope. In these pages, I encountered the overwhelming 
emptiness of missing my regard. The regard of the disconstituent and suicide is always 
already incomplete because such a standpoint is always waiting, held in abeyance, 
looking for punctuation, not quite understanding the interpellation that is never ending. 
What does a methodology to grapple with the implications of this failed regard look like? 
I am not sure because it is my regard that has failed and will continue to fail as long as I 
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remain committed to my self. There is something terrifying about the idea that nothing is 
missing. Researchers and practitioners of suicidology may very well want to revisit their 
systems of meaning making and sense making by way of also recalibrating resistance. 
The question is not how do we help people find meaning in order to move on and resist 
their own suicides. The question is how do we help people not make suicide mean 
anything other than another’s withdrawal from us. How do we stop clinging without 
necessarily letting go and rescinding our promise to take our regard seriously? How do 
we allow for redemption? 
 For Barthes (1981), the photograph becomes one of two possible adventures for 
the one who regards it: madness or tameness (pp. 117-119). To tame the photograph is to 
restore social order through it. The way of madness for Barthes, though, is the way of 
awakening which is also a social confrontation (p. 119). Mastery is an illusion. In 
regarding suicide, resolution is another form of illusory mastery. These endings will 
always be elliptical and caught in the subjunctive hopes of a third meaning. But, this does 
not have to mean that there is no possibility of catharsis. Burke (1966), in his 
consideration of Goethe, argues that catharsis for a “symbol-using animal” can simply be 
a matter of “getting something said” (p.159). In allowing oneself to confess to the falling 
away of one’s authorial, symbolic, and constituent subjectivity in a state of 
disconstituency that reveals one’s own disconstitutive rhetoric in the presentation of the 
disconstituent persona, one’s regard can become the new rhetorical situation of cathartic 
redemption. However, this redemption is not what it may seem to be. We do sacrifice 
others for us, and we are individually and collectively sacrificed for similar purposes. 
But, sometimes there is no sacrifice at all, even if a god does not stay your hand. 
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Sometimes, there is only a death that tells you things about yourself that you do not wish 
to hear. The one telling you what you do not want to hear is you. Thus, the available 
catharsis is writing down or speaking out loud those things that you have begun to tell 
yourself in order to withdraw your own false confession, at least temporarily, within your 
own regard. This is a rhetorical regard and transformation worth sharing. It is a way in 
which a new form of disconstitutive rhetoric can become a practice of opening up new 
possibilities of constituency. 
 Another way of framing the offerings of this dissertation is through a 
disconstituent regard rather than a redemptive catharsis. A disconstituent regard is one 
that allows the subject to fall away on both ends of the regard. In other words, it is 
another way of conceiving of the same twin vanishing points that perform the illusion of 
convergence within a symbolic practice. As in this dissertation regarding suicidal 
representations, such a regard actively seeks out the practices of subjective contour 
completion to expose the terrain that has been knitted together to complete the illusions 
of constituency. Once again, the disconstituent is not limited to literal suicidality. 
Disconstituent practices, or disconstitutive rhetoric, are any practices that undo 
constituencies through the creation of states of disconstituency within constituent regards. 
Humans, as symbol-using animals, want to tell stories about being together that forge 
togetherness. These stories typically make sense and have clear climaxes and resolutions 
that signify our collective being. The disconstituent undoes that redemptive meaning 
making and demonstrative sense making. The promise of becoming whole, of becoming a 
complete life, is forsaken in the disconstituent narrative. Completion is too abrupt and too 
disturbing in these cases and is read as incomplete because the resolution is unknowable 
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for those who most desperately seek it. To listen to such a story with the hopes of 
learning something can be a shattering experience when what is learned seems to only be 
self-destructive. But, in becoming lost oneself, there is the hope of finding new ways of 
being together. To realize that everyday practices of inclusion are often as violently 
assumed as our everyday practices of division can suggest an approach to others whom 
we regard as our fellow human beings that is given far more care.  
 Rhetoric has challenged what is unspeakable since at least Gorgias defended 
Helen of Troy. If there is a resistance that all rhetoricians should hold dear, it may be the 
resistance to what cannot be spoken. The analysis of this dissertation reveals the 
disconstituent story. The disconstituent story is one that we, as ultimately unknowable 
subjects, tell to the unknowable and unspeakable within us. These stories are a variation 
of the “closet speech” in which we tell stories to our own individual closets. Our stories 
are the continuing stories of Babel’s fall, and Babel is still falling. Of course, humans 
invented Babel and its fall to stand in for our own sense of space. We fill space with our 
own rhetorical performances of our own prosopopoeia. We stand in for the space in 
which we find ourselves. It is easy to skip over Burke’s (1966) third clause of his 
“definition of man”: “separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own 
making” (p. 13). But, it is in this clause that Burke most clearly explains how humans use 
tools through their use of symbolism to make the natural unnatural and the unnatural 
natural (pp. 13-16). The disconstituent narrative undoes our tools of repression instantly 
and over time, but this undoing does not have to be re-solved in order to keep speaking its 
truth. 
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I struggled for many years with my father’s priestly faith. The weight of Kryn’s 
suicide was too much for my faith in my father’s religion. As I spiritually broke apart in 
my adventure of self-destructive choices, I came upon Kwan Yin, the feminine aspect of 
Buddha. Her story struck me as remarkably akin to the Christ story to which both of my 
parents cling in their nocturne. Kwan Yin did not precisely bring Christ back into my 
heart, but she did bring my parents’ Christ back into my heart. An image of her is 
tattooed on my arm as a reminder of that moment when I realized there was hope for 
redemption for my family, that there was hope that we could be truly forgiven by 
ourselves. 
 Kwan Yin, also spelled “Kuan Yin,” is the female manifestation of 
Avalokitesvara, the Buddhist deity of mercy and compassion (Chamberlayne, 1962, pp. 
45-46). Her name translates into “she who hears the sounds (prayers) of mortals” or “she 
who looks down upon the world and hears its cries” (Chamberlayne, p. 47). There are 
various tales of her appearance, but most trace back to the legend of the princess, Miao-
shan, who refused to participate in her father’s courtly dictates of behavior and marriage. 
Instead, she chose the life of Buddhist devotion. Her father had her executed for her 
disobedience. Like Christ, she was resurrected, and, in her return, she forgave her 
father—even saving his life (Chamberlayne, p. 49). There are other variations on her tale 
and her execution, but she is always understood as a Bodhisattva, which is an aspect of 
Buddha who has awakened but remains in earthly form to help those who continue to 
mortally suffer. Redemption is not about waking the consciousness of others up. That is 
an arrogant assumption and deception caught up in another round of false interrogation 
and confession. The Zen master backs away and let’s the beautiful butterfly dream. 
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Redemption is the hope that when and if people around you wake up, you will be able to 
forgive them. It is also knowing that I have fallen asleep again and forgiving myself 
again. It is being forgiven by myself for the moments that I turned away, when I was not 
ready to give my regard. I forgive you. 
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